Reflexivity in the international system : international institutions and state strategies. by Harrison, Ewan
                          
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been





Reflexivity in the international system : international institutions and state strategies.
General rights
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author, unless otherwise identified in the body of the thesis, and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. It is permitted to use and duplicate this work only for personal and non-
commercial research, study or criticism/review. You must obtain prior written consent from the author for any other use. It is not permitted to
supply the whole or part of this thesis to any other person or to post the same on any website or other online location without the prior written
consent of the author.
Take down policy
Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to it having been deposited in Explore Bristol Research.
However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you believe is unlawful e.g. breaches copyright, (either yours or that of a third
party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation,
libel, then please contact: open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline of the nature of the complaint
On receipt of your message the Open Access team will immediately investigate your claim, make an initial judgement of the validity of the
claim, and withdraw the item in question from public view.
Reflexivity In The International System: 
International Institutions And State Strategies 1989-1999 
Ewan Harrison 
A dissertation submitted to the University Of Bristol in accordance with the 
requirements of the degree of Doctor Of Philosophy in the Department of 
Politics, Faculty of Social Sciences. 
October 1999 





The thesis uses the theoretical frameworks provided by neorealism, 
institutionalism and liberalism to examine the patterns of behaviour in the 
international system over the first ten years of the post Cold War period. The 
case studies examined are the state strategies of Germany, Japan and China 
since 1989, which have been identified by neorealists as key states in the 
emerging structure of international politics. The thesis examines these cases to 
generalise about the overall trajectory of international change in the post Cold 
War period. It explores the view that a liberal theory of international politics 
adopts a reflexive logic focusing on processes of state identity construction and 
socialisation within the international system. This contrasts with rationalist 
approaches which make assumptions about the basis of state behaviour that 
exogenise the influence of units' characteristics on the determination of outcomes 
at a systemic level. The term reflexivity is used to capture the interaction between 
units and structure which is central to a liberal model of socialisation. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, a critical mass of liberal states has been reached in 
the international system. As a consequence, the democratic peace has begun to 
generate powerful socialisation effects because the structure of interaction within 
the international system as a whole is overwhelmingly dominated by the liberal 
core. The system has come to embody high levels of reflexivity as the socialisation 
effects generated by the liberal core encourage states at the margins of change to 
adopt shifts in their underlying identity, a process which in turn feeds back into 
the properties of the system. Contrary to both neorealism and institutionalism, 
and in line with liberal predictions, the prospects for peaceful change in the 
global international system are high, even in a region such as East Asia where 
patterns of interdependence between states are poorly developed. 
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The recent collapse of the Soviet Union has provided an historic opportunity to 
examine how key states respond to large scale change in the international system. 
Between the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the aborted August 
coup that preceded the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international system 
witnessed the disintegration of the bipolar structure of military power which had 
characterised the post 1945 international order. Few, including the majority of 
International Relations scholars, can claim to have anticipated the changes that took 
place in the international system over this period. Furthermore, the global `systemic 
shock' provided by the demise of the bipolar Cold War international order provides a 
unique context within which to test and refine competing theories of international 
relations. For these reasons, the end of the Cold War has opened up questions about 
the overall nature of international change at the close of the twentieth century. This 
thesis aims to utilise the `real world laboratory' provided by the end of the Cold War 
to assess the `neo' or structural realist, institutionalist and liberal models of the 
international system. Since 1989, the preconditions necessary for each of these 
theories to make a discrete set of predictions about the overall nature of post Cold 
War change have been present. In line with the neorealist model, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union has brought about a major shift in the distribution of military 
capabilities between states. In line with the institutionalist model, there are significant 
variations in patterns of interdependence across the global international system. In line 
with the liberal model, since 1989 the international system has witnessed the 
historically unprecedented emergence of a core of formally liberal democratic states at 
a global level. Moreover, a decade has now passed since the end of the bipolar Cold 
War order. States have been provided with a prolonged period in which to respond to 
the dramatic changes which began to take place in the late 1980's. If the behaviour of 
states is indeed significantly affected by the environment within which they interact 
with others, the incentives and constraints generated by the system within which they 
operate ought to be beginning to exert their influence on patterns of behaviour and 
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outcomes observed. Using the opportunity presented by the close of the first ten years 
of the post Cold War period, this thesis examines how Germany, Japan and China 
have responded to the changes which have taken place in the international system 
since the end of the Cold War. By applying general theories of international relations 
to examining the state strategies of these major powers between 1989 and 1999, the 
aim of this thesis is to identify the overall nature of change in the international system 
after the Cold War. 
In applying theories of the international system to understanding the state strategies of 
major powers in the post-Cold War period, this thesis follows the model set out by 
two collaborative research projects carried out at Harvard University during the 
1990s. The first is the Keohane et al edited volume After The Cold War: International 
Institutions And State Strategies In Europe 1989-1991 (Keohane et al, 1993). This 
book, published shortly after the dramatic developments of the late 1980's and early 
1990s, examines how international institutions and state strategies affected one 
another in Europe in the immediate post-Cold War period. In particular, Part I of the 
study examines how the United States and the major European powers used 
international institutions in adjusting to the changes taking place in the international 
system at the time. The book uses its findings to draw conclusions about the relative 
merits of the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system 
in explaining patterns of international behaviour and outcomes during this critical 
period of transition. The second book upon which this thesis is modelled is the more 
recent Unipolar Politics: Realism And State Strategies After The Cold War, edited by 
Kapstein and Mastanduno (Kapstein and Mastanduno, 1999). This book differs from 
the Keohane et al volume in two important ways. First, it examines realist theories on 
international relations, rather than engaging in debates across competing schools of 
thought in international relations theory. Hence it focuses primarily on the strategies 
of the major powers in the international system, rather than on the nexus between 
international institutions and state strategies. Second, it examines post Cold War state 
strategies at the level of the global international system, rather than focusing purely on 
a European context. As with the Keohane et al project, this thesis engages in 
evaluation of competing theoretical paradigms. It therefore focuses on the nexus 
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between international institutions and state strategies, rather than solely upon state 
strategies. As with the Kapstein and Mastanduno project, this thesis examines state 
strategies at the level of the global international system. Nevertheless, this thesis 
shares an underlying commonality with both the Keohane et al and the Kapstein and 
Mastanduno books in as much as it explicitly uses theories of international relations as 
frameworks to analyse how major states have responded to the changes which have 
taken place in the international system since 1989. 
In order to provide shared points of reference with the two research projects 
discussed, this thesis adopts definitions of key terms compatible with their use in 
these studies. In particular, the definitions of the terms `the end of the Cold War', 
`state strategies' and `international institutions' are compatible with the use of these 
terms made by the contributors to both these books. Following Keohane et al, the 
term "the end of the Cold War" refers to the withdrawal of Soviet military power from 
central Europe, and to the reunification of Germany which resulted directly from this 
(Keohane et al, 1993: 1-2). The end of the Cold War is therefore viewed as 
significantly predating the formal collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, referring 
to the period from 1989 onwards in which the disintegration of the bipolar distribution 
of military power became clearly apparent at the level of the global international 
system. The term `state strategies' conventionally refers to the ways in which states 
deploy the material and diplomatic resources available to them in order to achieve 
security and maximise their welfare within the international system. The term is 
utilised in order to capture the general foreign policy orientation of key states in the 
international system. Following the pattern set out in both the Keohane et al and 
Kapstein and Mastanduno projects, this thesis focuses on the grand strategies of key 
states in the international system, rather than examining in detail any particular aspect 
of their foreign policies over the 1990s. Finally, `international institutions' are 
understood as sets of principles, norms, rules and operating procedures around which 
states orient their expectations within the international system. This follows the 
conventional and widely accepted definition of an international regime established by 
Krasner (Krasner, 1983: 2). It is important to recognise that this provides a broad 
definition of what constitutes an international institution, encompassing both formal 
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and informal aspects of the institutionalisation of state behaviour. Thus, state 
behaviour need not be formally institutionalised for it to reflect reciprocally 
recognised rules of conduct. 
The general aim of this thesis is to investigate the overall nature of change in the post- 
Cold War international system. So it is necessary to specify the precise terms in which 
this change is to be measured. The `overall nature of change' in the international 
system is defined in terms of variation along three inter-related dimensions, each of 
which are derived logically from the general theories to be utilised. Each of the three 
theories to be analysed generates radically different predictions about: 1) the key 
variable affecting state behaviour; 2) the levels and type of institutionalisation which 
will take place between states; 3) the sources of `power' for states in the post Cold 
War international system. By examining patterns of international behaviour and 
outcomes along each of these three dimensions, it is possible to make general 
statements about the trajectory of international change since 1989. Following 
Kapstein and Mastanduno, the purpose of analysing the overall nature of international 
change is both empirical and theoretical (Kapstein and Mastanduno, 1999: 1-2). At an 
empirical level, the thesis aims to analyse the grand strategies of important actors in 
the emerging international order, and account for how they have adjusted to the end of 
the Cold War. At a theoretical level, the thesis aims to examine whether it is possible 
to make any general statements about the patterns of behaviour observed in the post 
Cold War international system. In so doing, the thesis aims to contribute to the 
assessment of competing theoretical paradigms, and draw provisional conclusions 
about the future direction of change as the international system enters the twenty first 
century. 
Having outlined the general nature, scope and purpose of the project to be engaged in, 
the remainder of this introduction addresses two issues. First, it examines the 
theoretical foundations of the thesis, and introduces the concept of `reflexivity' to the 
study of international relations. The second section of the introduction deals with 
more technical issues relating to aspects of research design. 
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Section 1: Theoretical Foundations 
This section of the introduction outlines the theoretical framework to be adopted by 
the thesis by providing a brief summary of the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal 
models of the international system. The centrality of the concept of reflexivity to the 
liberal model of the international system is emphasised. It then develops a more 
general discussion of the concepts of `reflexivity' and `reflexive modernisation', and 
how they might be useful for international relations theorists interested in charting the 
overall trajectory of change in the post-Cold War international system. 
Theoretical Framework 
This thesis takes an overtly theoretical approach to the study of international relations 
after the Cold War. It aims to be clear about the theoretical assumptions underpinning 
its analysis, and to apply these to answering a substantive research question about the 
overall nature of change in the post Cold War international system. The promise of 
adopting a theoretical approach to the study of international relations is that it aspires 
to move beyond a purely descriptive analysis by offering generalisable explanations 
of recurrent patterns of international behaviour and outcomes (Waltz, 1979). 
However, following Keohane et al the thesis recognises that existing theories of 
international relations are too imprecisely specified to permit the rigorous testing of 
hypotheses in the context of the emerging post Cold War international order 
(Keohane, et al, 1993: 7). It therefore adopts Keohane et al's prescription of using 
international relations theories to help devise frameworks for the construction of more 
sophisticated empirical investigations (Keohane et al, 1993: 7). The purpose of the 
thesis is therefore largely descriptive and documentary, the aim being to collect, 
collate and present information on the nature of change in the post Cold War 
international system. Nevertheless, the analysis presented is explicitly structured by 
theoretical frameworks which have emerged in the professional academic study of 
international relations over the 1980's and 1990s. Indeed, the extent to which the 
descriptive and documentary evidence collated and presented in this study is useful in 
providing a provisional account of the nature of change in the emerging post Cold 
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War international system will itself be a litmus test of the value of adopting an overtly 
theoretical approach to the study of international processes. 
Following the procedure adopted by Keohane et al, this thesis is informed by 
structural or neo-realist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system 
(Keohane et al, 1993: 3-6). A full account of the three models of the international 
system to be utilised is presented in the theoretical chapter of this thesis. However, in 
order to clarify the parameters of the research project being undertaken, a preliminary 
account of their central claims is required. The structural or neorealist model stresses 
the importance of the polarity of the international system for determining patterns of 
international behaviour and outcomes. Neorealism posits that, given the anarchic 
character of the international system, defined in terms of the absence of a central 
organising political authority, states must make provisions for their own defence in 
order to provide for their security. However, in so doing they unintentionally make 
other states insecure, and thereby establish a security dilemma. The overall result is 
that the international system tends towards recurrent formations of balances of power, 
defined as a condition in which no one state can further increase its existing 
capabilities. The key explanatory variable highlighted by the neorealist model is 
therefore the structure of the international system, defined in terms of its anarchic 
organisation and the distribution of capabilities between states. Indeed, it is the 
parsimonious, structural explanation of patterns of behaviour and outcomes it offers 
which distinguishes the neorealist model of the international system from `classical' 
realist perspectives which focus their account of international politics on human 
nature or the nature of states. Given the security dilemma faced by states, neorealist 
theory anticipates that patterns of institutionalised activity in the international system 
will be of a relatively limited nature, and will occur within the constraints provided by 
the international structure. Any rule patterned behaviour which does occur will be 
predominately organised around the tendency of the system as a whole towards a 
balance of power equilibrium. The sources of power for states under these 
circumstances will be the relative gains they can make in their material capabilities 
with respect to other units in the system. 
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The institutionalist model focuses on the configuration of information and institutions 
for the determination of patterns of behaviour and outcomes within the international 
system. Institutionalism asserts that, even in the absence of` a central organising 
authority in the international system, institutionalised activity between states is 
possible under certain conditions. Where complex patterns of interdependence among 
actors are well developed and states engage in ongoing interactions, international 
institutions can take on instrumental value to states in maximising their security and 
welfare. By providing forums which reduce the costs of undertaking diplomatic 
negotiations, reducing uncertainly and shaping states' expectations, international 
institutions can facilitate the emergence of co-operation between states. By focusing 
on the configuration of information and institutions in determining international 
behaviour and outcomes, the institutionalist model focuses on system process. Process 
refers to allocative and bargaining behaviour which occurs within the power structure 
provided by the distribution of capabilities among actors. Given the potential for 
process level variables to facilitate the emergence of co-operative patterns of 
behaviour between states in the international system, institutionalist theory anticipates 
that state behaviour can become institutionalised around limited forms of reciprocity 
organised on the basis of tit-for-tat exchanges. Under such circumstances, the 
prominent source of power for states will become the mutual (or absolute) gains they 
can make from their interactions. 
Both neorealist and institutionalist models of the international system exogenise the 
domestic political characteristics of states from the account of the systemic 
determination of behaviour. By contrast the liberal model stresses the reflexive 
interaction between domestic politics and international relations. In contrast to the 
neorealist focus on structure and the institutionalist focus on process, a liberal model 
of international relations therefore stresses the importance of the reflexive component 
of system organisation. States' political preferences, which reflect an underlying 
identity derived from sets of domestic political values and ideas, economic interests 
and political institutions, play a crucial role in the liberal model. In particular, liberal 
democracies behave differently towards one another than do authoritarian states in the 
sense that they rarely or never fight wars against one another. This is because liberal 
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states are unique in their ability to trust one another about their underlying strategic 
intentions in an anarchic context. A liberal model is therefore more optimistic about 
the level and type of institutionalisation which can occur in the international system. 
When there is a significant convergence of liberal preferences, the liberal model 
anticipates comparatively high levels of international co-operation between formally 
democratic states, and the diffuse practice of reciprocity. 
It is important to recognise that, in the liberal model, a strong convergence of liberal 
state preferences affects not only relations within the core of formally liberal 
democratic states, but also relations between liberal and non-liberal states at the 
margins of change in the system. This is because it is the configuration of state 
preferences which is the key explanatory variable in liberal theory. In particular, once 
a critical mass of formally liberal states exists, it changes the patterns of interaction 
which occur within the international system as a whole. In consequence, formally 
non-liberal states at the margins of change in the system come under intense systemic 
pressures to adopt changes in their underlying political identity which will allow them 
to conduct their relations with the core on terms compatible with the democratic 
peace. By implication, liberalism develops a distinctive view of the sources of power 
for states in the international system, at least when the system as a whole is in the late 
stages of development. Once a stable core of formally liberal states exists within the 
international system, the predominant source of power for states will be to sustain the 
trust of others by transparently conveying a benign set of intentions towards them. 
This will enable states to develop deeply institutionalised ties with states in the 
dominant core. However, it also requires them to become socialised to the dominant 
norms and rules of the liberal international system. Thus it is important to recognise 
that liberal theory's stress on the configuration of state preferences as the key variable 
determining state behaviour which allows it to develop a distinctive account of state 
identity construction and socialisation within the international system. 
The term reflexivity is used to capture the distinctive patterns of interaction between 
units which are central to a liberal model of socialisation. Specifically, it captures the 
dynamics of interaction between states under the particular circumstances associated 
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with the emergence of a critical mass of formally liberal democratic states at the core 
of the international system. Liberalism suggests that after the emergence of a liberal 
core, states achieve high levels of autonomy of action in the sense that the political 
preferences they articulate become chronically influential in changing patterns of 
behaviour at a systemic level. It is important to recognise that this does not necessarily 
ensure that states adopt a formally liberal democratic identity or express preferences 
compatible with the democratic peace. Indeed, particularly at the margins of change in 
the international system, the articulation of non-liberal preferences is compatible with 
the predictions of the liberal model and is even to be expected. The most important 
feature of the international system is not necessarily that individual states articulate 
formally liberal preferences, but that the configuration of preferences is dominated 
overwhelmingly by the liberal core. However, it is equally important to recognise that 
an international system in which states have acquired a high degree of autonomy of 
action itself takes on properties which are historically distinctive. The characteristic 
patterns of interaction generated by the liberal core develops powerful socialisation 
effects. At the margins of change, states which persistently articulate non-liberal 
preferences are likely to come under intense systemic pressures to adopt changes in 
their political identity. In turn, these shifts generate positive feedback which 
reinforces the liberal configuration of preferences in the core. The term reflexivity is 
used to capture the way in which the liberal model suggests that with the emergence 
of critical mass of liberal states, units acquire high levels of autonomy of action in the 
international system, a process which in turn reinforces the overall trajectory of 
systemic change in a historically distinctive fashion. 
The significance of the concept of reflexivity for the development of a liberal theory 
of international relations has not been widely recognised within the discipline of 
international relations. There are two plausible reasons why this might be the case. 
First, liberal theory has been under-developed. Most of the theoretical debates which 
have occurred over systemic theorising within the discipline of international relations 
over the 1980's and 1990s have been between neorealists and institutionalists. 
Probably the most significant attempt to account for the effect of liberal state 
preferences on international behaviour and outcomes has emerged in the literature on 
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the democratic peace. However, by focusing on the debate over whether or not 
democratic states are more peaceful in their relations with other democratic states, this 
literature has underestimated the significance of a convergence of liberal state 
preferences for patterns of interaction which occur within the system as a whole. In 
consequence, it has overlooked the way in which the emergence of a critical mass of 
liberal states in the international system may generate an effect which is worth more 
than the sum of its individual parts. Second, most of the theoretical literature which 
has emerged within the discipline of international relations over the 1980's and 1990s 
has been avowedly rational in its orientation. Rational approaches exogenise questions 
about the underlying identity of actors. States' conceptions of their `interests' are 
given by assumption. By contrast, liberalism posits a theory of identity construction 
and socialisation within the international system. This presupposes that states are 
capable of behaving reflexively in relation to the complex environments within which 
they operate. That is to say, it presupposes that states are capable of internalising 
patterns of behaviour and deploying this understanding knowledgeably in contexts of 
action. In combination, the underdeveloped nature of liberal theory combined with the 
rationalist orientation of much of the theoretical literature has ensured that the avenues 
of enquiry opened by the concept of reflexivity have remained largely unexplored by 
the discipline of international relations. 
However, the concept of reflexivity has been increasingly influential in the social 
sciences as a whole during the 1980's and 1990s. In particular, it has been developed 
by the prominent social theorist and sociologist Anthony Giddens. Giddens' work has 
been indirectly influential in the discipline of international relations through his work 
on the so called `agent-structure problem' in social theory. In the late 1980's and early 
1990s, the international relations theorists Alexander Wendt and David Dessler drew 
upon Giddens' research into the so called agent-structure problem to open up 
fundamental theoretical questions about the constitution of the international system 
(Wendt, 1987; Wendt 1992; Dessler, 1989). The ideas generated by Wendt and 
Dessler have become enormously influential within the discipline of International 
Relations over the 1990s, providing the theoretical foundations for the emergence of a 
`constructivist' school of thought within the discipline. Constructivism emphasises the 
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socially constructed and historically contingent nature of patterns of behaviour within 
the international system, and stresses the importance of state identity for patterns of 
behaviour and outcomes observed within it. The criticism is often made of the 
constructivist literature that it has ultimately failed to resolve the problems about the 
overall nature of change in the international system which it has opened up (Keohane, 
1989: 170-174; Keohane, 1996: 472-473). ' More specifically, it has failed to identify 
the precise historical conditions under which states' domestic political characteristics 
can play a significant role in influencing the properties of the international system as a 
whole. In attempting to address this issue, Wendt and other constructivists have 
tended to move away from their initial interest in Giddens' writings. However, it is 
perhaps surprising that constructivists such as Wendt and Dessler have so far failed to 
consult Giddens' own writings on the historical development of the nation-state in the 
international system, and more generally the broader sociology of modernity within 
which he situates this account. In the attempt to move beyond the limitations faced by 
the constructivist literature, this thesis has returned to draw further inspiration from 
Giddens' sociology, and in particular his discussion of reflexivity and reflexive 
modernisation. 
Reflexivity, Reflexive Modernisation 
Anthony Giddens is both a social theorist and a sociologist. Both strands of his work 
are interconnected, and both engage with the concept of reflexivity. Giddens' writings 
as a social theorist encompass the early stage of his career. During this period, he 
examined the so called agent-structure problem in social theory, and in so doing 
identified what he refers to as `reflexive monitoring of action' as a general feature of 
human social conduct. Giddens writings as a sociologist have occupied his attention in 
the more recent phase of his career. They have examined the sociology of modernity, 
and deal with reflexivity as a historically specific feature of modem forms of social 
organisation. The two strands of Giddens' thought are closely related in as much as he 
is careful to stress that the reflexivity of modernity presupposes the reflexive 
'It is important to recognise that not all constructivists regard themselves as liberals. However, there 
are significant affinities between the liberal and the constructivist models which are highlighted in the 
account of the liberal model provided in the theoretical chapter of this thesis. 
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monitoring of action as a more encompassing feature of human social- conduct. Thus 
Giddens has developed his sociology of modernity on the theoretical foundations 
provided by his more general approach to social theory. 
The `agent-structure problem' is a theoretical issue which is of central concern across 
the social sciences. It refers to the way in which established forms of social analysis 
have tended towards, one of two poles. On the one hand, structural forms of analysis 
focus upon various kinds of social totality; on the other hand, interpretative 
approaches focus upon the role of the individual actor. Giddens aims at a synthesis of 
these incompatible approaches through the elaboration of what he refers to as 
structuration theory. According to structuration theory, "(t)he basic domain for study 
of the social sciences, ... is neither the experience of the 
individual actor, nor the 
existence of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across time and 
space" (Giddens, 1984: 2). Thus the fundamental unit of analysis for structuration 
theory is neither any form of social structure, nor individual action but rather social 
practices. Social practices refer to how social activity is `carried on' as a continuous 
and ongoing flow of conduct. Social structure and individual action, far from being 
mutually exclusive categories of social analysis, necessarily presuppose one another, 
both logically and as they are carried out in day to day routines. Alternatively phrased, 
social structure and action are both part of a much deeper and more fundamental 
ordering of social relations across time and space. 
Giddens uses these ideas to develop a distinctive approach to both action and structure 
in social theory. He identifies the reflexive monitoring of action as the most distinctive 
feature of human social conduct. The reflexive monitoring of action refers to the idea 
that "actors not only monitor the continuous flow of their activities and expect others 
to do the same for their own; they also routinely monitor aspects, social and physical, 
of the contexts in which they move" (Giddens, 1984: 5). To Giddens, this aspect of 
human agency represents a "chronic feature of everyday action" - an inescapable 
quality of human social conduct (Giddens, 1984: 5). Giddens therefore portrays social 
agents as competent, skilled and knowledgeable, even in the most taken for granted 
routines of social life. Importantly, he does not assume that social agents are 
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necessarily `rational' in the sense that they attempt to maximise their expected utility 
from patterns of social interaction. Actors can behave in ways which are skilled, 
competent and knowledgeable, but which fail to `utility maximise'. Giddens 
illustrates this point though a discussion of `slips of the tongue'. He notes that the 
very fact that agents acknowledge and deal with such slips as errors reveals not only 
the degree to which by and large actors are aware of what they are doing and why they 
are doing it, but also their great skill at coping with them by compensating for them 
appropriately (Giddens, 1984: 93-104). This is not, of course, to make the claim that 
all actors will necessarily survive in particular social systems. Unintended 
consequences of interaction may, under some circumstances, severely punish some 
types of behaviour. Nevertheless, to Giddens, `rationality' is not the defining quality 
of human action. Rather it is the ability of social agents to act in purposive and 
meaningful ways, and it is this sense in which he incorporates the insights of 
interpretative approaches to social theory (Giddens, 1984: 2). 
Giddens also uses structuration theory to approach the notion of social structure. He 
notes that `structure' is conventionally conceived of as an arrangement of material 
resources which provides an external constraint on the free initiative of the human 
agent (Giddens, 1984: 16). Within structuration theory, however, structure is 
considered as a set of rules and resources which are continuously and recursively 
implicated in the reproduction of social practices (Giddens, 1984: 17). `Resources' 
refer to underlying forms of material capability available to actors. `Rules' refer to 
"generalisable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices" 
(Giddens, 1984: 21). To follow a social rule is to know how to `go on' in social life. 
Structures are therefore not conceptualised in terms of an external constraint on actors, 
but are internal to them and are reproduced only through their knowledgeability. 
Giddens also develops the related notion of `the duality of structure'. This expresses 
the idea that structure is "always both constraining and enabling" (Giddens, 1984: 25). 
It is important to recognise that this is a statement about the logical relationship 
between structure and action, and not a statement about concrete social circumstances. 
It represents the idea that structure is recursively drawn into social action, thus 
permitting `action' to take place in any meaningful sense. It does not, Giddens is 
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careful to emphasise, "prevent the structured properties of social systems from 
stretching away ... beyond the control, of any 
individual actors" (Giddens, 1984: 25). 
Nevertheless, such a view of structure does imply that social practices are continually 
open to potential transformation by the actors which constitute them. Thus to analyse 
the structuration of social systems is to examine the conditions governing the ongoing 
flow of social interaction (Giddens, 1984: 25). 
In his more recent writings, Giddens has shifted his focus from the level of social 
theory to the analysis of social dynamics under particular historical circumstances. 
More specifically, Giddens has attempted to pin down the nature of modernity as a 
distinctive type of social organisation. He has developed this approach in the attempt 
to move beyond the limitations bequeathed to sociology by Marx, Durkheim and 
Weber. According to Giddens, the classical sociologists all suffered from the tendency 
to see social order as being "bounded" by the parameters of one institutional 
dimension of modernity in the form of capitalism, industrialism, or the concentration 
of military and administrative power in the nation-state (Giddens, 1990: 10-14). 
Instead, "the question of order should be reformulated as a problem of how it comes 
about that social systems `bind' (social) time and space. The problem of order is here 
seen as one of time space distanciation - the conditions under which time and space 
are organised" (Giddens, 1990: 14). He suggests that modernity is "multidimensional 
at the level of institutions", but nevertheless a deeper social reality is common to all 
the various institutional dimensions modernity encompasses (Giddens, 1990: 12). In 
this way, Giddens' sociology of modernity attempts to identify the basic framework 
for action within which the various institutional dynamics it exhibits are articulated; it 
attempts to characterise modernity as a distinctive social form. 
Giddens identifies two generic features of modernity as a form of social organisation. 
The first is its inherently globalising nature (Giddens, 1990: 63). According to 
Giddens, globalisation is a feature of social organisation which cuts across the various 
institutional dimensions embodied by modernity. Globalisation cannot be understood 
in terms of a single ineluctable dynamic, but rather encompasses a complex set of 
tendencies that simultaneously push in diametrically opposed directions. Globalisation 
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must therefore be understood in terms of "the complex relations between local 
involvements ... and interaction across 
distance" (Giddens, 1990: 64). Such a view 
emphasises the dialectical character of globalisation "because local happenings may 
move in the very opposite direction from the very distanciated relations that shaped 
them. Local transformation is as much a part of globalisation as the lateral extension 
of social connections across time and space" (Giddens, 1990: 62). Globalisation is 
therefore understood in terms of the various `push and pull' tendencies it embodies: 
between universalisation and particularisation; the local and the global; and the 
extensional and the intensional. Giddens suggests that it is the distinctive way in 
which modernity organises time and space which provides the key to understanding 
its globalising character. In traditional societies, "time and space were connected 
through the situatedness of place" (Giddens, 1991: 16). By contrast, modem society 
presupposes the separation of time and space such that they become abstract 
dimensions along which social life is organised. The separation of time and space 
allows modem institutions to become `disembedded' or continuously lifted out of 
localised contexts of interaction and restructured across indefinite spans (Giddens, 
1990: 21). In consequence, with the onset of modernity "time and space are 
recombined to form a genuinely world-historical framework of action and experience" 
(Giddens, 1990: 21). 
The second generic feature of modernity identified by Giddens is the expansion of 
social reflexivity. According to Giddens "the reflexivity of modem social life consists 
in the fact that social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of 
incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their 
character" (Giddens, 1990: 38). The concept is intended to convey the way modern 
society uses knowledge about the circumstances of social life as a constitutive element 
in its organisation. Giddens is careful to distinguish the reflexive quality inherent in 
human social conduct from the expansion of social reflexivity as a feature of modem 
social organisation. As has been noted, he refers to the former as the reflexive 
monitoring of action. By contrast, the latter refers to institutional reflexivity. The 
expansion of social reflexivity presupposes human beings' abilities to monitor the 
circumstances of their activities as a routine element of their social conduct. However, 
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the institutional reflexivity associated with modernity involves the development of a 
calculative attitude towards the conditions of social reproduction which was largely 
absent from traditional societies (Giddens, 1993: 6). Giddens stresses the association 
of institutional reflexivity with the generation of `power' understood in terms of an 
ability to transform the conditions of social reproduction. For this reason, "the 
expansion of institutional reflexivity stands behind the proliferation of organisations 
in circumstances of modernity, including organisations of global scope" (Giddens, 
1993: 6). It is the expansion of social reflexivity which lies behind the emergence of 
the various institutional dimensions of modern social life represented by capitalism, 
industrialism and the bureaucratic apparatus of the nation-state. 
Giddens develops a related distinction between simple and reflexive modernisation, or 
alternatively between `early' and `late' modernity. The period of simple 
modernisation was associated with the globalising of the various institutional 
dimensions of modernity. Capitalism, industrialism and the system of nation states 
proliferated so as to become organisations operating on a world wide basis, and in 
consequence this period saw the virtual eradication of pre-modem civilisations across 
the globe. During the period of reflexive modernisation, the expansion of social 
reflexivity becomes more fully developed, and there is an intensification of the 
influence of globalisation. The generic features of modem social organisation become 
more pronounced in their influence, which in turn begins to alter the overall nature of 
global social change. Reflexive modernisation lies behind developments as diverse as 
the collapse of the command economies, the rise of neoliberal political and economic 
thinking, the global shift towards liberal democracy in authoritarian states, the 
simultaneous decline in political participation in states which are already formally 
democratic, changes in the structures of the family on a world wide basis, and the 
changing nature of social risk (Giddens, 1994). Whilst each of these developments 
might not appear to have common origins, Giddens suggests that what lies behind 
each of them is that they are the product of intensified globalisation and the increased 
autonomy of action brought by the expansion of social reflexivity. They are the 
product of a world of `clever people', who actively and reflexively engage with the 
complex environments in which they operate (Giddens, 1994: 7). The result is 
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unprecedented and wholesale fluidity, dynamism and change at all levels of global 
society. 
A specific area in which Giddens has analysed in depth the effects of the changes 
associated with reflexive modernisation has been the realm of interpersonal relations 
which he suggests is the site of some of the most profound social changes taking place 
in the world today. In his book Modernity And Self Identity, Giddens discusses the 
impact of the onset of a period of developed institutional reflexivity on aspects of day 
to day life and personal identity (Giddens, 1991). He argues that, under conditions of 
late modernity, the self becomes a "reflexive project" sustained through revisable 
narratives of self-identity (Giddens, 1991: 32-33). Globalising influences penetrate 
more deeply into the fabric of everyday life than they have in previous eras, with the 
result that, more than at any previous stage in history, sources of self-identity for 
individuals cannot be sustained with regard to pre-established traditional social 
practices. Instead they have to be actively created and managed for the intrinsic value 
they bring individuals, and in the context of a plurality of possible choices. That is to 
say, individuals acquire a great deal of autonomy from traditional structures which in 
the past would have constrained them in the development of their personal lives. 
Giddens is careful to stress that this process of change opens up both opportunities 
and risks for individuals. In terms of opportunities, Giddens documents the emergence 
of the pure relationship. The pure relationship, according to Giddens, "is one which ... 
exists solely for whatever rewards the relationship ... can deliver" (Giddens, 1991: 6). 
It is a relationship negotiated and sustained on the basis of trust and free choice 
between partners who consider themselves equal and independent (Giddens, 1991: 6). 
That is to say, the pure relationship is reflexively organised according to criteria 
generic to the relationship itself. Although ideal typical, the emergence of the pure 
relationship opens up new possibilities for individual self fulfilment which are 
historically distinctive and largely unavailable in previous historical eras. In terms of 
risks, changes taking place in personal life are associated with the rise of 
fundamentalism, understood as a response to the decay of tradition as a structuring 
feature of everyday life and the threat of meaninglessness this brings in its wake 
(Giddens, 1991: 201-202). Giddens understands fundamentalism as edged with the 
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possibility of violence. It "can arise in all domains of social life where something has 
to be decided about rather than just taken for granted", and represents a direct 
response to the increased autonomy of action associated with heightened social 
reflexivity (Giddens, 1994: 6). 
Giddens makes the claim that the institutional influences he analyses in the context of 
interpersonal relations may also operate at the level of changes in patterns of social 
organisation in large scale social systems. Indeed, one of his underlying concerns is to 
highlight the way in which a distinctive feature of modernity as a form of social 
organisation is the increasing connections it brings between the intentional and 
extensional dimensions of social life (Giddens, 1991: 1). ' In particular, Giddens 
suggests that the institutional influences which operate at the level of interpersonal 
relations in principle apply to the way in which nation-states construct and sustain 
their identity within the international system. He notes that "(i)n the literature on 
international relations, nation-states are seen as `actors' - as `agents' rather than 
structures' - and there is a definite reason for this. For modem states are reflexively 
monitored systems which, even if they do not act in the strict sense of the term, follow 
co-ordinated polices and plans on a geopolitical scale" (Giddens 1991: 15). Indeed, 
such a view is compatible with his own analysis of the nation-state in the international 
system, which has been another major empirical focus of his writings on the sociology 
of modernity. In The Nation-State And Violence Giddens documents extensively the 
rise of the modern nation-state and the associated emergence of a global international 
system (Giddens, 1985). He suggests that in the early stages of modernity, the 
concentration of military and administrative power in state bureaucracy leads to the 
emergence of a reflexively organised international system organised around the 
structure provided by the distribution of military capabilities. This process is 
identified by Giddens as playing a central role in the constitution of state sovereignty 
and national identity in the early modern state. Over the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, this system became globalised, a process which culminated in the 
emergence of the bipolar Cold War order in the post war period. 
=This, of course, relates back to his more general attempt to transcend the divisions between micro and 
macro social analysis using structuration theory. 
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In his more recent writings, Giddens has developed an analysis of the nation state in 
the international system under conditions of reflexive modernisation. The analysis he 
sets out echoes strongly the assessment of the trends in interpersonal relations he 
documents in his analysis of self-identity formation under these historical conditions. 
According to Giddens, the collapse of the bipolar order is indicative of a profound 
transformation in the constitution of the international system which must be 
understood in terms of the wider patterns of social change in the present era he 
documents. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, themselves 
developments which are the direct product of the process of reflexive modernisation, 
opens up the realistic possibility of the end to major war amongst the great powers on 
a global scale (Giddens, 1994: 233). In turn, in a world without clear enemies, nation 
states are required to develop a more reflexive construction of their national identities 
than they have in the past (Giddens, 1998: 130-133). Giddens effectively transposes 
his analysis of self identity formation in inter-personal relations to the understanding 
of processes of state identity construction within the international system. Under 
conditions of late modernity, the structural features provided by the balance of 
military power between states is increasingly influenced by the more general 
expansion of social reflexivity. States become relatively free of structures of 
constraint previously imposed on them, and the autonomy of action they acquire 
encourages them to alter the basis of their interactions with other actors in the 
international system. Indeed, one might logically extend Giddens' analysis to the form 
relationships between states take and the underlying causes of violence between them. 
Extending Giddens' analysis implies that relations between states will increasingly be 
sustained on the basis of active trust, and negotiated on the basis of independence and 
formal equality between `partners'. Where a state persistently fails to redefine its 
national identity in a manner appropriate to a world without clear enemies, it will 
suffer from a loss of internal cohesion and legitimacy. This may culminate in a 
potentially violent reassertion of a `traditional', exclusivistic sense of national identity 
as a fundamentalist response to the increased autonomy of action brought by high 
levels of reflexivity in the international system. 
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Overall, this discussion of Giddens' analysis of reflexivity and reflexive 
modernisation suggests that scholars of International Relations might benefit from an 
engagement with Giddens' sociology of modernity. In the late 1980's International 
Relations specialists such as Wendt and Dessler drew fruitfully upon structuration 
theory to develop important insights about the conceptualisation of key issues in 
international relations theory. In line with Giddens' intentions, they used structuration 
theory to highlight that the structure of international anarchy is open to potential 
transformation, and they challenged the rationality assumption predominant in much 
of the theoretical literature. However, in so doing they opened up questions about the 
conditions under which states may participate in the transformation of the 
international system which structuration theory is unable, in and of itself, to answer. 
In order to respond to the questions about the historical transformation introduced into 
the discipline by Wendt's formulation of the agent-structure problem, international 
relations theorists might fruitfully return to Giddens' writings in order to link a series 
of essentially ontological claims about the logical status of anarchy in IR theory to 
definite patterns of institutional alignment and change in the international system 
under concrete historical and sociological circumstances. In turn this may challenge 
conventionally held assumptions about the distinctiveness of the international system, 
and open up connections between research programmes in the disciplines of 
International Relations and Sociology. 
Section 2: Research Design 
Having discussed the theoretical basis for and intellectual origins of this thesis, the 
second section of the introduction addresses technical issues of research design. It 
examines methodological considerations, case selection criteria, chapter organisation, 
and the question of the originality of the thesis. 
Methodological Considerations 
Attempting a single author comparative study of. the state strategies of major powers 
over the first ten years of the post-Cold War period is potentially a vast undertaking. 
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As such, it requires close consideration of methodological issues relating to how 
information about the nature of post-Cold War change is to be gathered, and the status 
of the knowledge generated by the thesis. 
The methodology adopted by this study is to survey the large body of professional 
secondary literature (books and specialised foreign policy journals) in the English 
language which has emerged on the post-Cold War state strategies of each of 
countries to be examined. The English language literature has been targeted because it 
provides the most extensive body of available writing on the foreign policies of the 
major powers after the Cold War. It provides an extremely rich, high quality and 
easily accessible source of `information' about each of the selected countries' 
strategies since 1989. The professional literature which has emerged on this subject is 
itself enormous, and the survey of the literature undertaken makes no pretence to be 
comprehensive. However, it is certainly extensive and can legitimately claim to have 
consulted the great majority of the relevant materials which have appeared in the 
professional literature within the field of International Relations. In order to facilitate 
the gathering of relevant materials, the procedure adopted was to identify the major 
book and pamphlet based studies available, and then draw up a list of articles from a 
series of core journals. Although not all of these works were actually utilised in the 
course of writing the case study chapters, they were consulted. `Major' books and 
pamphlets were identified as those written or edited by the appropriate single country 
specialists within the field, or alternatively have been published under the auspices of 
major foreign policy think thanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations, The 
Brookings Institution, The Royal Institute For International Affairs and, the 
International Institute For Strategic Studies (IISS). The `core' journals utilised were 
the major English language journals which specialise in the field of International 
Relations, or which routinely publish articles on foreign affairs: International Security 
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The National Interest, International Affairs, Survival, 
Aussenpolitik, Pacific Review, and Asian Survey. Significantly, many of these 
journals are associated with the foreign policy think tanks listed above. From this 
initial body of literature, further references were collected and collated, and drawn 
upon where they appeared to offer relevant insights. The criteria through which 
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information was utilised are therefore loose and interpretative. Information was not 
selected on the basis a tight set of criteria for relevance. 
It is important to identify some caveats and qualifications about the general principles 
outlined above. First, the Ist January 1999 has been selected as an arbitrary cut off 
point for the literature survey in order to make the make the project finite and 
manageable one in the closing stages of research. Second, it has to be acknowledged 
that some literature published after this date has been employed in this study. This 
literature has been employed selectively for a variety of reasons. A major exception to 
the January 1999 cut of point was the publication of the Kapstein and Mastanduno 
research project in April 1999. The justification for this is that access to a draft 
manuscript of this book had been available since mid 1996 and had played an 
instrumental role in providing a template for the research engaged in this thesis as has 
been identified. Furthermore, the literature published after the cut off point was 
consulted in situations where developments occurring in the closing years of the study 
did not receive attention because of the considerable lag which exists in the 
production of specialist literature. Owing to this lag, articles discussing developments 
which have occurred in the late 1990s have sometimes not been available. Under these 
circumstances, footnotes have been used to acknowledge the lack of availability of 
specialist literature on these topics. Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge that a 
number of International Studies Association conference papers have been drawn upon 
by the case study chapters on a number of occasions. 
It is important to make explicit the methodological status of the foreign policy 
literature. In his contribution to the latest edition of The Handbook Of Political 
Science Goldmann has proposed a useful typology for categorising the nature of 
research into the post Cold War international system. His three fold typology, 
illustrated in Figure 1, is based on the purposes the research embodies: 
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Figure 1: 




motivated by motivated by 
extra-academic concerns intra-academic concerns 
(I) (II) 
(Taken from Figure 16.1, Goldmann, 1996: 409) 
Type I research is motivated by a desire to inform and influence policy makers. Type 
II research is motivated by intra-academic concerns, namely the desire to test and 
refine general theories of the international system. Goldmann identifies that both Type 
I and Type II research is positive in orientation in the sense that its purpose is to add to 
existing knowledge. This contrasts to the purpose of Type III research, which is 
critical in its orientation and is designed to investigate the limits of what others take to 
be knowledge (Goldmann, 1996: 408-414). Goldmann's typology is intended to be 
ideal typical. However, most if not all of the surveyed foreign policy literature fits into 
Goldmann's Type I and Type II research. Type I research tends to characterise the 
majority of the literature including the longer established foreign policy journals, and 
many of the specialist books. There is also a significant minority of Type II research 
which is explicitly social scientific in orientation. This literature characterises the 
more recently established journals within the field, notably International Security' 
However, this trends towards professionalisation of the literature is also more 
generally apparent in specialist books and articles appearing over the 1990s. 
'Since 1995 when it became a refereed journal, ' Pacific Review has also increasingly adopted this 
approach. 
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This thesis draws on both types of positive research identified by Goldmann in order 
to access information about state strategies of the selected countries in the post Cold 
War international system. It is important to draw attention to the way in which the 
specialist foreign policy literature available in the English language is not necessarily 
overtly social scientific in orientation, nor is it necessarily theoretically informed. In 
his Presidential Address to the International Studies Association in 1988, Keohane 
suggested that the "preponderance of empirical researchers ... 
implicitly or explicitly 
accept" the premises of theories of the international system (Keohane, 1989: 173). 
However, in practice the majority of positive research within the field is of a Type I 
nature and is orientated towards loosely descriptive and interpretative analysis and 
policy prescription rather than the systematic, theoretically informed collection of 
empirical evidence. It is not possible to turn to the available foreign policy literature 
to find a series of comprehensive and systematic surveys about all, or even most, 
aspects of the foreign policies of major powers in the post Cold War international 
system. However, what this literature does offer is a rich and informed body of 
`expert' analysis. Thus two further limitations of using the secondary literature in the 
English language must be made explicit. First, the studies upon which this thesis 
draws does not represent a rigorously selected sample of a systematic body of 
information about all aspect of the state strategies of the case countries to be analysed. 
Second, it is important to recognise that the evidence drawn upon by this thesis in 
support of theoretical claims is not necessarily produced through clearly specified 
processes of descriptive inference. Rather it draws upon the loosely descriptive and 
interpretative analysis offered in the available literature by foreign policy specialists. 
In view of these considerations, this thesis does not aim to definitively test and/or 
falsify the general models of the international system under analysis, but rather 
provides a preliminary study. Reliance upon primary data across the three cases is not 
possible at the present historical juncture. The collection of high quality primary 
documentary evidence to support the claims of this thesis would not only be 
extremely difficult and financially expensive, but would also be enormously time 
consuming. Instead, the thesis uses the foreign policy literature as a vehicle with 
which to probe the plausibility of a series of competing theoretical claims about the 
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overall trajectory of change in the post Cold War international system. The literature 
is surveyed in order to draw out strands within it supporting various theoretically 
informed interpretations of the state strategies pursued since 1989 for the cases under 
examination. However, the thesis accepts that there may be systematic bias in the 
information being relied upon. Future historians will have access to the time and 
resources to develop a more comprehensive and systematic survey of the changes 
taking place in the international system today. For the time being, reliance on 
secondary literature provides a practical and efficient way in which to present a highly 
relevant account of the overall nature of post Cold War international change 
contemporaneously with the unique historical juncture provided by the close of the 
first decade of the post Cold War period. 
At deeper level, the use of secondary literature has more fundamental implications for 
the methodological status of the thesis. In particular this thesis adopts the 
methodological premises compatible with structuration theory. At the core of 
structuration theory is the insight that, unlike the natural sciences, social science is 
"not concerned with a `pre-given' universe of objects, but with one which is 
constituted or produced by the active doings of subjects" (Giddens, 1993: 168). 
Although human agency is bounded and patterned in significant ways, the 
reproduction of society is a skilled performance undertaken by knowledgeable and 
reflexive actors. It follows that concepts developed by social theorists are involved in 
what Giddens refers to as a double hermeneutic. The idea of the double hermeneutic is 
intended to convey the way in which social theorists generate concepts which not only 
describe and explain patterns of behaviour which occur independently of the observer, 
but also enter into the discursive environment drawn upon actors and in so doing 
become constitutive of patterns of behaviour and outcomes. Thus according to 
Giddens "there is a continual `slippage' of the concepts constructed by ... (social 
theorists), whereby these are appreciated by those whose conduct they were originally 
coined to analyse, and hence become integral features of that conduct ... thereby ... 
potentially compromising their original usage within the technical vocabulary of 
social science" (Giddens, 1993: 170). 
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Giddens argues that these considerations are intimately bound up with the logical 
status of social scientific activity. He does not accept that there is a dualism between 
positivist and interpretative approaches to the study of society. Social researchers 
cannot ignore the way in which their research generates a double hermeneutic without 
compromising the scientific rigour of their activities. This is because all scientific 
activity must first recognise the most distinctive properties of the field of 
investigation, which in the case of human social activity is the capacity of human 
beings to exercise individual agency. As a logical corollary of effective explanatory 
and descriptive analysis, researchers must `sensitise' themselves to the constitutive 
functions performed by their activities. This has important considerations for the 
practical conduct of empirical research. In the context of the present study, it might be 
suggested that whilst reliance upon secondary literature enhances the relevance of the 
analysis it presents, it necessarily compromises the degree of social scientific rigour it 
embodies. This would reflect a positivist view that social scientific enterprise should 
be modelled on the same techniques and standard of descriptive inference employed 
by the natural sciences. By contrast, it is the methodological premise of this thesis that 
such an approach would be inappropriate to the object of enquiry, and as such would 
compromise the social scientific rigour of the study being undertaken. In particular, by 
employing secondary literature generated by the professional literature on post Cold 
War state strategies it is possible to sensitise research to the way in which this 
literature is drawn upon as part of the routine conduct of actors within the 
international system. This methodological premise may be formulated in terms 
compatible with Goldmann's typology of research into international relations after the 
Cold War. Contrary to the assumptions made by the vast majority of the foreign 
policy specialists, it is the premise of this thesis that critical or Type III research is a 
necessary prerequisite to the identification of positive trends in the international 
system of interest to Type II professional social scientists and Type I policy analysts 
and makers. 
In summary, the methodological approach adopted by this thesis is to undertake a 
detailed survey of the available secondary literature on the foreign policies of the case 
study counties over the post Cold War period. As with all approaches to social 
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research, this methodology has significant limitations which have been made explicit 
in this account. However, it also has two advantages over alternative approaches 
which might be adopted. First, it presents the most effective means available of 
carrying out a large scale comparative study of overall patterns of change in the post 
Cold War international system. Second, it provides a means of sensitising the research 
to the mutually constitutive relationship between professional theorising about the 
overall nature of change in post Cold War international relations and the strategic 
practices of states over the post Cold War period. It thereby enhances the rigour of the 
social scientific analysis. 
Case Selection 
The case selection criteria employed by this thesis are derived logically from the 
theoretical considerations set out in chapter one. All three of the theories which 
inform the analysis agree that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War will present critical tests for their predictions about the overall nature of change 
in the post Cold War international system. However, they differ radically in their 
predictions about what the overall trajectory of change will be. 
The neorealist model of the international system is pessimistic about the overall 
direction of post Cold war international change. It predicts a return to the conflictual 
patterns of behaviour which characterised the international system in the late ninetieth 
and early twentieth centuries. Prominent neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz, 
Christopher Layne and John Mearsheimer have identified that the structure of the 
international system creates strong incentives for Germany, Japan and China to 
balance against preponderant US power (Waltz, 1993; Layne, 1993: Mearsheimer, 
1990). Given Russia's continued status as a nuclear power in the post Cold war 
period, the likely result is the emergence of a five power multipolar system 
characterised by shifting patterns of alliances among the major states. Neorealist 
predictions specify ranges of behaviour which are therefore relevant to both a 
European and East Asian context. It makes a pessimistic set of predictions about the 
state strategies that will be engaged in over the post Cold War period by the major 
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powers in both these regional settings. Patterns of institutionalised behaviour between 
states across both these regions will , 
be minimal or significantly reduced from the 
levels of institutionalised activity that developed under the shelter of the bipolar Cold 
War structure. Under these conditions, states will be motivated in their behaviour 
primarily by their relative status in the international system and their potential 
capabilities as actors. 
The institutionalist perspective is more optimistic about the patterns of behaviour 
which it predicts will emerge in the post Cold War period. It is prepared to challenge 
neorealist claims, most notably in the context of Western Europe. In particular, the 
prominent institutionalist Robert Keohane argues that, contrary to neorealist 
predictions, Germany has strong functional incentives to remain committed to the 
institutional frameworks within which it has participated over the post war period 
(Keohane, 1993: 289-290). Germany is therefore presented with strong reasons to 
continue to practice limited forms of reciprocity with other states in the international 
system for the absolute befits this can provide for its security and welfare. However, 
institutionalists have difficulty in challenging core neorealist claims in an East Asian 
context in the absence of well developed patterns of interdependence between states in 
this region. According to institutionalist theory, the prospects' for international co- 
operation between states in this region, particularly Japan and China, are potentially 
difficult to manage. However, in practice prominent institutionalists have been 
extremely influential in the formulation of US foreign policy in the East Asia region. 
Notably, the prominent institutionalist Joseph Nye was employed in the capacity of 
Assistant Secretary of State for defence during the period in the mid-1990s, and 
undertook the most important review of US security policy in the East Asia region in 
the post Cold War period (Office Of International Security Affairs, 1995; see also 
Nye, 1995). The defence report which resulted recommend that, the US should 
maintain a strong forward defence presence in the East Asia region. Although this 
would not substitute for a well developed pattern of interdependent relations between 
China and Japan, it could provide some of the preconditions for multilateral 
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institutions to take on instrumental value for these states in formulating their 
strategies. 
The liberal model is more optimistic still about the nature of change in the post Cold 
War international system. With the emergence of a critical mass of formally liberal 
states at the core of the international system in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, patterns of interaction amongst the units will be strongly affected at a global 
level. Under these conditions, patterns of institutionalisation between states are likely 
to become well developed. In a West European and German context, the levels and 
type of institutionalisation expected by the liberal model are higher and of a more 
developed quality than institutionalist theory predicts. Moreover, liberalism predicts 
that similar patterns of institutionalisation are also likely to emerge in an East Asian 
context, affecting the behaviour of Japan and China even in a region where patterns of 
interdependence between states are poorly developed. Two points about the patterns 
of change predicted by the liberal model are important to recognise. First, the most 
extensive patterns of institutionalisation of state behaviour predicted by the liberal 
model will occur at the level of informal institutionalisation. Liberalism predicts that, 
with the emergence of the liberal core, relations between the major powers will 
increasingly be conducted around norms of trust and the diffuse practice of 
reciprocity. This reflects the way in which liberalism suggests that sustaining trust is 
the most important source of power for states when there is a strong convergence of 
liberal preferences in the international system. Second, the articulation of non-liberal 
preferences by states is to be expected at margins of system change. However, states 
which articulate non-liberal preferences are likely to show signs of coming under 
intense socialisation pressures arising from the liberal core. Rather than envisaging a 
neorealist style global multipolar structure, or a world order of multi-level 
interdependence as suggested by institutionalists, liberalism suggests that the post 
'Note that the theoretical chapter of this thesis does not examine the implications of the Nye report for 
the predictions of institutionalist theory after the Cold War. It focuses purely on comparing models of 
the international systems in abstract terms in order to make an independent theoretical statement. 
However, it is important to recognise that the conclusions of the Nye report follow logically from 
institutionalist international relations theory. The Nye report suggests that, in the absence of a situation 
of complex interdependence in the East Asia region, the US must maintain a strong forward defence 
presence in the region in order to foster conditions favourable to multilateralism. Thus in the case study 
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Cold war international system will be best conceptualised in terms of a gradual core- 
periphery continuum. 
Overall, the state strategies adopted by the major powers identified by neorealists in 
Western Europe and East Asian context will provide clear tests of the predictions 
offered by the models of the international system which inform this thesis. Examining 
the strategies with regard to international institutions adopted by Germany, Japan and 
China over the first ten years of the Cold War period will provide an effective means 
of arriving at a general picture of the overall nature of change in the post Cold War 
international system. 
Chapter Organisation 
The thesis is organised into a theoretical chapter which is followed by the three case 
study chapters. The theoretical chapter provides a detailed comparison of the 
foundations and predictions of the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of the 
international system. The neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models have been 
selected as the theories of the international system to be used to structure the case 
study analyses because they are the only available theoretical perspectives which are 
able to offer parsimonious and systemic level explanations of behaviour and outcomes 
in the post Cold War period. ' Waltz's neorealist account of the international system 
was the first theoretical approach to develop the parsimony and systemic orientation 
which made it capable of producing general explanations of historically recurrent 
patterns of behaviour in international politics, notably the occurrence of war and the 
formation of balances of power. In contrast to classical realist approaches the 
neorealist perspective offers exploratory elegance and generalisable predictions about 
state behaviour, thus making it compatible with a scientific approach to the study of 
chapters, the implications of the Nye report for state strategies in an East Asian context are considered 
because they are crucial significance for institutionalist predictions. 
Contructivism cannot claim this status because it cannot specific the precise historical conditions 
under which the substantive content of foreign policy varies. As Wendt is careful to make explicit, 
constructivist theory "says something about what kinds of entities there are in the world and how their 
relationship should be conceptualised, and as such provides a conceptual framework or meta-theory for 
thinking about real world social systems, but it does not tell us what particular kinds of agents or 
particular kind of structures to expect in any given concrete social system" (Wendt, 1987: 355). 
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international politics. The institutionalist model was the first to emerge as a serious 
contender to neorealism. By focusing on systemic variations in the quality of 
information available to states, institutionalism is also available to offer generalisable 
explanations and predictions about state behaviour. 
The liberal model of the international system remains in the embryonic stages of 
development, although a number of recent attempts have been made to develop its 
insights by Wade Huntley and Andrew Moravcsik (Huntley, 1996: Moravcsik, 1997). 
In particular, Moravscik has identified that liberalism's focus on the configuration of 
state preferences for the determination of state behaviour provides liberalism with the 
parsimony and elegance expected of a systemic level theory of international relations 
(Moravscik, 1997). Nevertheless, given the underdeveloped character of liberal 
theory, the theoretical chapter of the thesis offers an independent statement about the 
nature of a liberal theory of international politics, and its relationship to the neorealist 
and institutionalist models. The relationship of the liberal model of the international 
system to neorealist and institutionalist theories is important to analyse because it is 
liberalism's synthetic nature which accounts for its most distinctive characteristics and 
predictions. In particular, it is liberalism's synthetic nature which allows it to explain 
both the sudden and unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union, and indicate the 
historical significance of the emergence of a critical mass of formally democratic 
states at the core of the international system for the overall nature of change in the 
post Cold War international order. 
The three case study chapters analysing the state strategies with regard to international 
institutions of Germany, Japan and China since 1989 each follow the same structure. 
The bulk of the case study chapters focus on applying the models of the international 
system being utilised to the state strategies adopted by the specific country under 
consideration. The three theories are applied in the same sequence in each case, 
working through neorealist, institutionalist and liberal accounts of the behaviour of 
the state concerned. The third section of each chapter, which applies the liberal model, 
concentrates upon attempting to develop a characterisation of the distinctive foreign 
policy preferences of the country under analysis. It is left until the fourth and final 
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section of each chapter to analyse the strategic choices facing each state in negotiating 
the transition to the post Cold War international order. This section examines how 
each state being analysed has been affected by its interactions with other units in the 
international system, and assesses of the implications of this interaction for the 
direction in which their strategies are being encouraged to develop by systemic level 
trends. By applying the same chapter structure to each of the case study chapters, the 
comparative dimension of the project being undertaken shall be brought into sharper 
relief. In turn, this facilitates the ease with which generalisations might be made 
across the three countries analysed. 
Second, each case study chapter adopts a metaphor drawn from Giddens' analysis of 
processes of self identity formation as set out in the book Modernity And Self Identity. 
Using the metaphor, the state is personified in both the opening sections of the 
introduction and the closing sections of the conclusions. The metaphor is useful for 
the organisation of each chapter in the sense that it provides a `coat-hanger' around 
which each chapter can develop its overall argument. However, the use of the 
metaphor is also intended to draw attention to the crisis of identity-transition faced by 
Germany, Japan and China in the post Cold War period. It is intended to provide a 
graphic way of illustrating the way in which the end of the Cold War has created a 
`defining moment' for each of the three cases examined. Nevertheless, it is important 
to clarify that the use of the metaphor is no way designed to draw direct parallels 
between trends in interpersonal and international relations, which can not be 
substantiated on the basis of the evidence presented in this thesis. 
Originality and 'Value Added' 
A final question relating to aspects of research design pertains to the originality of the 
thesis in terms of the value it adds to existing knowledge within the discipline of 
international relations. The originality of this study lies in its presentation of a 
systematic evaluation of competing theories of the international system through a 
comparative study of state strategies at the unique historical juncture provided by the 
close of the first ten years of the post Cold War period. The thesis seeks to show 
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which strategies states adopted after the end of the Cold War, and the degree to which 
their responses to this development was institutionalised around co-operative norms. 
In doing so, it provides knowledge that may help towards an understanding of 
important features of contemporary world politics. At the present time, trends in the 
emerging international system are relatively opaque and difficult to extrapolate. 
However, the information and analysis presented in this study should prove useful 
when trying to understanding the historic changes which have taken place over the 
past decade. In turn, this knowledge can be brought to bear on the grand theories that 
provide our deepest presumptions, and which shape our understanding of the 
emerging world order. ' 
6Adapted from Keohane et al, 1993: 19 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Reassessing the Logic of Anarchy: Rationality versus Reflexivity 
Drawing on the insights of constructivism and recent attempts to develop a liberal 
model of international relations, this chapter compares neorealism, institutionalism 
and liberalism in terms of their competing conceptualisations of the composition and 
dynamics of the international system. It argues that prominent institutionalists have 
mistakenly interpreted neorealism as a rationalist model of the international system in 
order to develop their own arguments countering its central propositions. Rather than 
relying on rational actor assumptions, neorealism instead adopts a reflexive logic 
focusing on processes of identity construction and socialisation arising from the 
generative consequences of international anarchy. Thus whilst neorealism and 
liberalism differ fundamentally in terms of their assessment of the nature and long 
term consequences of international anarchy, they may actually be closer to each other 
in terms of their conceptualisation of system composition and dynamics than 
neorealism and institutionalism. On the basis of this argument, the chapter rejects a 
`linear' understanding of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and 
liberalism in which institutionalism is seen as providing the point of synthesis on a 
spectrum that runs between neorealism and liberalism. Instead, it proposes a 
`triangular' understanding of the relationship between these three models of the 
international system in which the debates between neorealists and institutionalists 
constitute its rationalist leg, and debates between neorealists and liberals constitute its 
reflexivist leg. Understood in these terms, liberalism's focus on the generative 
consequences of international anarchy and the overall trajectory of identity 
construction and socialisation within the international system is likely to be more 
productive in the search for a general synthesis of competing theories of international 
relations than institutionalists' attempts to refine rationalist models. 
In developing this argument, the chapter focuses on the debates between neorealists, 
institutionalists and liberals over the mechanisms through which the anarchic structure 
of the international system is constituted (reproduced/transformed). All three of these 
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theories agree that international anarchy is constituted through the interaction of units. 
Importantly, however, they identify different mechanisms through which units within 
the international system interact. One way in which units can interact is on the basis of 
rational behaviour. Units which behave rationally "possess consistent, ordered 
preferences, and ... calculate the costs of benefits of alternative courses of action in 
order to maximise their utility in view of these preferences" (Keohane, 1984: 27). The 
notion that actors behave rationally in their interactions exogenises questions about 
the characteristics of units within the international system, since units' conceptions of 
their `interests' are given by assumption (Wendt, 1992: 398). An alternative means 
through which units can interact is on the basis of reflexive behaviour. Actors which 
behave in a reflexive manner "not only monitor the continuous flow of their activities 
and expect others to do the same for their own; they also routinely monitor aspects, 
social and physical, of the contexts in which they move" (Giddens, 1984: 5). Actors 
are therefore viewed as competent, skilled and knowledgeable about the complex 
environments in which they move, but they are not necessarily rational in the sense 
that they expect to maximise their expected utility from patterns of social interaction. 
For example, even what may appear from a rational-choice perspective to be 
`irrational' social behaviour involves a high degree of reflexive attention and 
awareness by purposeful social agents. The idea that actors are capable of reflexive 
behaviour involves making statements about their basic identity as agents. To adopt 
Wendt's definition, identity refers to "relatively stable, role specific understandings 
and expectations about self' from which actors define their portfolio of `interests' 
(Wendt, 1992: 397). That is to say, `interests' depend on identities which are either 
actively or passively constructed by knowledgeable actors on the basis of 
intersubjective meanings and purposes acquired from their institutionally defined 
roles (Wendt, 1992: 398). 
The chapter is organised into three sections examining the neorealist, institutionalist 
and liberal models of the international system respectively. First, their assumptions 
about the nature of international anarchy are analysed to shed light on differences in 
the ontological status of anarchy across the theories. Second, the way in which each 
theory conceptualises the constitution of the international system is examined in order 
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to identify whether a rationalist or a reflexivist logic is adopted. Finally, the theories 
are compared with respect to their predictions about both the sources of state `power', 
and the levels and type of institutionalisation expected within the international system. 
A final section of the chapter will consider the relationship which exists between the 
three models set out, the possibilities for a general synthesis between them, and the 
implications of these abstract theoretical considerations for substantive research 
programmes within the discipline. 
The Neorealist Model 
The key variable identified by the neorealist model of the international system is the 
configuration of capabilities between states. This conclusion is drawn from the 
specification of Waltz's theory of international politics. Waltz's model begins by 
clearly distinguishing between the structure of domestic and international political 
systems. For Waltz, domestic political systems are centralised and hierarchical. In 
contrast, the structure of the international system is anarchic because of the absence of 
a central organising authority in international relations (Waltz, 1979: 88). Waltz argues 
that, because of its anarchic deep structure, the international system becomes a self 
help one analogous to an economic market in the sense that "(w)hether units live, 
prosper or die depends on their own efforts" (Waltz, 1979: 91). Under these 
circumstances, states will be encouraged to behave in ways which produce the 
recurrent formations of balances of power. Due to the anarchic organising principle of 
the international system, "those who do not help themselves, or who do so less 
effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to danger. Fear of 
unwanted consequences therefore stimulates states to behave in ways that tend 
towards the creation of balances of power" (Waltz, 1979: 118). In this way, the 
balance of power may be seen as a condition of structural "equilibrium" in the 
distribution of capabilities among states 'within the international system in which no 
one single unit can further increase its existing capabilities (Waltz, 1979: 121). It exists 
externally to the actors themselves, and emerges in an unintended way as a 
"constraining and dispensing force" on the behaviour of units within the international 
system (Waltz, 1979: 69). 
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As Dessler notes, Waltz's model of the international system relies on a positional 
model of structure which focuses on the role of unintended consequences of 
interaction arising from a unit's relative position within a given set of relationships 
(Dessler, 1989: 448-451). Within such 
ä 
model, "the units precedes the system, and 
through action generates structure. ... (Thus whilst) 
in Waltz's causal explanatory 
scheme, structure is seen as constraining and disposing state action .... ontologically 
speaking, it is the interaction of units that creates the structure" (Dessler, 1989, p. 449). 
To demonstrate this claim, Dessler cites Waltz's assertion that that "From the 
coaction of like units emerges a structure that affects and constrains all of them. Once 
formed ... [... a system] becomes a force in itself that the constitutive units acting 
singly or in small numbers cannot control" (Waltz, cited Dessler, 1989: 448-449, 
Dessler's emphasis; see also Waltz, 1979: 90). Wendt similarly identifies that in the 
neorealist model states are what he refers to as "ontologically primitive" entities 
(Wendt, 1987: 339). He rejects Ashley's early argument that Waltz is an unreformed 
structuralist, arguing instead that Waltz adopts an individualist definition of the 
structure of the international system (Wendt, 1987: 341; see also Ashley, 1986: 238- 
242). Waltz himself claims that neorealist theory emphasises that causation runs from 
both structures to states and from states to structures (see figure 3.1 in Waltz, 
1979: 40). However, as Dessler notes, properly speaking the creation of system 
structure through unit interaction is postulated ontologically, whilst the constraint 
imposed on interaction is explained theoretically by neorealism (Dessler, 1989: 449 fn 
33). 
The implication of Waltz's adoption of a positional model of structure is that the 
international system envisaged by neorealism takes on a reproductive rather than a 
transformative character. To Waltz, unintended consequences of interaction cause 
patterns of behaviour to reoccur even against the wishes of the system's members. In 
this view, structure is defined as an arrangement of actors which acts as an external 
constraint on state action (Dessler, 1989: 449). Once formed structure becomes 
"essentially impervious to attempts to modify it or control its effects. ... Even when 
structure is recognised for what it is, it continues to defeat strategies designed to evade 
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its influence" (Dessler, 1989: 450). It is ultimately due to his adoption of a positional 
model that Waltz's neorealist theory is seen as privileging the causal role played by 
system structure in the constitution of the international system (Wendt, 1987: 340- 
344). It is important to recognise that the logic of Waltz's theory does allow some 
scope for the transformation of the international system if its ordering principle shifts 
from anarchy to hierarchy, presumably through the instigation of some form of world 
government (Waltz, 1986b: 342). However, this must be seen as unlikely because of 
the anti-hegemonial character of the balance of power mechanism in Waltz's model 
which works to ensure the persistence of anarchy (Waltz, 1986b: 343 and 340-341). As 
Ruggie has identified, in Waltz's model "continuity (in the form of the persistence of 
anarchy) ... is the product of premise even before it is hypothesised as an outcome" 
(Ruggie, 1986: 152). Alternatively, Cox suggests that Waltz's is a problem solving 
theory that "takes the world as it is, with the prevailing social and power relationships 
within it ... as the given framework for action", rather than a critical theory capable of 
directing attention towards possible sources of historical transformation (Cox, 
1986: 208). 
Despite the essentially reproductive role played by the structure of international 
anarchy in the neorealist model, it is important to recognise that there is a strong 
dynamic quality to Waltz's understanding of international relations which he is 
careful to emphasise (Waltz, 1986b: 341-344). Due to his stress on the role of 
unintended consequences of interaction within the international system, Waltz argues 
that "(i)n systems theory, structure is a generative notion" (Waltz, 1979: 72, emphasis 
added). For Waltz, "structure acts as a selector" (Waltz, 1979: 73), and over time will 
eliminate units which fail to respond to the imperatives of the system. Waltz's stress 
on the generative qualities of international anarchy leads him to place a great deal of 
emphasis on the "pervasive" importance of competition and socialisation within the 
international system (Waltz, 1979: 74). For Waltz, socialisation is a process of 
emulation, and competition a process of elimination (Waltz, 1979: 74-77). Waltz sees 
these forces at work in the international system through its structural effects. For 
Waltz, states face strong structural incentives to emulate the effects of the most 
successful and in so doing become `socialised' to the international system. If they fail 
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to respond to these incentives, competition will, over time, tend to eliminate them 
from the international system as imbalances of power are restored to equilibrium. This 
has both internal and external consequences for the organisation of states within the 
system. Internally, they will adopt equivalent organisations. Externally, states will 
adopt structurally similar repertoires of behaviour. Competition and socialisation 
within the international system therefore encourage the homogenisation of units 
within the international system such that they are functionally alike, and furthermore 
promote the convergence of the international system around a balance of power 
equilibrium. 
Waltz's suggestion that the structure of international anarchy is generative has 
important implications for the way in which he conceptualises the role played by the 
state in the constitution of the international system. Waltz is conventionally 
interpreted as making the theoretical assumption that states behave rationally in 
response to incentives provided by system structure. Most notably, Keohane, a 
prominent institutionalist, adopts this interpretation of neorealism. He holds that "(f)or 
Waltz ... (t)he link between system structure and actor behaviour is forged by the 
rationality assumption, which enables the theorist to predict that leaders will respond 
to incentives and constraints imposed by their environments. ... Otherwise, state 
behaviour might have to be accounted for by variations in the calculating ability of 
states; in that case the systemic focus of Structural Realism (and much of its 
explanatory power) would be lost. Thus the rationality assumption ... 
is essential to 
the theoretical claims of structural realism" (Keohane, 1986: 167; see also Keohane, 
1984: 83.84; Keohane, 1993: 273). However, in making this claim Keohane knowingly 
counters Waltz's own assertion that his theory "requires no assumptions of rationality 
or of constancy of will on the part of all of the actors. The theory simply says that if 
some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside" (Waltz, 
" 1979: 118; see also Keohane, 1986b: 201 fn 15). Waltz does hold that his theory 
requires the assumption that at least some states seek to ensure their survival (Waltz, 
1979: 91 and 118). However, he does not assume that they pursue this strategy 
rationally. Instead, he relies on the generative consequences of the structure of 
international anarchy to `select out' those who pursue this strategy relatively poorly, 
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and reward those who pursue it relatively successfully. Indeed, in his response to his 
critics, Waltz stresses "the importance I accord, and Keohane denies, to the process of 
selection that takes place in competitive systems" and asserts that "(w)e should keep 
the notion of `selection' in a position of central importance" (Waltz, 1986: 330 and 
331). Waltz does qualify these statements with the assertion that he does not differ 
with Keohane over the issue of rationality "except semantically" (Waltz, 1986: 330). 
However, in the light of more recent developments in international relations theory, it 
is possible that Waltz's judgement about the semantic nature of his differences with 
Keohane on this issue may have been somewhat premature. 
In particular, Buzan et al have elaborated further on the role played by the state in 
neorealist theory. They suggest that "it is ... possible to show that Waltz 
has 
independently alighted on a solution to the problem (of the relationship between units 
and structure within the international system) ... that coincides with the position now 
being adopted in other areas of the social sciences" (Buzan et al, 1993: 110). In 
particular, they argue that the state in neorealist theory is best characterised as a 
reflexive rather than a rational actor. They propose that implicit in Waltz's model is an 
incipient `top down' theory of the state (Buzan, 1993: 117-119). Whilst recognising 
that the international system is individualist in origin in neorealist theory, they 
identify that "(o)nce states are coacting ... Waltz is quite clear that the structure of the 
international system does have an important bearing on the development of the state. 
This is because he believes or theorises that the ordering principle of international 
anarchy generates a competitive environment" (Buzan et al, 1993: 117). It is for this 
reason that Waltz observes the importance of the imitation of successful practices of 
others within the system, a process which "plays an integral part in the process that 
maintains the balance of power and, in turn, sustains the anarchic system" (Buzan et 
al, 1993: 117-118; see also Waltz, 1979: 127-128). Thus, in the neorealist model, 
"agents of the state, like Janus, are required to look in two directions simultaneously. 
They confront two sets of structures: one internal and the other external" (Buzan et al, 
1993: 120). Buzan et al use this observation to argue that Waltz's view of the unit- 
structure relationship strongly echoes a depiction of social agents as "knowledgeable 
and reflexive, having not only a sophisticated view of the world and how it is 
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structured, but also the ability to monitor their actions in the light of this knowledge" 
(Buzan et al, 1993: 107). 
There is a distinction which it is important to highlight between an understanding of 
the state as a reflexive actor, and an understanding of it as a rational actor. Buzan et al 
use the example of the behaviour of motorists at traffic lights to illustrate this point. 
They note that there is a complex set of social institutions that shape the behaviour of 
motorists which "are observed not because of the sanctions imposed on deviants, but 
because of the reflexive ability to see what would happen in situations of strategic 
interaction if the structures did not exist. ... So 
it follows that a structure constitutes a 
structure only because of the behaviour of the agent, which in turn is intimately bound 
up with knowledge of the structure" (Buzan et al, 1993: 107). In this way, patterns of 
behaviour may persist not because of rational calculations of interest on behalf of 
units, but because of the essential recursiveness of social life, i. e. the way in which 
social activity is `carried on', at least at the level of practical consciousness, by 
reflexively aware actors. Dessler makes the same point when he notes that whilst 
neorealism suggests that the distribution of material capabilities amongst actors 
motivates their behaviour, the anarchic structure implicitly generates rule following 
activity on the behalf of units within the international system (Dessler, 1989: 459-461). 
Dessler uses this observation to argue that "(r)ules, which give shape and meaning to 
rationality and thereby make survival possible, are a necessary (if theoretically 
suppressed) component of structure in the neorealist model" (Dessler, 1989: 461). 
Indeed, the balance of power may even be seen as conforming to Wendt's definition 
of an institution as "a relatively stable set or `structure' of identities and interests ... 
(which exists) only in virtue of actors' socialisation to and participation in collective 
knowledge" (Wendt, 1992: 399). Distinguishing between a social structure sustained 
by rational action and one sustained through reflexive self-regulation on behalf of 
actors is difficult to identify purely through observation because the outcomes in the 
form of patterned behaviour over time is identical. However, the distinction between 
rational and reflexive behaviour on the part of actors within the international system is 
of crucial importance for the way in which the composition and dynamics of the 
system concerned are conceptualised. 
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In particular, the salient point to recognise at this stage in the argument is that 
neorealism does indeed have a theory of the state, and specifically a theory of state 
identify construction and socialisation within the international system. It postulates 
that states are reflexively aware agents capable of internalising appropriate patterns of 
behaviour and deploying this understanding knowledgeably in contexts of action. 
What are initially `external constraints' on state action are over time internalised and 
learnt by reflexively aware actors through a processes of socialisation. To appropriate 
Wendt's language, within the neorealist model, the state is able "1) to have a 
theoretical understanding (however inaccurate) of its activities, in the sense that it 
could supply reasons for its behaviour; 2) to reflexively monitor ... its behaviour; and 
3) to make decisions" (Wendt, 1987, p. 359). Wendt himself explicitly accepts the 
view that neorealism presents a rationalist model of the international system, drawing 
on Keohane's seminal article outlining rationalist and reflectivist approaches to 
substantiate this point (Wendt, 1992: 391, see especially fn 2). However, it is 
interesting to note that more recently Wendt et al have explicitly acknowledged that 
"Waltz was implicitly talking about identity when he acknowledged that anarchic 
structures tend to produce like units" (Wendt et al, 1996: 34). Wendt et al do go on to 
make a valid qualification of this assertion by pointing out that that whilst "Waltz 
allows for what he calls `socialisation' and `imitation' processes ... he envisions the 
shaping of the behaviour of pregiven actors" (Wendt et al, 1996: 41). However, it is 
equally important to recognise that Wendt et al are merely drawing attention to the 
way in which neorealism adopts a positional model of structure in which states are 
primitive units. The essential point is that in the neorealist model states should be 
understood as being reflexive rather than rational actors remains, and takes on crucial 
significance when comparing neorealism to institutionalist and liberal models of the 
international system. 
Tensions in Waltz's account of the relationship between units and structure within the 
international system become most apparent when the status of neorealism's 
predictions about the behaviour of states within the international system are 
scrutinised. At a superficial level, it seems relatively straightforward to arrive at 
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general statements about the character of the international system that may be 
associated with Waltz's model. Power for Waltz is "defined in terms of the 
distribution of capabilities" within the international system (Waltz, 1979: 192). Power 
is therefore understood in relative rather than absolute terms, relating back to the 
positional model of structure on which his theory is based. The predominant source of 
power for states in the international system will be the relative gains in terms of actual 
or potential capabilities to be made in their interactions with other units (Grieco, 
1993a; Grieco, 1993b). In terms of neorealism's predictions about the levels and type 
of institutionalisation that will take place within the international system, Waltz is at 
pains to point out that the decentralised character of the international system does not 
mean that it is not ordered in important ways. Instead, anarchy means that "patterns 
emerge and endure without anyone arranging the parts to form patterns or striving to 
maintain them" (Waltz, 1979: 77). Waltz anticipates that patterns of behaviour that 
take place in the international system will converge around a balance of power 
equilibrium. For Waltz, therefore, the international system becomes `institutionalised' 
around the balance of power. He notes that "(i)nternational organisations do exist, and 
in ever growing numbers. Supranational agents able to act effectively, however, either 
themselves acquire some of the attributes and capabilities of states, or they soon 
reveal their inability at act in important ways except with the support, or at least the 
acquiescence, of the principle states concerned and the matters at hand" (Waltz, 
1979: 88). Levels of institutionalisation occurring above and beyond the balance of 
power will therefore be limited. The existence of any effective international 
organisations will ultimately be contingent on shifting distributions of power between 
states within the structure provided by international anarchy, and it is ultimately for 
this reason that international politics is merely "flecked with particles of government" 
(Waltz, 1979: 114). 
However in the light of recent debates over the status of neorealism as a theory of 
foreign policy, it is becoming increasingly clear that neorealism is fundamentally 
ambiguous about the extent to which international structure will determine 
international behaviour and outcomes. Waltz is insistent that neorealism represents a 
theory of international politics which operates at a structural level of analysis, rather 
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than as a theory of foreign policy which offers predictions about the determinate 
behaviour of units within the international system (Waltz, 1996). Yet, as Elman has 
noted, this leaves the status of any predictions about the behaviour of states made by 
neorealism open to question. He identifies that Waltz has himself used neorealism to 
both explain the foreign policy behaviour of particular states, and make specific 
predictions about the behaviour of others. Elman makes the point that "(n)eorealists 
who believe that their theories are unable to make foreign policy predictions should 
stop making them" (Elman, 1996a: 10-11; Elman, 1996b: 60). However, Elman 
simultaneously cautions that "refraining from making such predictions would 
diminish neorealism's usefulness considerably" (Elman, 1996b: 60). If, as Waltz 
asserts, international political theory can explain states' behaviour only when external 
pressures come to dominate the internal disposition of states (Waltz, 1996: 57) then the 
key question faced by international relations analysts becomes how to explain the 
variation in the influence of system structure upon outcomes over time. There are 
therefore fundamental ambiguities about the nature of the. predictions neorealism 
makes about the behaviour of states in the international system that may be traced to 
its inability to specify clearly the relative influence of unit and structure over the 
foreign policy behaviour over time. 
In summary, three aspects of the neorealist model of the international system have 
been highlighted. First, the neorealist model develops a positional model of structure, 
and as such it takes on an essentially reproductive rather than a transformative logic. 
Second, the neorealist model is not, as is widely supposed, committed to the 
assumption that states are rational actors. Instead, neorealism relies on the generative 
consequences of international anarchy in combination with the idea that units are 
reflexive agents which behave knowledgeably in relation to the complex 
environments in which they operate. Thus it is important to acknowledge that 
neorealism does have a theory of state identity construction and socialisation within 
the international system, albeit that these processes are understood as occurring within 
a pre-given set of structural parameters. Thirdly, neorealism predicts that power in the 
international system resides in relative gains from inter-state interaction. Under these 
conditions, levels of institutionalisation in the international system will be low, and 
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that the behaviour of states will become `institutionalised' around the balance of 
power. However, it is also important to recognise that due to the tensions between 
neorealism's conceptualisation of unit-structure relations introduced by Waltz's 
acceptance of the notion that international anarchy is not fully generative, the 
neorealist model is fundamentally ambiguous about the status of its predictions about 
international behaviour and outcomes within the international system. 
The Institutionalist Model 
The key variable identified by the institutionalist model is the configuration of 
information and institutions within the international system. By focusing on the 
systemic impact of information and institutions, institutionalists seek to demonstrate 
that international co-operation is possible from the same set of core assumptions about 
the nature of the international system as neorealism. Institutionalist theory therefore 
purports to accept neorealist assertions about the nature of international anarchy, and 
to share in common with neorealism the assumption that states behave rationally. The 
essence of the institutionalist argument is therefore that neorealism's conclusions do 
not follow from its premises. 
Institutionalists purport to accept neorealist claims about the structure of international 
anarchy for patterns of behaviour and outcomes within the international system. 
Keohane asserts that his analysis of international relations "begins at the systemic 
level because I believe that the behaviour of states ... is strongly affected by the 
constraints and incentives provided by the international environment" (Keohane, 
1984: 26). However, as well as international anarchy, institutionalists also stress the 
importance of interdependence between states in the international system. Here 
institutionalists build on the research into the effects of interdependence on 
international relations engaged in by Keohane and Nye during the 1970's. Keohane 
and Nye define interdependence as a situation of mutual dependence or situations 
characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different 
countries (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 8). They developed the idea that, under a situation 
they referred to as complex interdependence, the existence of multiple channels of 
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communication and high level of information flows between advanced industrial 
states led to relationships between them from which they could potentially benefit 
mutually (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 23-37). Thus, whilst accepting the significance of 
international anarchy, instititutionalists' analysis of the prospects for international co- 
opertion also assumes that there are extensive common interests amongst certain types 
of states (Keohane, 1984: 6). 
Keohane suggests that game theory can be useful when understanding the difficulties 
posed by the problem of international anarchy for cooperation between advanced 
industrial states. According to Keohane, such a situation can be modelled by the game 
known as Prisoner's Dilemma in which two participants in a game could benefit from 
cooperation but fail to do so due to the patterns of incentives generated by the 
structure of strategic interaction that exists between them (Keohane, 1984: 68). That is 
to say, institutionalists draw upon game theory to model a possible situation 
compatible with neorealism in which the structure of international anarchy generates a 
collective action problem even in situations where parties can benefit mutually 
through co-operation. In making the claim that it is theoretically valid for relations 
between states in the international system to be modelled in terms of a Prisoner's 
Dilemma, institutionalists "concede to neorealists the causal powers of anarchic 
structure" (Wendt, 1992: 392). As with neorealists, institutionalists are engaged in 
problem solving theory rather than critical theory because they offer only an internal 
rather than an external critique of neorealism's logic (Powell, 1994: 329). 
Institutionalism concentrates on system process, understood in terms of allocative and 
bargaining behaviour within a given power structure (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 21). 
However, because insitiutionalists "lack a ... theory of how ... (systemic 
transformation) occurs ... (they) must privilege realist insights about structure while 
advancing their own insights about process" (Wendt, 1992: 393). 
Nevertheless, having asserted that Prisoner's Dilemma is an appropriate model for 
theorising relations between advanced industrial states, institutionalists go on to build 
their critique of the neorealist model of international relations. As has been noted, 
institutionalists adopt a particular interpretation of neorealism in which the state is 
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regarded as a rational actor. Drawing on theories of rational choice, Keohane suggests 
that whether or not defection is the dominant strategy within a Prisoner's Dilemma 
depends on the number of times the game is played. If the game is played once or only 
a small number of times, defection will be the dominant strategy for rational egoists. 
However, if the game is played iteratively by the same players, cooperation between 
the participants can rationally emerge if the participants value future rewards 
(Keohane, 1984: 75). The reasoning behind this is that the iterative playing of the 
game generates a shadow of the future, such that "(t)he more future payoffs are valued 
relative to current payoffs, the less incentive to defect today - since the other side is 
likely to retaliate tomorrow" (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993: 91). Thus within an iterated 
Prisoner's Dilemma, mutual cooperation will rationally emerge through a strategy of 
`tit-for-tat' between egoists (Keohane, 1984: 76). Cooperation between states becomes 
institutionalised around norms of what Keohane refers to as specific reciprocity, in 
which "specified partners exchange items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited 
sequence" (Keohane, 1989b: 134). Having made these claims, Keohane goes on to 
suggest that iterated rather than single play Prisoner's Dilemma is the more 
appropriate model for understanding the routine conduct of diplomacy between 
advanced industrial states. This is because negotiations between these states on issues 
of mutual concern "take place continuously and are expected to continue indefinitely 
into the future" (Keohane, 1984: 76). 
Keohane also holds that international regimes can play a functional role in facilitating 
cooperation among states which act as rational egoists. International regimes are 
conventionally defined as "sets of implicit or explicit sets of principles, norms, rules 
and decision making procedures around which actor's expectations converge in a 
given issue-area of international relations" (Krasner, - 1983a: 2). Keohane suggests that 
although regimes do not substitute for reciprocity, they can play an important role in 
encouraging states to engage in this behaviour (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993: 110). To 
demonstrate this, he draws on economic theory to develop the insights of the Coase 
Theorem when applied to what he refers to as `political market failure' (Keohane, 
1984: 84-88). The Coase Theorem suggests that the externalities leading to market 
failure can be dealt with in the absence of a central authority if there is a legal 
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framework establishing liability for actions, perfect information, and zero transactions 
costs. In international politics, none of these situations holds, leading to `political 
market failure' in the form of the collective action problems faced by states under 
international anarchy. However, Keohane suggests that international regimes can be 
functional for states seeking to cooperate for mutual gains for two principle reasons. 
First they can reduce the transactions costs of coming to an agreement, for example, 
by making it cheaper for governments to get together to negotiate agreements 
(Keohane, 1984: 90). Second, regimes can help reduce uncertainties by providing 
information which shape states' expectations of future behaviour in a number of 
important ways. For example regimes can reduce asymmetries in information, by 
helping states insure compliance, raising the costs of deception and irresponsibility 
(Keohane, 1984: 97). This does imply that regimes will be difficult to create, since 
under international anarchy it is difficult for states to establish legal liability for states 
through regimes (Keohane, 1984: 89). However, once brought into existence (for 
instance, by a hegemonic power) they will be functional for states and will therefore 
tend to endure (Keohane, 1984: 100-101). Thus regimes may rationally persist even 
when structural conditions within the international system change. Keohane goes on 
to explore the implications of relaxing the assumption of rationality by examining the 
implications of assuming `bounded rationality' (Keohane, 1984: 110-120). He also 
discusses the possibility of limited redefinitions of actor interests away from pure 
egoism (Keohane, 1984: 120-130). However, he qualifies this by recognising the move 
away from the assumption of rational egoism takes his analysis beyond the functional 
theory of regimes he has set out (Keohane, 1984: 132). Thus it is important to 
recognise that Keohane's functional theory of regimes never abandons the assumption 
that states behave as rational actors, and indeed requires this assumption in order that 
it can be seen as progressively expanding neorealism's explanatory power. 
It is important to acknowledge that institutionalism's commitment to the assumption 
that- states are rational actors has important theoretical implications for how it 
conceptualises the composition and dynamics of the international system. In 
particular, institutionalism does not, and indeed cannot, provide a theory of state 
identity formation within the international system. Keohane explicitly acknowledges 
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that "rationalists theories contain no endogenous dynamic. Individual and social 
reflection leading to changes in preferences or in views of causality ... are ignored. 
That is preferences are assumed to be fixed" (Keohane, 1989c: 171). This commitment 
to a rational choice framework makes institutionalist theory highly distinctive from 
both neorealist and liberal models of the international system. As has been explained, 
neorealism does make an attempt to provide a theory of identity construction and 
socialisation within the international system and as such adopts a view of the state as a 
reflexive rather than a rational actor. Similarly, whilst institutionalism shares with 
liberalism a concern with explaining the formation of international institutions and 
regimes, unlike a liberal model of the international system, it allocates no role in this 
process for the importance of cognitive human characteristics such as the capability 
for autonomous self-reflection and choice, intentionality and the possibility of social 
learning for world politics (Keohane, 1989c: 168-170). Instead, states simply respond 
mechanistically to functional incentives to cooperate. ' It is on the basis of these 
tensions in institutionalists' analysis of international institutions that Moravcsik 
argues that functional regime theory, referred to by Keohane himself as neoliberal 
institutionalism or simply as neoliberalism is not properly a liberal theory of 
international relations (Moravcsik; 1997: 536-537). Wendt makes the same point 
when he distinguishes institutionalism's "weak liberalism" which brackets processes 
of interest and identity formation, and "strong liberalism" which encompasses insights 
about learning and cognition (Wendt, 1992: 393-394). Indeed, Keohane explicitly 
concedes the validity of such arguments when he notes that "(I)n view of the links 
between insititutionalist thinking and both liberalism and realism, I now prefer the 
simple appellation `institutionalist' to `neoliberal institutionalist' or `liberal 
institutionalist"' (Keohane, 1993b: 298 fn 3). 
'It might be suggested that the institutionalist model can be re-read to contain a reflexive dimension 
because of the iterative nature of the games it assumes are played by actors. In particular, 
institutionalism assumes that actors value future rewards, and this could be understood as a form of 
ability to acquire knowledge and reflexive awareness. However, it is important to recognise that the 
knowledge of actors in the institutionalist account is given by assumption, such that they merely 
respond to patterns of incentives generated in their external environment. It makes no assertions about 
their basic identity as actors because their knowledge is not internalised through a process of 
socialisation. Thus the iterative games played by actors in the institutionalist model does not require 
them to behave reflexively and engage in learning. Instead actors merely respond mechanistically to 
external incentives. 
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Nevertheless, despite the potential tensions in its analysis of international institutions, 
the institutionalist model of the international system does make relatively clear 
predictions about both the sources of power for states, and the level and type of 
institutionalisation expected within the international system. The predominant source 
of power for states in the international system, at least where relations are conducted 
in the context of complex interdependence, will be the absolute gains to be made 
through states' functional incentives to co-operate (Baldwin, 1993: 5-6). Keohane and 
others have accepted that pursuit of absolute gains is to some extent conditional, and 
there are debates about the precise nature of these conditions (Keohane, 1993: 278- 
283; see also Powell, 1993). However, Keohane is clear that institutionalism's focus 
on absolute gains constitutes a key prediction that may be tested against patterns of 
behaviour in the emerging international system (Keohane, 1993: 284-291). 
Institutionalisation is likely to take place between advanced industrialised states only, 
where there are strong potential incentives to cooperate. Where patterns of 
interdependence between states are poorly developed and/or highly asymmetrical, 
potential incentives to cooperate will be weaker and regimes will tend not to form in 
the absence of a hegemon. The type of institutionalisation expected will be that which 
is organised around norms of specific reciprocity, reflecting states rational incentives 
to cooperate to receive mutual benefits on a tit-for-tat basis. Finally, the level of 
institutionalisation expected by institutionalists under conditions of complex 
interdependence is best described as moderate or between advanced industrial states 
only. This is in contrast to both the comparatively low level of institutionalisation 
predicted by neorealism and the comparatively high level of institutionalisation 
expected by liberalism in a late stage of development of the international system (see 
below). 
In summary, three aspects of the insititutionalist model of the international system 
have been highlighted. First, like neorealism insititutionalism takes on an essentially 
reproductive rather than a transformative logic. Second, unlike neorealism, 
institutionalism is committed to the assumption that states behave as rational actors. 
As such it lacks a theory of identity construction and socialisation within the 
international system. Finally, institutionalists predict that the predominant source of 
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power in the international system will be the absolute gains they can make from 
international cooperation, that the level of institutionalisation in the international 
system will be moderate (between advanced industrial states only), and that the type 
of institutionalisation that will occur will be organised around norms of specific 
reciprocity. 
The Liberal Model 
The key variable in explaining international behaviour and outcomes identified in the 
liberal model of the international system is variation in the configuration of state 
preferences (Moravcsik, 1997: 513). State preferences are defined as fundamental 
social purposes which provide the basis for the strategic calculations made by 
governments (Moravcsik, 1997: 513). Preferences may be understood as reflecting an 
underlying political identity derived from sets of domestic political values and ideas, 
commercial/economic interests and political institutions (Morvacsik, 1997: 524-533). 
However, liberalism's stress on the importance of states' preferences in determining 
international outcomes should not be understood as undermining its ability to account 
for the impact of international anarchy for state behaviour. Indeed, one of the 
distinctive features of the liberal model is that it develops a theory of state identity 
construction within the international system based on a very particular view of the 
nature and long term effects of the structure provided by international anarchy. 
A liberal theory of international relations builds upon the insights of constructivism, a 
point which has been acknowledged by advocates of both these theoretical 
persuasions (Wendt, 1992: 394; Moravcsik, 1997: 539-540). In particular, liberalism 
adopts what the prominent constructivist David Dessler refers to as a transformational 
model of structure (Dessler 1989: 452-454). Within a transformational model of 
structure, the dynamics of the international system can push it towards fundamental 
change rather than simple reproduction. A transformational model of structure 
requires a very particular conceptualisation of the mechanisms through which the 
international system is constituted. In the transformational model units and structures 
"are understood as "`codetermined' or `mutually constituted' entities" which are of 
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equal and irreducible ontological status (Wendt, 1987: 339). Structures exist "only 
through the medium of the agents and practices they constitute" (Wendt, 1987: 360). 
Thus structure is conceptualised as enabling as well as constraining and as internal to 
actors rather than external to them because "state action is possible only if there exist 
the instruments through which that action can in fact be carried out" (Dessler, 
1989: 453). Thus in the transformational model, structure is viewed as more than 
simply an arrangement of actors. Rather, anarchy is conceptualised as a set of rules 
and resources which are continuously and recursively drawn upon by units in an 
ongoing process of development and change within the international system. In this 
context, rules refer to frameworks of meaning and resources to physical attributes 
through which units communicate with one another (Dessler, 1989: 452-454). Thus the 
ontological status of international anarchy in a liberal theory of international politics 
differs fundamentally from neorealist and institutionalist models. 
The implications of liberalism's adoption of a transformational model of structure are 
two fold. First, liberalism is not necessarily committed to a narrowly state-centric 
view of the international system. If structure is viewed purely as an arrangement of 
actors as in the positional model, the broad historical context within which units 
operate is not relevant to its characteristics. By contrast, if structure is viewed as a set 
of rules and resources drawn upon recursively by units in an ongoing process of 
historical change, then the social, economic and political characteristics of the units 
become important for the overall trajectory of development produced in and through 
the structural effects generated by the system as a whole. As Moravcsik notes, in 
contrast to neorealism and institutionalism, the view of system structure adopted by a 
liberal model of the international system "forges a direct causal link between 
economic, political and social change and state behaviour in world politics" 
(Moravcsik, 1997: 535). In particular, liberalism stresses the significance of modernity 
in terms of the development of world society for overall patterns of change within the 
international system. Thus "(o)ver the modern period the principles of international 
order have been decreasingly linked to dynastic legitimacy and increasingly tied to 
factors directly drawn from ... liberal theory" in the form of sets of domestic political 
values and ideas, commercial/economic interests and political institutions compatible 
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with liberal state preferences (Moravcsik, 1997: 535). Liberalism's conceptualisation 
of structure in terms of rules and resources means that it adopts an inherently `critical' 
approach to international anarchy. 
Second, liberalism's view of structure as rules and resources allows it to adopt a view 
of anarchy which is, in principle, always potentially open to transformation by the 
actors which constitute it. As Wendt remarks, "social structures are only instantiated 
by the practices of agents. The deep structure of the states system, for example, only 
exists in virtue of the recognition of certain rules and the performance of certain 
practices by states" (Wendt, 1987: 359). However, a liberal theory of international 
relations also goes beyond the constructivist view that "anarchy is what states make of 
it" (Wendt, 1992). As Huntley identifies, it also specifies a set of determinate 
historical and sociological dynamics which encourage the emergence and perpetuation 
of these tendencies in the form of the long term effects of competition and 
socialisation within the international system (Huntley, 1996: 57-62). Liberalism's 
conceptualisation of the mechanisms through which the international system is 
constituted can be represented as set out in the matrix in Figure 1 below. The top left 
box of the matrix represents an international system which is constituted along the 
lines suggested by neorealism, whereby the structure of international anarchy results 
in its simple reproduction. Within this model, units within the system have limited 
discretionary power because regardless of their intentions outcomes will remain 
confined to relatively limited ranges. The bottom left box of the matrix represents an 
international system in which the structure of international anarchy has generated 
unintended consequences which have acted to encourage system transformation 
through competition and socialisation processes. For example, Huntley discusses the 
ways in which liberal states will tend to outperform non-liberal states in long term 
competition, and similarly identifies liberal states' capacity to be trusted as casting a 
long `shadow of the future' effect, thereby unwittingly socialising them to the liberal 
peace (Huntley, 1996: 57-58). 
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Thus Huntley identifies important ways in which within the liberal model of the 
international system, anarchy is "`both a constraining and dispensing force' and a 
force for transformation and progress" (Huntley, 1996: 61). As Moravcsik suggests, 
liberalism provides a framework able to provide an explanatory account of systemic 
level transformations which complements constructivist insights concerning the 
ontological status of anarchy in international relations theory (Moravcsik, 1997: 540). 
Liberalism therefore both draws upon and moves beyond the claim of constructivists 
that "there is no logic of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate 
one structure of identities and interests rather than another" (Wendt, ' 1992: 395). In 
this sense, a liberal theory of international relations has affinities with neorealism in as 
much as anarchy is viewed as having important generative consequences. Yet, unlike 
the neorealist model, liberalism "is able to offer a conception of structure that 
accounts for its own transformation" (Huntley, 1996: 61). Within the liberal model 
there is a definite `logic of anarchy', but rather than this logic being reproductive as 
neorealists suggest, it is fundamentally transformative. 
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It is the bottom right hand corner of the matrix, however, which is perhaps the most 
distinctive element of a liberal model of the international system. It stresses the 
importance of `cultural change' for the operation of competition and socialisation 
within the international system (see Wendt et al, 1996). Unlike the unintended effects 
of international anarchy, cultural change involves conscious human agency and 
intentional choice, and as such is crucially important at the margins. This draws 
attention to the ways in which the liberal model understands competition and 
socialisation in the international system as operating at least partly through the 
dynamic interplay of state agency or action and anarchic structure. Competition and 
socialisation cannot be considered unit level phenomenon because they operate at 
least partly through the unintended effects generated by international anarchy, thus 
imbuing them with a systemic quality. Yet nor can they be considered purely as the 
unintended outcome of the structure provided by international anarchy because at the 
margins of system change states' intentions are crucially important. As liberal culture 
expands globally, states' conscious and intentional choices reinforce the already 
powerful long term unintended effects of competition and socialisation which push 
states towards the adoption of liberal norms of behaviour. This process will continue 
until a genuinely stable equilibrium has been reached as the ideal of peaceful 
federation of liberal democratic states on a global scale is approximated. It is therefore 
the bottom right hand box of the matrix which draws out the full implications of 
liberalism's reliance on a transformational model of structure for its understanding of 
system composition and dynamics. The role played by cultural change within the 
liberal model of international relations means that although it adopts the same 
modalities of system reproduction suggested by neorealism - competition, 
socialisation and equilibrium - it nevertheless understands these central characteristics 
in very different terms. 
The special place that cultural change has in liberalism's conceptualisation of 
competition and socialisation processes draws attention to important differences and 
similarities it has with other theories of the international system. The liberal model's 
most distinctive feature is that it adopts a more differentiated view of the composition 
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of the international system than that adopted by neorealism and institutionalism. 
Whilst neorealism focuses primarily on the effects of structure and institutionalism 
primarily on the effects of process, liberalism's analysis of system composition and 
dynamics requires a focus on unit-structure interaction within the international 
system. Liberalism suggests that an international system is not necessarily defined and 
constituted within limits tightly set by its structure. Instead, it is the reflexive 
component of system organisation - the interaction of states' intentional choices with 
the long term unintended consequences of anarchic structure - which is of greater 
overall historical significance for the trajectory of the international system. 
Nevertheless, important parallels between the neorealist and liberal theories of the 
international system remain which set them apart from institutionalism. First, unlike 
insititutionalism but like neorealism, liberalism offers a theory of state identity 
construction and socialisation within the international system which is directly related 
to its conception of the generative effects of international anarchy. As Huntley 
identifies, the liberal model parallels neorealism in as much as there are powerful 
"homogenising" influences within the international system in which "competition and 
socialisation ... (work) dynamically, promoting convergence towards the rule of law" 
both within and between states (Huntley, 1996: 57 and 59). Second, because of their 
shared reliance upon the socialisation of units to conceptualise dynamics within the 
international system, liberalism shares with neorealism a conception of the state as a 
reflexive rather than a rational actor. This is because units' abilities to be `socialised' 
presuppose their ability to internalise appropriate patterns of behaviour and deploying 
this understanding knowledgeably in contexts of action. Unlike neorealism, state 
identity is not shaped within pregiven parameters because the model of structure 
adopted by a liberal theory of international relations is essentially transformative. 
Indeed, within the liberal model the ability of actors to engage reflexively with the 
international environment is critical to the process of cultural change which drives 
systemic transformation. However, differences between neorealism and liberalism in 
terms of their conceptualisation of the fundamental nature and long term 
consequences of anarchy should not detract from their shared view of the state as a 
knowledgeable, reflexive agent. 
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Moravcsik makes the argument that a liberal model of international relations relies on 
the assumption that states are comprised of aggregates of individuals and groups 
which are "on the average rational", citing the authority of Kant on this issue 
(Moravcsik, 1997: 516 and 517 fn 7). Such a claim would seem to indicate that 
liberalism shares with institutionalism a commitment to the assumption of actor 
rationality. The validity of this claim, however, is dependent upon the precise 
definition of `rationality' Moravcsik adopts. His conception of rationality, however, is 
ambiguous given the lack of any clear definition of this term within his paper. If by 
`rationality' Moravcsik means the ability to rank preferences whilst making a priori 
assumptions about actor identity in the manner suggested by institutionalists, this is 
incompatible with a liberal model of international relations. As has been identified, a 
liberal model of the international system is oriented towards providing an account of 
the socialisation of agents through a process of learning involving cultural change. By 
contrast, if Moravcsik's understanding of `rationality' refers to the ability of agents to 
reason autonomously about the conditions under which they interact with others 
through the use of their cognitive faculties, this is a position compatible with a liberal 
model of international relations. However, such behaviour is more usefully depicted 
as reflexive rather than rational for two related reasons. First, it draws attention to the 
way in which, within the liberal model, the state is viewed as an agent rather than 
merely as an object which responds mechanistically to patterns of incentives provided 
by an external environment. This becomes particularly important in providing a 
theoretical explanation for the possibility of `fundamentalist' behaviour, as is 
discussed below. Second, it draws attention to the clear distinction which must be 
drawn between the conception of the state offered by the institutionalist and liberal 
models of international relations. In consequence, it also highlights important 
differences between institutionalism and liberalism in terms of their conceptualisation 
of mechanisms through which the international system is constituted. 
Liberalism's stress on the importance of the reflexive component of system 
organisation allows it to identify the ways in which competition and socialisation 
encourage the expansion of a `Pacific Federation' of liberal states in a dynamic way 
through recursivity effects within the international system. That is to say, the systemic 
57 
forces of competition and socialisation generate a strong, "dialectical `causal loop"' of 
self-reinforcing positive feedback (Huntley, 1996: 59). This feedback loop furthers 
systemic incentives towards further changes in state identity conducive to continued 
progressive change within the international system. As positive feedback gathers 
historical momentum within the international system through recursivity effects, the 
international system will come to embody higher and higher levels of reflexivity. That 
is to say, the socialisation effects generated by the liberal core encourage states at the 
margins of change to adopt shifts in their underlying identity, a process which in turn 
feeds back into the properties of the system by strengthening the liberal core. Within 
an international system characterised by high levels of reflexivity, units within the 
international system will acquire a high degree of autonomy of action in as much as 
the underlying political identity their foreign policy preferences reflects will become 
critically important to the determination of systemic outcomes. Under these 
conditions, liberalism's focus on state preferences as the key variable affecting state 
behaviour allows it to make predictions about the behaviour of states which fall 
outside the ranges provided by either neorealist or institutionalist international 
relations theory. In particular, liberalism stresses that it is the configuration of state 
preferences which is the important factor in explaining patterns of international 
behaviour and outcomes (Moravcsik, 1997: 523). Liberalism suggests that under 
circumstances where states do acquire a high capacity for autonomous action, patterns 
of behaviour within the international system become determined through a process of 
"strategic interaction" between states' different political preferences. Thus "the 
expected behaviour of any single state .... reflect not simply its own preferences, but 
the configuration of all states linked by patterns of significant policy 
interdependence" (Moravcsik, 1997: 523; also 545 for use of term, `strategic 
interaction'). 
It is important to recognise that a system in which levels of reflexivity is high also 
opens up the possibility that states which persistently articulate a non-liberal identity 
within the international system will rekindle the tendency of international anarchy 
towards conflict and violence. At this stage of development of the international 
system, the top right hand corner of the matrix in Figure 1 above also becomes 
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important to the determination of outcomes within the liberal model. It is possible to 
identify such behaviour as being fundamentalist in origin. It persists, even though the 
state concerned will be severely punished by the dominant liberal core, and may even 
risk elimination as a serious actor within the system. That is to say, the behaviour 
represents a response to the high levels of autonomy acquired by actors rather than 
being determined by structures of constraint as might be suggested by neorealism. 
Such behaviour is beyond theoretical explanation by rationalist models, since only 
actors capable of persistently failing to internalise a liberal-cosmopolitan political 
identity in the face of a plurality of possible options are capable of fundamentalist 
behaviour. Moreover, it is also the case that fundamentalist behaviour can be 
important for explaining overall patterns of behaviour and outcomes within the 
international system. In particular, fundamentalist behaviour has the effect of pushing 
the international system away from transformation and back towards simple 
reproduction. As Moravcsik points out, "socialisation towards convergent norms stem 
from convergent domestic institutions and ideas. Liberal institutions and norms may 
be particularly conducive to the promotion of peace and co-operation, but the 
argument also implies that the convergence of nonliberal values ... may also have 
significant effects" (Moravcsik, 1997: 540, authors emphasis). The possibility of 
fundamentalist behaviour on behalf of units within the international system therefore 
draws attention to the explanatory importance of conceptualising the state as 
knowledgeable and reflexive rather than as a rational actor. 
Related to its conception of system composition and dynamics, a liberal theory of 
international relations also develops an associated understanding of the nature of 
power for states within the international system (Moravcsik, 1997: 523). In an 
international system where levels of reflexivity are high, the autonomy of action 
acquired by states means that information about their underlying strategic intentions is 
the critical factor in the determination of behaviour and outcomes. Under these 
circumstances, being transparent about their foreign policy preferences becomes a 
highly effective way for states to influence the overall trajectory of international 
change. In particular, clearly conveying preferences reflecting a benign set of strategic 
intentions to other states will allow them to establish their relations with others on the 
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basis of trust. Trust between states may be identified as a form of institutionalisation 
within the international system, and more specifically reflects norms of what Keohane 
refers to as diffuse reciprocity. In contrast to specific reciprocity, diffuse reciprocity 
does not depend on exchanging items of equivalence in delimited sequence, but rather 
upon meeting obligations by "conforming to generally accepted standards of 
behaviour" (Keohane, 1989b: 134). Neorealism suggests, and institutionalism accepts, 
that the anarchic nature of the international system inherently tends to breed mistrust 
between states, regardless of their intentions towards one another, thereby placing 
important constraints on the ranges within which patterns of interaction within the 
international system can occur. By contrast, the liberal model of the international 
system counters this argument by suggesting that when levels of reflexivity in the 
international system are high, trust becomes the predominant source of power for 
states within the international system. 
Here, liberalism may again draw fruitfully upon constructivist insights. Sustaining the 
trust of others allows states to establish a basis for common action with other states 
based upon "feelings of solidarity, community, and loyalty and thus for collective 
definitions of interest" (Wendt, 1994: 386, emphasis added). Keohane notes that in 
relations characterised by norms of diffuse reciprocity, actors contribute their share or 
behave well towards others "not because of ensuing rewards form specific actors, but 
in the interest of continuing satisfactory overall results for the group of which one is a 
part, as a whole" (Keohane, 1989b: 146). He recognises that "such norms need not 
imply altruism ... (but) can consist of standards of behaviour which are widely 
regarded as legitimate; they do not necessarily embody ethical principles that override 
self-interest" (Keohane, 1989b: 147)2. Wendt, however, goes further in identifying the 
way in which collective definitions of interest - or what he refers to as a collective 
identity - can act as a positive source of power for states. He notes that acting on the 
basis of interests derived from a collective identity "does not mean that actors are 
2 There are strong potential linkages here with the analysis of legitimacy and community in 
international society provided by the English School of international relations. As Burrell notes in his 
discussion of regime theory from an international society perspective, "the status of the norm of 
reciprocity (within rationalist approaches) raises serious difficulties. It is seen as an ahistorical and 
acultural norm .... But there 
is a powerful argument that its functioning depend on a pre-existing sense 
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irrational or no longer calculate costs and benefits but, rather, that they do so on a 
higher level of social aggregation. This discourages free riding by increasing diffuse 
reciprocity and the willingness to bear costs without selective incentives" (Wendt, 
1994: 386). For example, Wendt argues that collective identity can form an important 
basis for "states to make commitments to multilateral action against non-specific 
threat... (by) providing an important foundation for it by increasing the willingness to 
act on `generalised principles of conduct' and diffuse reciprocity" (Wendt, 1994: 386). 
Overall, therefore, liberalism suggests that when levels of reflexivity in the 
international system are high, sustaining the trust of others is a source of power for 
states in the sense that it allows states to act in ways which they would not otherwise 
be able to. In particular, states will be able to form more deeply institutionalised ties 
with one another than neorealism and institutionalism predict is likely or even 
possible. 
It is extremely important to distinguish between the type of information flow stressed 
by liberalism, and the kinds of information flow identified as theoretically significant 
by institutionalists. If a state's strategic preferences are benign, transparency helps 
promote trust between states, a form of diffuse reciprocity proving a basis for 
collective identity and solidarity founded on mutual obligations. This is the type of 
information flow stressed by liberalism. By contrast, Keohane is clear that the type of 
information flow stressed by institutionalism's theory of regimes promotes and 
facilitates only specific reciprocity. The information exchanged between the actors 
does not relate to their underlying strategic intentions towards one another, but rather 
reflects a process of strategic bargaining for tit-for-tat exchange. Thus the type of 
information flow represented by transparency about underlying intentions is beyond 
theoretical explanation by a functional theory of regimes. This distinction is important 
to draw attention to for two reasons. First, it highlights the primacy of state 
preferences as the key variable in the liberal model, in contrast to institutionalism's 
focus purely on non-preference related information as a factor influencing state 
behaviour. Second, the distinction is of fundamental theoretical significance, and yet 
of community, or at least that it is itself reflective of that community. And the more that reciprocity 
becomes generalised and diffuse, the more it tends to be synonymous with fairness" (ilurrell, 1993: 68). 
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has been glossed over in the debates between neorealists and institutionalists. In his 
summary of these debates, for example, Baldwin identifies `intentions versus 
capabilities' as one of six key "focal points" for discussion between these schools of 
thought (Baldwin, 1993: 7-8 and 4). However, the inclusion of this focal point perhaps 
more accurately reflect institutionalists' tendencies to hold personal sympathies for 
liberal arguments about the nature of the international system rather than being 
derived logically from institutionalist theory. 
Related to its predictions about the sources of power for states in the international 
system when levels of reflexivity are high, liberalism also provides predictions about 
the levels and type of institutionalisation which will take place between states under 
these conditions. Liberalism predicts that in an international system in the late or 
mature stages of development, levels of institutionalisation will be high in contrast to 
the moderate and low levels of institutionalisation predicted by institutionalism and 
neorealism respectively. They suggest that states can begin to challenge the 
uncertainty and mistrust they, along with neorealists, assume is necessarily a feature 
of an anarchic international system. Furthermore, contrary to institutionalism which 
holds that states incentives to institutionalise their behaviour will be strongest between 
advanced industrialised states because only these types of relations may be modelled 
in terms of a Prisoner's Dilemma, liberalism suggests that states' incentives to 
institutionalise aspects of their behaviour will be strongest at the margins of change 
within an international system characterised by high levels of reflexivity. States 
within the core which have already engaged in cultural change face relatively low 
incentives to become socialised to the system's dominant norms since they have 
already internalised them. Peaceful relations between these states emerge as an 
unintended consequence of the structure of the interaction between their shared 
political identities. It is therefore between the core and the periphery in the 
international system that socialisation effects generated by the system as a whole 
operate most powerfully within the liberal model. Whilst these states may be formally 
non-liberal, they face intense systemic pressures to internalise shifts in their political 
identity compatible within the overall trajectory of international change. A liberal 
theory of international relations predicts not only higher absolute levels of 
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institutionalisation within the international system than insititutionalism - it also 
suggests that there will be higher levels of institutionalisation at the margins of system 
change. 
In terms of the type of institutionalisation predicted, liberalism suggests that, under 
conditions in which levels of reflexivity in the international system are high, relations 
between states will become organised around norms of diffuse reciprocity. The global 
international system at this stage in development will be overwhelmingly dominated 
by a security community of liberal democratic states. Relationships between states 
within such an international system will be increasingly conducted on the basis of 
trust. This has important implications for the form of relations between states. In 
particular, it implies that states will begin to negotiate and sustain their relationships 
on the basis of mutual independence, and thereby in terms of equality between 
partners. This follows by logical extension from Keohane's definition of the general 
concept of reciprocity. Keohane suggests that both specific and diffuse reciprocity 
share two core features. First reciprocity implies contingency because it involves 
conditional action. Second, reciprocity implies at least a rough equivalence of 
benefits. Within specific reciprocity, these features are only weakly developed on a tit 
for tat basis. However, within diffuse reciprocity these features become more strongly 
developed. Exchange becomes contingent upon parties taking on obligations towards 
one another on the basis of independent and autonomous choice, such that the 
relationship becomes a partnership rather than merely contractual in nature. In turn, 
this implies equivalence in the sense that parties to exchange regard these obligations 
as mutual. 
In summary, three aspects of the liberal model of the international system have been 
highlighted. First, a liberal model of international relations adopts a transformational 
model of structure in which international anarchy is understood as a set of rules and 
resources recursively drawn into an ongoing process of development within the 
international system. Second, liberalism is not committed to the assumption that states 
are rational actors. Like neorealism, liberalism relies on the generative consequences 
of anarchy in combination with the idea that units are capable of acting as reflexive 
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agents. Consequently liberalism provides a theory of state identity construction and 
socialisation within the international system. Thirdly, liberalism offers a distinctive 
set of predictions about the international system in a late stage of development. It 
holds that under these conditions trust will become the dominant source of power for 
states within the international system. The level of institutionalisation associated with 
a system in this stage of development will be high (including at the margins of 
cultural change), and the type of institutionalisation which takes place will be 
organised around norms of diffuse reciprocity. 
Having outlined each of the three models of the international system, Table I 
summarises their central attributes: 
Table 1: Summary Of Theoretical Framework 
Key Variable State-as- Status Of Source of Level of Type Of 
actor Anarchy State Institutio- Institution- 
Power nalisation alisation 
Neorealism Configuration Reflexive Reproductive Relative Low Institutionali 




Institutionalism Configuration Rational Reproductive Functional Moderate Specific 
of incentives (Between Reciprocity 
Information to cooperate core states 
and only) 
Institutions 
Liberalism Configuration Reflexive Transformative Trust about High Diffuse 
of State underlying (Including Reciprocity 
Preferences strategic core- 
intentions periphery 
margin) 
Towards A General Theoretical Synthesis 
The final section of this -chapter analyses the relationship between neorealist, 
institutionalist and liberal theories of the international system outlined and the 
prospects for a general synthesis between them. The discussion shall be framed 
around a comparison of what shall be referred to as the `linear' and the `triangular' 
conceptualisations of the relationship between the three theories. Each of these 
competing conceptualisations of the relationship between the three models under 
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discussion suggest the possibility of a synthesis of competing theories of the 
international system. However, they differ over the issue of the terms on which such a 
synthesis can be achieved. In turn, this has important implications for the content of 
substantive research programmes within the discipline of international relations after 
the Cold War. 
Prominent institutionalists have characterised institutionalism as a school of thought 
in terms of a `mid-point' between the two extremes of neorealism and liberalism. 
According to Keohane, neorealism's central characteristic is its stress on the 
importance of system structure for determining international behaviour and outcomes 
(Keohane, 1989a: 7-8). Its approach is a rationalist one which makes the assumption 
that state preferences are exogenous to the explanation of international behaviour and 
outcomes (Keohane, 1989c: 160). By contrast, liberalism "stresses the role of human 
created institutions in affecting how aggregations of individuals make collective 
decisions. It emphasises the importance of changeable political processes rather than 
simply of immutable structures, and it rests on a belief in at least the possibility of 
cumulative progress in human affairs" (Keohane, 1989a: 10). Liberalism is reflectivist 
in as much as it emphasises "the importance of human reflection for the nature of 
institutions and ultimately for the character of world politics". As such it is essentially 
hermeneutic or interpretative in orientation (Keohane, 1989c: 161). On the basis of 
these arguments, Keohane arrives at the conclusion that "institutionalists accept a 
version of liberal principles' that eschews determinism and that emphasises the 
pervasive significance of international institutions without denigrating the role of state 
power" (Keohane, 1989a: 11). Understood in these terms, institutionalism is uniquely 
positioned to draw upon and incorporate the strongest elements of neorealism and 
liberalism into its own analysis. 
Keohane's analysis implies what shall be referred to as a `linear' conceptualisation of 
the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism. In this view, 
institutionalism is seen as providing the point of synthesis on a spectrum that runs 
between neorealism and liberalism as depicted in Figure 2 below: 
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Figure 2: The Linear Model 
NR IL 
Rationalism Reflectivism 
A linear conceptualisation of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism 
and liberalism suggests the intuitively plausible argument that neorealism is closer to 
institutionalism in terms of its understanding of the composition and dynamics of the 
international system than are neorealism and liberalism. On the basis of the 
understanding of neorealism he adopts, Keohane reasons that neorealism and 
institutionalism share a rationalistic approach to international relations theory 
(Keohane, 1989c: 160). By contrast, although institutionalism and liberalism have a 
common concern with the origins and persistence of international institutions, their 
approaches differ in as much as the former is rationalist and the latter is reflectivist in 
orientation (Keohane, 1989c: 171). Thus, on Keohane's account, whilst neorealism 
and institutionalism share a rationalistic approach to the study of international 
relations, and institutionalism and liberalism adopt a shared concern with international 
institutions, neorealism and liberalism have no theoretically significant commonalties. 
Keohane's opinions on the nature of the relationship between the different schools of 
thought in international relations theory have led directly to his assertions on future 
research within the discipline of international relations. In particular, Keohane's view 
that only institutionalism allows researchers to provide an adequate account of 
international institutions leads him to suggest that future research within the field 
should engage in attempts to refine rationalist models, both conceptually and, more 
importantly, through empirical research (Keohane, 1989a: 12-16). More recently, 
Keohane has set out the rationalist research programme in more detail. Conceptually, 
he suggests that debates should focus on the precise conditions under which states will 
be concerned about relative and absolute gains (Keohane, 1993b: 273-283). 
Empirically, researchers should seek to test neorealist against institutionalist theory in 
the context of the emerging post-Cold War international system. Specifically, 
Keohane argues that Western Europe provides the most fruitful context in which to 
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test competing rationalist theories of international relations. Here Keohane is 
responding to the prediction made by the prominent neorealist John Mearsheimer, and 
echoed by Waltz himself, that a united Germany in the centre of Europe would lead 
this region `back to the future' (Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz 1993). On the basis of 
Mearsheimer's argument, Keohane argues that Europe is an area of the world where 
neorealism and institutionalism develop divergent hypothesises about the nature of 
international change (Keohane, 199b: 272-273). He does qualify his argument with an 
acknowledgement that the end of the Cold War, a development which was 
unanticipated by most IR scholars, may suggest that academic debates in international 
relations theory may have been overtaken by the pace of international change 
(Keohane, 1993: 297). Nevertheless, the thrust of his argument is clear - that attempts 
to refine rationalist models are likely to demonstrate that insititutionalism provides the 
most fruitful terrain for a general synthesis of competing theories of international 
relations. 
However, it is possible to develop a different conceptualisation of the relationship 
between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism as models of the international 
system which has the implication of challenging Keohane's conclusions. The starting 
point for this alternative approach is to challenge the institutionalist's interpretation of 
neorealism as a rationalist model of the international system. As has been highlighted, 
this assumption both runs explicitly against both the wishes of Waltz, and the logic of 
neorealist analysis. Instead of making rational actor assumptions, neorealism develops 
a theory of state identity construction and socialisation within the international system 
arising from the generative consequences of international anarchy. In this sense, 
neorealism adopts a reflexivist logic and is closer to liberalism than it is to 
insistitutionalism's rational choice framework. Thus rather than conceiving of the 
relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism in terms of a linear 
spectrum, it is more accurate to conceptualise the relationship between the three 
models in triangular terms. Within such a conceptualisation, debates between 
neorealists and institutionalists constitute the rationalist leg of the triangle because 
neorealism's commitment to a positional model of structure means that it is 
potentially amenable to a rationalist interpretation, as insistitutionalists have 
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attempted to exploit. By contrast, debates between neorealists and liberals about the 
generative consequences of international anarchy and the overall trajectory of state 
identity construction and socialisation within the international system constitute the 
reflexivist leg of the triangle' The triangular model of the relationship between 
neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system is illustrated 
in Figure 3 below: 
Figure 3: The Triangular Model 
NR 
Rationality Reflexivity 
(Rational choice) (Identity construction/ 
socialisation) 
I L 
Such a conceptualisation of the relationship between realism, insititutionalism and 
liberalism as theories of the international system has important implications for 
understanding the possibilities for a general synthesis of their insights. In particular, it 
calls into question the validity of insistitutionalists' claims that their own theory 
provides the strongest basis for subsuming the research programmes of competing 
approaches. Instead, it suggests that liberalism's focus on the generative consequences 
of international anarchy and the overall trajectory of identity construction and 
socialisation within the international system is likely to be more productive in the 
search for a general synthesis of competing theories of international relations than 
institutionalists' attempts to refine the rationalist models. Liberalism's most important 
characteristic in this regard is the claim that, unlike neorealism, it "provides a 
plausible theoretical explanation for variation in the substantive content of foreign 
policy" (Moravcsik, 1997: 534, emphasis added). Neorealist assumptions about the 
international system hold when states have certain preferences. A liberal model of 
'The third leg of the triangle identifies the links which exist between institutionalism and liberalism. In 
particular, both institutionalism and liberalism stress the importance of institutions for the constitution 
of the international system. However, institutionalism and liberalism makes very different assumptions 
about the fundamental nature of social actors. As such the links which exists between these schools of 
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international relations invites analysts to scrutinise the conditions under which those 
preferences are prevalent (Moravcsik, 1997: 517). Two such conditions suggest 
themselves: situations in which levels of reflexivity in the international system are 
comparatively low due to the long term effects of competition and socialisation being 
poorly established; and situations in which levels of reflexivity in the international 
system are comparatively high, but in which states adopt non-liberal fundamentalist 
political identities in their interactions. This indicates that liberalism offers what 
Moravcsik refers to as a "general account of variation in socialisation" (Moravcsik, 
1997: 540). It demonstrates that "liberal theory remains important, even primary, even 
in what are currently considered `least likely' cases, for example, where there exist 
direct threats to national security, high levels of interstate conflict and large numbers 
of non-liberal states" (Moravcsik, 1997: 541). Indeed, the ability of a liberal model to 
offer an account of variation in socialisation within the international system answers 
the call made by Waltz himself for "a single theory capable of explaining the 
behaviour of states, their interactions, and international outcomes" (Waltz, 1996: 57). 
In this sense, a liberal model of the international system subsumes the research 
programme generated by neorealist analysis, and as such satisfies the criteria for 
theory evaluation against which Waltz himself suggests neorealism should be assessed 
(see Waltz, 1997: 914). 
The account of variation in socialisation offered by a liberal model of systemic 
dynamics is illustrated in Figure 4 below. Curve A depicts a perfect positive 
correlation between the level of institutional density within the international system 
and the contingency of system structure. This illustrates the ways in which levels of 
institutionalisation will rise as the international system comes to embody higher and 
higher levels of reflexivity over time. Curve B suggests a possible modification to the 
basic liberal model which could incorporate some of the insights offered by the 
institutionalist school of thought. Under the scenario envisaged in Curve B, certain 
levels of functional interdependence between states are considered a prerequisite to 
the emergence of a relatively stable core of liberal democratic states. Once this point 
thought are not directly relevant to the overall line of argument being developed by this chapter, and 
shall not be discussed here. 
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has been reached (time period t2 below), then the socialisation effects can begin to 
operate effectively, and levels of institutionalisation will rise more rapidly. The 
overall trend will thus produce a concave curve such as the one depicted. Thus, as 
Moravcsik identifies, a liberal model of the international system is unique in terms of 
its ability to explain "when and why the assumptions about state preferences 
underlying realism and institutionalism hold, whereas the reverse is not the case" 
(Moravcsik, 1997: 543). 
Figure 4 












(Adapted from the matrix suggested in Wendt et. al., 1996: 38) 
The account of variation in socialisation provided by the modified liberal model of the 
international system illustrated in Curve B in Figure 4 above highlights the 
significance of a point of criticality in a developmental sequence of change in the 
international system. Criticality may be identified as a point at which a system's 
emergent properties switch, resulting in a dramatic change in overall patterns of 
alignment within it (see the terminology adopted by Jervis, 1997: 12-17 and 210-252). 
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The type of system effects envisaged by the liberal model are therefore dramatically 
different to those envisaged by neorealism. The neorealist model envisages what 
Jervis refers to as linear system effects, in which negative feedback loops promote 
stability through homeostatic reproduction and path dependent change. It is for this 
reason that the structure of international anarchy fixes international behaviour and 
outcomes within relatively well defined ranges (Jervis, 1997: 92-146). By contrast, the 
system effects envisaged by the liberal model envisage what Jervis refers to as non- 
linear change or "nonlinearities". Within such a system, "there will be a disproportion 
between the magnitude of the cause and the results, which will depend on the system 
as a whole" (Jervis, 1997: 146). In particular, after the point of criticality has been 
reached, what were initially small and insignificant changes within the system can 
build up and suddenly produce an enormous change in the system's overall 
characteristics. A simple example from the physical world is provided by the type of 
spinning top which so designed that, once it spins at above a certain velocity, its 
centre of gravity shifts so that it flips and spins on what was previously its head. 
Within the liberal model of the international system, such a point of criticality is 
provided by the emergence of a stable core of liberal democratic states at a global 
level at time period t2 on Curve B in Figure 4. Up until this point, the existence of 
democratic states within the system may have some significant effect on international 
behaviour and outcomes, but does not result in a fundamental shift in the emergent 
properties of the system as a whole. After this point, however, the structure of 
interaction within the system as a whole changes. The socialisation effects generated 
by the core begin to dramatically transform overall patterns of alignment and change 
within the entire system. 4 
The most obvious point of historical reference for the emergence of a critical mass of 
liberal democratic states is provided by the recent collapse of the Soviet Union. As 
The overall picture which emerges from this synthetic approach resonates strongly with systemic 
dynamics envisaged by Buzan in his attempt to render compatible structural realism and regime theory 
with the insights offered by the English School of international relations theory (Buzan, 1993). Buzan 
attempts to provide a developmental model of systemic change linking structure, process and 
interaction as components of system organisation. Furthermore, to achieve this he adopts a critical 
stance towards conceptualising the relationship between schools of thought often considered distinct in 
their approaches to international relations. The work of at least one major analyst therefore provides at 
least one recent precedent for the enterprise engaged in this chapter. 
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Huntley identifies, "The strikingly rapid collapse of communist ideology and Soviet 
authority marks an historic threshold" for the development of the international system 
(Huntley: 1996: 67). Liberalism is uniquely positioned to be able to both explain this 
development, and account for why it might constitute a point of enormous 
significance for the overall course of historical change in relations between states. 
First, the liberal model could plausibly suggest that the collapse of the Soviet Union 
was not only a cause of system change, as suggested by neorealism, but was itself 
symptomatic of overall historical trends within the international system in terms of the 
long terms effects of competition and socialisation processes. As Huntley argues, "the 
demise of Soviet Style communism is perfectly compatible with the long term 
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patterns of change in international politics" provided by a liberal understanding of 
competition and socialisation within the international system (Huntley, 1996: 67). 
Second, a liberal model of the international system provides a vision of the emerging 
post-Cold War international order which is "sharply divergent" from the predictions 
offered by established theoretical frameworks (Huntley, 1996: 62). It is more 
optimistic about the prospects of a genuinely world-wide Pacific Federation of states, 
positing the idea that systemic dynamics are pushing in this direction across the globe 
(Huntley, 1996: 70-72). It suggests that a realistic vision of the world in the twenty- 
first century is a shift towards the chronic institutionalisation of the international 
environment around liberal norms. Thus, as Huntley identifies, the "new era of world 
politics now emerging seems likely to provide telling tests between opposing 
expectations" of competing theories of international relations (Huntley, 1996: 72). 
In particular, the general synthesis provided by a liberal model of the international 
system suggests a very different research programme to that proposed by 
institutionalists such as Keohane. First, within a European context, the research 
programme is broader than institutionalists anticipate. Liberalism, as well as 
neorealism and institutionalism, develops divergent hypotheses regarding the overall 
nature of change in the post Cold War Europe. As has been identified (see Table 1 
above), these hypotheses encompass both the sources of power for states and the 
levels and type of institutionalisation within the international system. Second, a liberal 
model of international relations suggests that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
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emergence of a relatively stable core of liberal states within the international system 
has implications which extend beyond the confines of Western Europe. Liberalism 
suggests that this is a development affecting the international system at a truly global 
level, affecting the overall trajectory of historical development more strongly at the 
margins of change between the core and the periphery of the international system than 
within the established core itself. Prominent neorealists have identified China and 
Japan as emerging Asian powers which are likely to engage in balancing behaviour 
within this region as part of a more general shift towards global multipolarity (Waltz, 
1993; Layne, 1993). The post Cold War foreign policy behaviour of key East Asian 
states identified by neorealists provide critical tests for liberalism's predictions about 
the overall trajectory of change in the post Cold war international system. States such 
as Japan and China are at the margins of international change in as much as they 
interact in a regional context in which complex patterns of interdependence are not 
clearly established, and there are large numbers of formally non-liberal states. As such 
these cases represent `least likely' cases for the strong predictions offered by the 
liberal model. However, even under these conditions, liberalism makes predictions 
about both the levels and type of institutionalisation and the sources of power between 
states in the East Asia region which go well beyond what might be anticipated by 
institutionalists, even compared to institutionalist's predictions about state behaviour 
within a European context. This suggests that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War has much more dramatic implications for research within the 
discipline than institutionalists anticipate. Indeed, liberalism indicates that the collapse 
of the Soviet Union ought to be considered a development of truly profound 
significance for the study of international relations. 
In summary, this discussion of the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of the 
international system has revealed that it is possible that prominent institutionalists 
have fundamentally misconstrued the nature of the relationship between these schools 
of thought, and in so doing underestimated the possibilities for a general synthesis of 
their insights. Institutionalists have proposed what has been referred to as a linear 
conceptualisation of the relationship between the three models of the international 
system discussed. Understood in these terms, attempts to refine rationalist models of 
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the international system provide the most fruitful research programme for the 
discipline of international relations, and as such the critical focus of applied research 
after the Cold War is identified as the West European region. However, it is possible 
to dispute institutionalists' conclusions by questioning its interpretation of neorealism 
as a fundamentally rationalistic model of the international system. Instead, neorealism 
may be interpreted as adopting a reflexive logic in virtue of its focus on the generative 
consequences of anarchy and the overall trajectory of identity construction and 
socialisation within the international system. This implies a triangular 
conceptualisation of the relationship between the three models in which debates 
between neorealists and institutionalists constitute its rationalist leg, and debates 
between neorealists and liberals constitute its reflexivist leg. Understood in these 
terms, liberalism's focus on the generative consequences of international anarchy and 
the overall trajectory of identity construction and socialisation within the international 
system is - likely to be more productive in the search for a general synthesis of 
competing theories of international relations than institutionalists' attempts to refine 
the rationalist approach. This is because of the ability of liberalism to offer a fully 
generative model of the international system providing an account of variation in 
socialisation which can subsume the research programme generated by both 
neorealism and institutionalism. Such conclusions have important implications for 
substantive research within the discipline, indicating that the collapse of the Soviet 
Union has much more profound implications for the study of the global international 
system than institutionalists have indicated. In particular, the foreign policy behaviour 
of key states in East Asia as well as in a European context will provide critical tests 
for identifying the overall trajectory of change in post Cold war international 
relations. 
Conclusions 
One of the most distinctive features of debates within the discipline of international 
relations over the 1980's and 1990s has been the attempt to pin down systemic 
approaches to the field of enquiry. Systemic level theory offers the promise of 
providing general explanations of recurrent patterns of behaviour in international 
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politics, and as such potentially provides the discipline as a whole the logical rigour 
and explanatory insight that its status as a modem social science demands. 
However, the debates which have taken place between neorealists and institutionalists 
have become increasingly unproductive, both theoretically and empirically. Even 
major contributors to the debate have long recognised it has "tended to obscure rather 
than clarify", and has become increasingly "sterile" (Powell, 1994: 313 and 344). At a 
theoretical level, the attempt by institutionalists to critique the neorealist model of the 
international system has encountered important limitations. In particular, 
institutionalists have proved unable to overcome neorealism's central theoretical 
propositions about the nature and consequences of international anarchy. Yet it is 
important to recognise that the reason for this failure is not simply that 
institutionalists' attempts to take on neorealism on its own terms is a fundamentally 
misconceived endeavour. A more sophisticated approach to identifying the 
deficiencies of institutionalism is to identify the ways in which it fundamentally 
mischaracterised the nature of its relationship with both the neorealist and the liberal 
models of the international system. Institutionalists have developed an uncritical 
understanding of the relationship between schools of thought within the discipline. 
Institutionalists adopt a linear model of the relationship between neorealism, 
institutionalism and liberalism. In this view, institutionalism is seen as providing the 
point of synthesis on a spectrum that runs between neorealism and liberalism and as 
such is the model most likely to be able to reconcile the competing claims of 
alternative positions. However, whilst superficially plausible, such a view of the 
relationship between schools of thought glosses over important similarities between 
neorealism and liberalism as systemic approaches to international relations. Indeed, it 
is possible that it has been institutionalism's commitment to rationalism which has 
actively blocked the development of a model of the international system fully 
compatible with liberal assumptions. A more nuanced approach proposes a triangular 
understanding of the relationship between these three models of the international 
system, with debates between neorealists and institutionalists constituting its 
rationalist leg, and debates between neorealists and liberal constituting its reflexivist 
leg. Such a conceptualisation of the relationship between the three models allows a 
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fuller appreciation of the complex linkages which exist between them, and calls into 
question institutionalists' claims that their own theory provides the most plausible site 
for a general synthesis of the insights of competing perspectives. In particular, it 
highlights the way in which liberalism's distinctive focus on the generative 
consequences of international anarchy allows it to offer an account of variation in 
socialisation within the international system which is capable of subsuming the 
combined research programmes generated by neorealist and institutionalist models. 
Finally, it important to recognise the way in which these abstract theoretical 
considerations have had important implications for the content of substantive research 
programmes within the discipline in the post Cold War period. Proponents of 
neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism have all identified that the collapse of the 
Soviet Union has provided an historic opportunity to test competing theoretical claims 
about the nature of the international system that has begun to emerge after the Cold 
War. Neorealists have developed a broadly pessimistic analysis of the nature of 
international political change after the Cold War, predicting a return to conflictual 
multipolarity on a global scale. The nature of the responses to the challenge laid down 
by neorealists derived from institutionalism and liberalism varies considerably. On the 
basis of their argument that attempts to refine rationalist models of the international 
system are likely to provide the most promising basis for future research, prominent 
institutionalists have suggested that the discipline of international relations should 
focus its enquiries on testing a relatively limited and extraordinarily narrow range of 
propositions about the conditionality of relative gains seeking behaviour, and to do so 
primarily within a West European context. In making these claims, however, 
institutionalists have glossed over the way in which the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
perhaps one of the most significant developments in world politics over the past half a 
century, was not predicted by either neorealist or institutionalist international relations 
theory. As such, they have failed to identify the way in which the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the emergence of a relatively stable body of formally liberal 
democratic states at a global level has raised fundamental questions about the long 
term historical dynamics embodied by the international system. By contrast, 
liberalism's distinctive claim to subsume the insights of the neorealist and 
76 
institutionalist models suggests that it is capable of both accounting for this 
development in terms of the long run effects of competition and socialisation within 
the international system, and of providing a much richer and ultimately more 
challenging agenda for research into the overall nature of post-Cold War international 
change. International relations specialists can and must learn from the debates 
between neorealists and institutionalists that have taken place over the 1980's and 
1990s in order to revitalise systemic level theory for the post-Cold War period. 
However, to do so they need to engage critically with what have become deeply 
ingrained assumptions about systemic level theorising, and think imaginatively about 
the overall trajectory of international political change at the turn of the century. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Germany: Second Chances? 
In his book Modernity And Self Identity, Anthony Giddens begins the opening chapter 
with a discussion of a sociological investigation of divorce and remarriage entitled 
Second Chances by Judith Wallerstein And Sandra Blakesee. This book, Giddens 
notes, "describes the impact of marriage break-up, over a period of some ten years, on 
sixty sets of parents and children. Divorce, the authors point out, is a crisis in 
individuals' personal lives, which presents dangers to their security and sense of well 
being, yet also offers fresh opportunities for their self-development and future 
happiness. Separation and divorce, and their aftermath, can cause long lasting 
anxieties and psychological disturbances; but at the same time the changes brought 
about by the dissolution of a marriage provide possibilities, as the authors put it, to 
`grow emotionally', to `establish new competence and pride' and to `strengthen 
intimate relationships far beyond earlier capacities"' (Giddens, 1991: 10). Giddens 
goes on to record that "going though a phase of mourning, according to Wallerstein 
and Blakesee, is the key to reclaiming oneself after divorce. Anyone who successfully 
`decouples' from his or her previous spouse faces the task of stabilising a `new sense 
of self', a `new sense of identity'..... A separated or divorced person needs moral 
courage to try new relationships and find new interests. Many people in such 
circumstances lose courage in their own judgements and capabilities, and may come 
to feel that planning for the future is valueless ... Overcoming such feelings demands 
persistence in the face of setbacks and a willingness to alter established personal traits 
or habits" (Giddens, 1991: 11). Giddens chooses to open his discussion with a resume 
of Wallerstein and Blakesee's Second Chances because he sees the trends they 
document as symptomatic of the developed institutional reflexivity characteristic of 
late modernity. The self becomes a `reflexive project' sustained though revisable 
narratives of self identity, and it is this phenomenon which is reflected in the 
discussion of the dangers and opportunities created marital breakdown in the book 
Second Chances. 
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Features of Giddens' discussion of Wallerstein and Blakesee's Second Chances 
resonate with themes developed in the literature on Germany's position within the 
post Cold War international system. As the historian Arnulf Baring notes, 
contemporary commentators have spoken of "`a second chance' for Germany" in the 
context of its transition since 1989 (Baring, 1994: 1). Since the peace of Westphalia in 
1648, the so-called `German Question' has played a pivotal role in Europe and the 
wider world. On Baring's account, the German Question stems from Germany's 
location at the centre of Europe and its position in the European balance of power: 
"Germany was, and remains, too weak and at the same time too strong to be easily 
accepted by its neighbours" (Baring, 1994: 2). In the aftermath of the Second World 
War, a temporary solution to the German Question was found only by its division into 
East and West. Germany's turbulent history resulted in separation or `divorce'. 
During this period, Germany became a `semi-sovereign' state in the sense that the 
predominant interpretation of Article 24 of the Federal Republic's constitution 
permitted its participation in systems of collective security but precluded the 
Bundeswehr's involvement in anything other than self-defence activities. As a result, 
over the post-war period it was removed from its traditional position within the 
European balance of power by being subsumed within the wider Cold War 
international order. With the sudden collapse of the Soviet bloc and the (re)unification 
of Germany in 1989, the German Question has been reopened, and it is this which has 
raised the issue of a possible `second chance' for a united Germany. 
Baring himself follows others in making the argument that Germany is unlikely to 
have a second chance to develop a more stable basis for its relations with its partners. 
To Baring, Germany's new position in the centre of Europe is likely to mean a return 
to Germany's `sonderweg' or special path through history (Baring, 1994: 14-17). It 
remains tempting, however, to look more closely at the issue of a possible second 
chance for Germany. Is it possible that, having lived through a period of separation 
and introspection, Germany will be able to change its ways? This chapter seeks to 
answer this question by applying neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of 
international relations to analysing the state strategies adopted by Germany over the 
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first ten years of the post-Cold War period. ' Conclusions will then be drawn as to the 
validity of each of the three models in the case of Germany before returning to reflect 
upon the appropriateness of the theme of `second chances' as a metaphor for 
understanding Germany's behaviour in the emerging international system. 
Neorealism 
A number of analysts have used the neorealist model to make various predictions 
about the behaviour of Germany in the post Cold War international system. Most 
notable of these have been Mearsheimer, Layne and Waltz, who, despite differences 
in emphasis, have drawn upon neorealist theory to arrive at broadly pessimistic 
conclusions about the role a united Germany will play in the emerging structure of 
international politics (Mearsheimer, 1990; Layne, 1993; Waltz, 1993). Nationalist 
historians, most notably Rainer Zitlemann, have also made arguments which resonate 
strongly with the geopolitical logic of the neorealist model,. although to date have 
published only in the German language (Pulzer, 1995: 9-12; Heilbrun, 1996: 82-83). 
Mearsheimer uses the neorealist model to predict a return to conflictual multipolarity 
within Europe itself. He argues that "(t)he departure of the superpowers ... would 
transform Europe from a bipolar to a multipolar system. Germany, France, Britain and 
perhaps Italy would assume major power status; the Soviet Union would decline from 
superpower status but would remain a major European power, giving rise to a system 
of five major powers and a number of lesser powers. The resulting system would 
suffer from the problems common to multipolar systems, and would therefore be 
prone to instability" (Mearsheimer, 1990: 7). The emphasis of Layne and Waltz is on 
the emergence of conflictual multipolarity at a global level, with Germany, Japan and 
China rising to balance US hegemony in the wake of the power vacuum left by the 
' After the September 1998 general election in Germany, the ruling CDU/FDP coalition government 
headed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl was replaced by a new SPD/Green coalition government. The new 
Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, appointed Joschka Fischer of the Green Party as his Foreign Minister. 
Due to the limited period of time which has elapsed since the 1998 elections and the lag in the 
production of specialist international relations literature, there is a shortage of secondary material 
available on the new German government's foreign policy. For this reason, this chapter does not deal 
extensively with the foreign policy pursued by the new German government in the second half of 
1998. 
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collapse of the Soviet Union (Waltz, 1993; Layne, 1993). ' However, there are 
important underlying similarities between the predictions offered by Mearsheimer, 
Layne and Waltz about Germany's role in the emerging structure of international 
politics. First, they see Germany locked into a defensively positional location in post 
Cold War security order. They predict that Germany's position within the structure of 
the post-Cold War international system will encourage it to define its interests 
according to its relative capabilities in order to ensure its continued security. The 
outcomes compatible with such behaviour would be either a return to late nineteenth 
century-style conflictual multipolarity within Europe and/or between Germany and 
the other major global powers. 
Neorealists could point to various aspects of the process of German unification which 
could be interpreted as reinforcing their predictions about the orientation of 
Germany's post Cold War foreign policy. First, they could point to the failure of the 
Kohl administration to consult Anglo-French opinion on -the 
issue of German 
unification before making this policy a stated objective (Horsley, 1992: 230; Muller, 
1993: 129). Second, they could point to the bilateral character of the process of 
negotiations with eastern European countries - notably the Soviet Union and Poland. 
The Germans negotiated with the Soviets independently before taking the agreed 
conditions for German unification to be ratified within the Two Plus Four framework 
(Horsley, 1992: 230; Waltz, 1993: 62). In the case of the bilateral negotiations between 
Germany and Poland, Kohl caused considerable international anxiety by an apparent 
hesitation to guarantee the Oder-Neisse as the permanent eastern border of the united 
Germany (Horsley, 1992: 231-232; Muller, 1993: 146-150). These events could be 
construed as supportive of neorealist hypotheses concerning the state strategies of a 
2 Waltz himself makes the important qualification that Germany's place in the global multipolar 
structure may be taken by a united Europe. Consideration of such a claim is beyond the scope of this 
thesis and would require a separate analysis of the foreign policies of a possible future unified 
European state. However, the consistency of Waltz's position on this issue is disputed by those who 
argue that it is important to examine closely the political form that European integration takes, and the 
terms on which it is achieved with Germany's participation. In particular, it is important to recognise 
that European integration may not culminate in a form of political organisation that resembles the 
classical nation state, and may be achieved on terms other than as an instrument of German hegemony 
in Europe (see Pond and Waltz, 1994). Indeed, even the prominent neorealist Grieco has accepted that 
the validity of Waltz's predictions is being undermined by the dynamics displayed by the process of 
European integration over the 1990s (Grieco, 1996; Grieco, 1999). 
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unified Germany. They point to a refusal of German statesmen to contemplate use of 
multilateral decision making frameworks in cases of decisions where vital interests of 
national security may be at stake. The Polish border incident also reveals an apparent 
willingness to contemplate violation of existing international law when this conflicts 
with potential future German territorial gains in eastward expansion. Furthermore, 
taken together, these incidents reveal just how quickly sloppy diplomatic conduct by a 
unified Germany could unintentionally re-establish traditional security anxieties in a 
European context. Regardless of Germany's actual intentions and motives, countries 
such as Britain, France and Poland suffered considerable worries about German 
behaviour during this period. 
Further evidence in support of neorealist hypotheses comes from German behaviour 
in international crisis situations since unification, most significantly in the form of the 
German initiative for the diplomatic recognition of Croatia in mid-late 1991. Until this 
time, Germany had supported the European and US line that the priority was to keep 
Yugoslavia intact. Yet by December 1991 - on the eve of the Maastricht summit - 
Bonn announced that it would "formally recognise Slovenia and Croatia by the year's 
end even if this meant breaking ranks with the UN, the United States, and the majority 
of its EC partners" (Anderson and Goodman, 1993: 50). This had the effect of 
bringing about formal EC recognition of the two counties in January 1991 (Muller, 
1993: 152). Although formally it had acted within the structures provided by the EC, 
Germany's actions represent a major breach of the EC's formal decision making 
procedures (Muller, 1993: 152). In effect, it had used the threat of unilateral action to 
prompt a change in the European line on the issue. In contrast with its assertiveness in 
the Yugoslav crisis, it is Germany's apparent weakness over its policy in the Gulf 
which may be cited as evidence of German reluctance to follow a multilateral line. In 
the Gulf conflict, the German government contributed over DM16 billion to the allied 
coalition, and also made limited deployments in Turkey and in the Eastern 
Mediterranean (Muller, 1993: 138). However, it was notable for its unwillingness to 
commit ground forces to the area of action of the war - unlike Britain, France and 
Italy. The international crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the Gulf have been seen as 
a testing ground for the effectiveness of European political co-operation on foreign 
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affairs. By implication, they also represent a crucial case for Germany's resolve to 
work within existing frameworks for international co-operation on security issues. In a 
comparative analysis of European states' policies in these two crises, Salmon has 
noted that Germany is one of "a number of states (which) have fairly consistently 
maintained their freedom of manoeuvre" (Salmon, 1992: 235). Salmon makes this 
argument despite the existence of constitutional limitations on Germany's use of force 
in the Gulf which were widely supposed to exist at the time. Salmon argues that both 
crises illustrate "that while consensus might readily be achieved by `reflex' on second 
order problems, on matters of first order importance ... (there arose) forced fissures in 
policy and actions" by EC countries, including Germany (Salmon, 1992: 248). 
Salmon's argument has important implications for assessing the character of 
Germany's response to these international crises. It implies that Germany's policy 
making `reflex' in major international crises still shows a pronounced tendency to 
place its own vital interests and policy making autonomy over the higher order goal of 
a common European response. 
Similarly, Germany's attempts to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, 
its involvement with the formation of a European defence identity and its changing 
attitudes towards the use of military force abroad over the 1990s may also be 
interpreted as being consistent with neorealist logic. In 1994, Germany explicitly 
expressed a desire to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council 
(Bulmer and Paterson, 1996: 18). In line with a neorealist analysis, Heilbrun sees this 
development as indicating that "the Germans will not abandon any of the institutions 
supposed to contain their power, for there is no incentive for them to do so. Instead, 
they will attempt to use these institutions to fulfil their aims" (Heilbrun, 1994: 48). 
The first steps towards the consolidation of the Western European Union came in 
1991 with the Franco-German initiative to establish a Eurocorps (Horsley, 1992: 234- 
235; Muller, 1993: 155). The announcement of this measure caused great anxiety in 
both Britain and the United States, which harboured concerns that Germany intended 
the measure to weaken NATO (Horsley, 1992: 235; Muller, 1993: 156). Furthermore, 
in 1993 Germany took the important step of clarifying the provisions of its 
constitution so as to allow its armed forces to take part in military interventions 
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outside of the NATO area (Heilbrun, 1994: 48; see also Ruhe, 1993: 130). Overall, 
neorealists could find plausible evidence of what Heilbrun identifies as a "return to 
normality" in German security and defence policies (Heilbrun, 1994: 48). That is to 
say, Germany will become increasingly assertive and independent in its pursuit of its 
national security interests, and will respond as other states do to the imperatives of its 
relative position in the international system. 
Aspects of Germany's economic diplomacy and its strategies with regard to the 
process of European integration since 1989 are also amenable to a neorealist 
interpretation. Germany's role in the GATT negotiations during the early-mid 1990s 
revealed potential tensions between its commitment to supporting both France as its 
key partner in the process of European integration whilst at the same time fulfilling its 
commitments to the broader international economic order. France and the US came 
into dispute in the GATT negotiations over the issues of subsidies to agriculture and 
audio-visual production (Wood, 1995: 229). Faced with this tension, the German 
government lent their support to France (at some economic cost to themselves), thus 
forcing American concessions over this issue (Wood, 1995: 230-231). Whilst these 
developments did not hamper the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
negotiations, it does highlight longer term tensions in Germany's relations with the 
US and Europe which may be seen as highly significant from a neorealist perspective. 
More direct tensions in Germany's economic relations with other states emerged in 
the summer of 1992 when the Bundesbank raised German interest rates in the wake of 
inflationary pressures in the German economy arising from the impact of German 
unification. This caused serious economic difficulties in a number of southern 
European states, including France, and most dramatically forced the exit of Britain 
from the ERM. This development greatly strained the Franco-German relationship 
which has historically been central to the dynamic of European integration (Wood, 
1995: 225). It also made Germany vulnerable to the accusation that it was using its 
dominant position in European currency markets to force the costs of unification to be 
borne by its neighbours (Lippert and Stevens-Strohmann, 1993: 50). Such an argument 
is supported by the failure of German politicians to heed the advice offered by the 
Bundesbank during the unification process, which had cautioned against rapid 
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German Economic and Monetary Union (Lippert and Stevens-Strohmann, 1993: 41). 
On a neorealist interpretation, it could be argued that German politicians were willing 
to suspend the imperatives of the Bundesbank where the vital national interests of 
German unification was at stake, but not in subsequent cases where the economic and 
political interests of other ERM members were at risk. As with Germany's behaviour 
in international security crises, Germany appears to have been unwilling to develop a 
reflex of co-operation on issues of first order significance for Germany itself. 
Indeed, Heilbrun goes as far as to propose that there are signs that a united Germany is 
losing interest in the process of deepening European integration with France, and is 
instead attempting to achieve hegemony over eastern Europe in line with the strategy 
it pursued under Bismarck (Heilbrun, 1994: 44; Kirshner, 1996: 169 also recognises 
this possibility). Heilbrun suggests that "Germany is using the widening of the EU as 
a means of emancipating itself from France. The new EU members will allow 
Germany to create a Northern bloc, whose new members are acutely aware of their 
debt to Germany and they may look to Berlin rather than Paris for direction" 
(Heilbrun, 1994: 46). Thus, in Heilbrun's assessment, "Germany .... is creating an old 
fashioned sphere of influence in the East in which Central and Eastern Europe form a 
vital market for German goods and provide cheap labour for German manufactures" 
(Heilbrun, 1994: 47). He even proposes that Germany is now being courted by Russia 
and backs this statement by citing German support for Russian entry into the G-7, 
group against the wishes of the US and Japan in May 1994 (Heilbrun, 1994: 47). It 
may also be possible to interpret the pressure Germany brought to bear on Japan to 
provide economic assistance to the Soviet Union in 1991 in these terms, although this 
does not appear to find explicit support in the available literature. During talks in 
1991, Germany was one of the strongest supporters of the provision of economic 
assistance to the Soviet Union. By contrast, Japan was one of the least forthcoming on 
this issue due to Moscow's refusal to concede territorial rights to the Northern Islands. 
Germany stepped in to mediate over this issue, the result being that tension between 
the two states was considerably reduced (Sato, 1993: 381-382). On a neorealist 
interpretation, Germany's role as a broker on this issue might be understood as 
echoing a Bismarkian attempt to carve out a sphere of influence for itself to its east. 
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Such an assessment of the nature of Germany's state strategies after the Cold War fits 
squarely within the ranges predicted by the neorealist model. 
Overall, it would appear that there is a significant body of literature which would 
favour a neorealist interpretation of German state strategies in the period since 1989. 
Significant aspects of Germany's behaviour in this period tend to point to the 
emergence of a more aggressively unilateral stance in international institutions in 
which it participated in effectively during the Cold War period. There are also signs 
that fundamental incompatibilities of interest are emerging between a united Germany 
and the United States, as well as many of Germany's European partners as illustrated 
through conflicts of interest within NATO over the WEU, the crisis within the ERM, 
and the issue of German influence over eastern Europe. These could point to either the 
emergence of splits within the Atlantic Alliance framework or the beginnings of a 
resurgence of a German hegemony in Europe. All these factors tend to weigh in 
favour of neorealist hypotheses and predictions about united Germany's role in a 
Europe and the wider world after the Cold War. 
Institutionalism 
Germany is a state which may reasonably be assumed to be locked into a complex 
pattern of interdependent relations with the other advanced industrial democracies. 
Institutionalism predicts that, under these conditions, international institutions can 
take on instrumental value for states. Consequently, states will be encouraged to 
institutionalise aspects of their inter-relations so as to maximise their absolute gains 
from interaction. However, where institutionalisation imposes net costs on states in 
the form of requiring considerable flexibility, accommodation and adjustment on their 
behalf, they are likely to reject institutional options. 
Institutionalists can present a significant body of evidence in support of their 
predictions with respect to Germany's state strategies since 1989. First, it is far from 
clear that a neorealist interpretation of Germany's behaviour within the unification 
process is satisfactory. Kohl expressly intended unification to be firmly anchored 
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within both the EC and NATO (Kohl, 1990; Muller, 1993: 128). Moreover, Muller 
identifies that in the first quarter of 1990 alone, there were twenty nine meetings on 
German unity at head of state and ministerial level with Germany's European partners 
(Muller, 1993: 128). Although Germany did not consult either Britain or France before 
engaging in negotiations with the Soviets, it did make sure that they had the backing 
of the United States before proceeding (Muller, 1993: 128). Furthermore, the terms for 
unification negotiated by Kohl reflect a strongly multilateral orientation. It ensured 
continued German membership of NATO, limitations on the size and character of the 
Bundeswehr, and generous economic and technical assistance to the Soviets 
(Macardle Kelleher, 1993: 20; Schlor, 1993: 49). Germany became a signatory of the 
1990 Conventional Forces In Europe (CFE) treaty in which it limited the size of the 
Bundeswehr to 370,000 (Linnenkamp, 1993: 95). Kohl took the further important step 
of renewing Germany's commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
(Muller, 1993: 145). It is also possible that a neorealist interpretation of the Polish 
Border incident is far from unambiguous. Muller argues that Kohl's apparent 
hesitation to agree to this border had little to do with strategic posturing, but instead 
reflected domestic electoral considerations (Muller, 1993: 147). Thus the argument 
that Germany's negotiations within the context of unification were conducted 
bilaterally tends to oversimplify the extent to which this process was heavily 
institutionalised. As Muller notes "given that the highest national interests were at 
stake, the unification process was embedded in an astonishing web of consultations 
and mutual adjustments" (Muller, 1993: 129). 
Germany's post-unification strategies may also be interpreted in the light of 
institutionalist theory. Over the 1990s Germany has displayed consistently strong 
public support for NATO as an essential feature of the European security architecture 
(Kinkel, 1992: 3). Hyde-Price argues that NATO serves important functions for 
Germany. In particular, NATO provides Germany with a firm security guarantee, 
offers a visible demonstration of its continuing integration with the West, ensures a 
US commitment to European security and represents a tried and tested institutional 
framework (Hyde-Price, 1996: 182). For these reasons, "(a)lthough the German 
government has collaborated with France in seeking to develop a European defence 
87 
and security identity ... this 
has not yet resulted in any significant weakening of 
Germany's commitment to NATO. Even with the end of the Cold War, therefore, the 
NATO alliance remains the bedrock of German security policy" (Hyde-Price, 
1996: 181-182; see also Gutjahr, 1995: 308). Germany's support for expansion of the 
NATO framework into eastern Europe may also be understood in institutionalist terms 
with reference to the benefits this would provide for Germany in terms of stabilising 
its transition (Hyde-Price, 1996: 183: Ruhe, 1993: 183). This process has occurred 
both through direct NATO expansion, and through the formation in October 1991 of 
the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), now the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) (Schlor 1994: 46). NACC/PfP has instrumental value because it is able to act as 
a bridge between NATO and the wider European security framework provided by the 
OSCE/CSCE (Kinkel, 1992: 5; Schlor, 1994: 47). Finally, Germany has also been a 
consistent supporter of the CSCE/OSCE process itself over the post Cold War period 
(Hyde-Price, 1996: 187). Although it is important to note that Germany does not see 
the CSCE/OSCE as a substitute for NATO, it does see it as an important complement 
to it. It provides numerous advantages to Germany in its key security aim of helping 
stabilise international relations on its eastern border through a degree of 
institutionalisation (Hyde Price, 1996: 187-8; Muller, 1993: 156-7). From an 
institutionalist perspective, Germany's commitment to multilateral European security 
institutions may be understood in terms of their value to Germany in terms of the 
benefits they bring to its security environment. 
The evolution of Germany's attitudes towards use of its military force outside the 
NATO area over the post-Cold War period may also be interpreted as reflecting 
institutionalist predictions about Germany's behaviour. In an influential Foreign 
Affairs article, Hans Maull has argued that Germany is likely to remain a `civilian 
power' in the post Cold War international order, in as much as it has developed a 
strong commitment to multilateralism and "the concentration on non-military, 
primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a 
residual instrument" (Maull, 1991: 92). Maull's analysis challenges the neorealist 
prediction that, with the end of the Cold War, a united Germany in the centre of 
Europe will be under increasing pressure to `normalise' its behaviour by adopting a 
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more independent and assertive attitude towards the use of its armed forces. In this 
sense, it has affinities with institutionalism's predictions that the multilateral 
frameworks in which Germany has become embedded since the 1950's will continue 
to have value for it after the Cold War. Maull suggests that Germany's reluctance to 
support the use of military force abroad over the 1990s supports his assessment of 
Germany's international behaviour. In his examination of Germany's behaviour 
during the Yugoslav crisis, Maull argues that "although the crisis has pushed 
Germany closer towards full UN military participation in UN and NATO missions, 
this in no way suggests a decisive move away from Bonn's (non-military) post-war 
foreign policy orientation" (Maull, 1995: 126). Meirs identifies the benefits this brings 
to Germany by noting the way in which "when Germany takes a stronger policy line it 
raises suspicions amongst its allies that it is trying to establish German hegemony. To 
prevent misconceptions emerging .... (Germany 
is obliged to) pursue its polices and 
interests within the Euro-Atlantic framework" (Meiers, 1995: 96-7). Furthermore, 
Germany's status as a civilian power also brought benefits to. Germany in the form of 
providing an effective security guarantee, and limiting the financial expenditure and 
potential human costs of increased German military capacity overseas. Thus there is a 
significant body of literature stressing that Germany has continued to adopt a strongly 
multilateral orientation in the critical area of policy represented by its attitudes 
towards the use of military force abroad. 
Germany's strategies with respect to international economic institutions at both global 
and regional levels may also be seen to support institutionalist claims. At a global 
level, there is strong evidence in favour of the institutionalist model presenting 
accurate predictions of Germany's post unification state strategies. Since unification, 
the German government has displayed a strong commitment to the GATT/WTO, the 
IMF and the World Bank, and the G7. Despite tensions between French and American 
interests over the issue of agricultural and audio-visual, trade liberalisation, Germany 
managed to broker a compromise agreement (Wood, 1995: 231). Smyser notes that 
German trade relations with the Japanese have not been smooth, and highlights the 
automobile industry as being particularly sensitive for both countries (Smyser, 
1992: 224; see also Sato, 1993: 378). However, Sato identifies that growth in trade and 
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investment between Germany and Japan are grounds for continued optimism about 
their economic relationship in the 1990s (Sato, 1993: 367-375). Germany's role in the 
resolution of the conflict over Japanese aid to the Soviet Union in 1991 despite the 
outstanding issue of the possession of the Northern Territories by the USSR may also 
be interpreted in terms compatible with institutionalism. The logic that Germany 
appreciated the functional incentives for it to play a part in this diplomatic process is 
reflected in the analysis put forward by Katzenstein. Katzenstein notes that 
"Germany's willingness to broker the conflict between Japan and Russia expresses the 
awareness that substantial Japanese aid would help to stabilise conditions in Russia 
and enhance German security" (Katzenstein, 1993: 79). Relatedly, Germany has 
continued to provide both political and economic support for Russia over the period 
since German unification, both through multilateral forums such as the G7, the EU 
and GATT, as well as on a bilateral basis (Zhurkin, 1996: 212-216). Thus important 
aspects of Germany's economic strategies at a global level are potentially compatible 
with institutionalism's prediction that Germany, as a state with strong incentives to 
use international economic institutions, will tend to rely heavily upon them. 
Aspects of Germany's support for the process of European integration also may be 
used as evidence in favour of a institutionalist interpretation of its state strategies. 
First, Germany has been instrumental in pushing for the deepening of European 
integration. With France and the European Commission it pushed for two 
Intergovernmental Conferences on economic, monetary and political union (Le 
Gloannec, 1993: 256). These IGC's began in December 1990, and culminated a year 
later in the agreements reached at Maastricht in 1991. Second, Germany has been 
instrumental in pushing for the expansion of the EU to include both formerly EFTA 
states and states in eastern and east central Europe (Kirschner, 1996: 169). It is 
important to stress that, in line with institutionalist predictions, Germany's trade and 
aid policies in the central and eastern European region are strongly multilateral in 
character because they are carried out within the institutional framework provided by 
the European Union (Katzenstein, 1997b: 22). Moreover, there are clear and tangible 
benefits to Germany in both deepening and expanding the European Union, fitting the 
institutionalist hypothesis that international institutions can be effective in situations 
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where they have instrumental value and present absolute gains to the state concerned. 
The most obvious benefits of deepening the EU come in the form of the benefits of a 
single European currency for Germany's export led economy. The benefits of 
widening the European Union come in the stabilising effect this will have on the 
countries of east central Europe, and will also be apparent in the large gains Germany 
stands to make from its comparative advantages in trade with in this region (Smyser, 
1992: 195). Germany therefore has very strong incentives to encourage either of these 
strategies for European integration. 
Despite this, however, there remain aspects of German strategies which are difficult to 
correlate with the predictions of the institutionalist model. Whilst it is true that 
Germany does indeed have strong incentives to either broaden or deepen the European 
Union, it is less clear that it remains in its direct interest to pursue both objectives 
simultaneously. This is not a point which has been stressed by analysts of German 
foreign policy sympathetic to institutionalist claims, although writing in the early 
1990s Maull did recognise the potential contradictions posed by the simultaneous 
widening and deepening of the European Union for Germany's continued support for 
the integration process (Maull, 1991: 105). However, the contradictions of Germany's 
pursuit of such a policy have become increasingly apparent over the 1990s as 
awareness has grown of the exponential increases in the size of the EU budget which 
would occur if the benefits of the CAP and Regional Development Fund were 
extended to new members (Tewes, 1998: 123). It is important to recognise that 
institutionalism highlights the importance of the instrumental value of international 
institutions to states. It predicts that where commitment to institutions would create 
considerable costs to states, they will reject institutional options. Thus it would appear 
that the kind of behaviour predicted by institutionalism would be the advocacy by 
Germany of either some form of `core Europe', or alternatively, a `wider Europe' (see 
the classifications of positions within German foreign policy discourse offered by 
Gutjahr, 1994; Hellmann, 1996, Janning, 1996, Meyer, 1997). The former envisages a 
core of West European states pushing ahead with monetary and political union as 
provided for in the Maastricht Treaty. The latter is understood to involve the extension 
of the EU eastwards as a free trade area. The instrumental logic of institutionalist 
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analysis therefore suggests that Germany should be making clearer strategic choices 
between broadening and deepening the EU than it appears to be at present. 
Overall, it is possible to explain important features of German state strategies since 
1989 from an institutionalist perspective. The institutionalist model offers plausible 
explanations of many aspects of German state strategies since 1989, including key 
aspects of the unification process, its commitment to Atlantic security institutions, its 
apparent reluctance to take on military commitments abroad, its participation in the 
global international economic system, and dimensions German strategies towards the 
process of European integration. Whilst institutionalism suggests that Germany is 
beginning to face important choices in its European integration strategies, there are 
strong signs of underlying continuity in Germany's use of international institutions 
over the post Cold War period. It is therefore plausible to make the argument that 
Germany's highly interdependent relations with other advanced industrial 
democracies has encouraged it to continue to value its institutional commitments over 
the 1990s. 
Liberalism 
Liberalism stresses the significance of states' foreign policy preferences, which in turn 
reflect an underlying political identity, as a factor in determining international 
behaviour and outcomes. Liberalism's precise predictions vary according to the 
preferences of the particular state under analysis and the configuration of state 
preferences in the international system as a whole. However, the liberal model defines 
a set of predictions directly relevant to Germany's state strategies over the post cold 
war period. In particular, liberalism suggests the possibility of higher levels of 
institutionalisation of state behaviour than that anticipated by the institutionalist 
model. Institutions may take on intrinsic rather than instrumental value for states in as 
much as states define their portfolio of interests from a collective identification 
offered by institutional arrangements. Alternatively expressed, institutionalisation 
may provide normative frameworks which act as guides for policy choice and action 
for states, rather than being valued solely for the functional benefits they bring. This 
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does not, of course, mean that states do not formulate a conception of their own 'self- 
interest'. However, it does imply that institutionalised relationships may come to 
embody a diffuse form of reciprocity. Alternatively expressed, states which 
institutionalise their relationships in this way express their interests at a higher level of 
aggregation than the institutionalist model suggests is possible. 
Important aspects of Germany's behaviour during the process of unification are 
compatible with the predictions offered by the liberal model. During the unification 
process, Germany not only reaffirmed but deepened its support for NATO and other 
broader Euro-Atlantic security institutions. The generosity of the terms of unification 
agreed within the Two-Plus-Four framework belies an interpretation of these policy 
measures which sees them as an instrumental function of Germany's interests in 
achieving continued membership of NATO. Katzenstein notes that the "political 
reassurance that Kohl and Genscher could offer indicated ... that the West German 
political leadership had ... internalised the norm of peaceful international co-operation. 
Kohl and Genscher repeatedly insisted in public that the terms they were negotiating 
with the Soviet Union would have to be acceptable not only to all of the Allied 
powers, but, more importantly, to all members of the CSCE and, in particular, to 
Poland. In their minds German unification was as much a European as a national 
issue" (Katzenstein, 1993: 76). Second, the terms in which German politicians were 
thinking suggests that their use of NATO in this period reflected not merely the 
instrumental value of its preservation as institutionalism suggests, but rather its value 
as a normative framework within which to orientate its actions. Germany has played a 
leading role in pushing for change within NATO in order to adapt itself to the new 
post Cold War international environment. Hyde-Price notes that Germany was a 
"prime mover" behind NATO's London Declaration which envisaged a united 
Germany in an Atlantic alliance of free democracies (Hyde-Price, 1996: 183; see also 
Ruhe 1993: 130; and Linnenkamp, 1993: 98 for details of the London Declaration). As 
Anderson and Goodman identify, "the question posed by German politicians was not 
whether to remain in the Atlantic Alliance but rather how to adapt the alliance, with 
due regard for the interests of other members, to the rapidly changed circumstances on 
the continent" (Anderson and Goodman, 1993: 29). 
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Similarly, during the 1989-90 period Germany actively deepened its support for the 
continuing process of European integration. In April 1990, Kohl announced his 
government's willingness to waive Community structural fund assistance for the soon 
to be former GDR (Anderson and Goodman, 1993: 32). 3 Furthermore, "(i)n the face of 
domestic concerns about the dangers and risks of EMU, voiced principally by the 
Bundesbank and the Ministry Of Finance, the Chancellor committed his country to 
accelerated progress toward the twin and, as he maintained, inseparable, objectives of 
economic and political reform in the EC" (Anderson and Goodman, 1993: 33; Kohl, 
1990). Thus in 1993 Katzenstein was able to write that "despite German unification, 
the expectations about the extent of political, economic and monetary integration far 
exceed those held when the EC92 process was launched in earnest in 1987-1988" 
(Katzenstein, 1993: 77). Overall, increased German support for both the process of 
European integration and NATO during the process of German unification, indicates 
that its support for these institutions was not merely instrumental. Anderson and 
Goodman have concluded that during this period "institutions ... restructured and 
remoulded German interests, so that, in the eyes of German political elites, 
institutional memberships were not merely instruments of policy but normative 
frameworks for policy making. The development of reflexive support for institutions 
... 
has played an important role in shaping German interests since unification" 
(Anderson and Goodman, 1993: 24). Drawing on Anderson and Goodman's analysis, 
Keohane et al have characterised Germany's foreign policy preferences between 1989 
and 1991 as "reflexively institutionalist: its institutional ties were viewed as intrinsic 
to the German's view of themselves" (Keohane et al, 1993: 10, emphasis added; see 
also Katzenstein, 1993: 75) 
Germany's foreign policy over the post-1991 period has continued to display a pattern 
of development compatible with Anderson and Goodman's initial characterisation of 
its strategic preferences. In terms of the development of the Atlantic Alliance 
framework, German statesmen have been adamant that development of a European 
defence identity complements NATO by providing it with a stronger `European pillar' 
' Anderson and Goodman note that the EC later refused to accept Kohl's offer. 
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of the Atlantic Alliance. In Former Defence Minister Ruhe's terms, "European 
integration and a trusting transatlantic partnership do not preclude each other. Europe 
and North America continue to be a community bound by common interests .... What 
we need now is a new partnership among equals - the United States as a partner that 
supports the shaping of a new Europe, and a Europe that assumes greater 
responsibility for itself and the promotion of world peace" (Ruhe, 1993: 133; see also 
Schmidt, 1996). Ruhe's statement reflects Germany's conception of itself as an actor 
which defines its interests in terms of a collective security identity. Germany did not 
simply value NATO for the instrumental benefits it brings in terms of provision for 
Germany's security. Instead, Germany's multilateral commitments actively reshaped 
and remoulded the way in which it defined its portfolio of interests, thereby 
facilitating a process of norm-governed change. In particular, by altering the terms of 
Germany's participation within the Euro-Atlantic institutions, Ruhe reasoned that 
their underlying normative fabric can be maintained, the degree of reciprocity they 
embody increased, and their effectiveness thereby enhanced. In the early 1990s this 
pattern of behaviour was most clearly evident in Germany's participation in the 
formation of NACC/PfP. NACC/PfP came into existence through a joint German- 
American initiative in 1991 (Hyde-Price, 1996: 183). This was despite the existence of 
very clear limitations of its effectiveness as a security institution, which Kinkel 
himself was careful to acknowledge (Kinkel, 1992: 5; Schlor, 1993: 47). However, the 
real significance of NACC to German statesmen lies not so much in its security 
benefits for Eastern Europe, but in its Atlantic connection. As Schlor notes, "NACC 
demonstrates Germany's commitment to NATO and can be used to deflect criticism 
about its involvement with the CSCE and West European defence integration" 
(Schlor, 1993: 47). Thus NACC/PfP allows Germany to make its commitment to the 
North Atlantic framework transparent, and thereby provides the US with the trust and 
reassurance in Germany's strategic intentions it requires to allows it help to strengthen 
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Its instrumental value to Germany is 
minimal, but its intrinsic symbolic value for Germany is highly significant because it 
allowed Germany to preserve and develop a community of interests with the US. Thus 
perhaps more than any other single institution, NACC/PfP reflects Germany's 
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preference for actively developing institutional frameworks in a reflexive, norm 
governed fashion. 
However, by far the most prominent example of this type of shift in German security 
policy has occurred with respect to its attitude towards the use of military force 
outside of the NATO area begun in 1993. Commentators have identified how the 
German government became increasingly aware of the limits of its cheque-book 
diplomacy during the Gulf conflict, and was finally prompted into action after the 
failure of its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia to effectively tackle the root causes 
of the Balkans conflict (Smith, 1995: 52; Dorff, 1997: 57). Indeed, in 1993, Ruhe stated 
that "adopting a passive role would harm vital German interests ... If Germany now 
hesitates to contribute adequately to international activities, it could be perceived as a 
sign of discontinuity of German policy towards the Alliance. In fact, there is no reason 
to doubt that Germany will fulfil its alliance commitments" (Ruhe, 1993: 130). During 
the 1990s the German government has been attempting to increase the number of 
occasions when German troops play some military role - most notably in Somalia and 
Bosnia (Kaiser, 1995: 7; Dorff, 1997: 58-59; Ruhe, 1993: 130). It has also undertaken 
"a major reorientation of ... defence planning" to deal with multilateral forms of 
international crisis management, prioritising flexibility and mobility to allow conflict 
resolution through military escalation and de-escalation (Linnenkamp, 1993: 100; see 
also Ruhe, 1993: 137; Gutjahr, 1995: 311). Smith identifies that the German 
government's handling of the issue of the use of force abroad reflects its orientation 
towards what he explicitly refers to as its "reflexive multilateralism" (Smith, 
1995: 49). Germany acted only when it perceived that "multilateralism in general and 
Germany's support for it in particular could be at risk" (Smith, 1995: 50). To achieve 
its aim Germany is deliberately overriding its post war non-military power orientation 
and in so doing exposed itself to significantly increased financial and human costs and 
risks. However, Germany was prepared to accept these costs and risks in order to 
preserve the basic normative fabric of the Atlantic Alliance security framework. Thus, 
given the nature and extent of the changes which have taken place in Germany with 
respect to its attitudes towards the use of military force abroad, it perhaps 
oversimplifies to interpret this development in the utilitarian terms suggested by 
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institutionalist analysis. A more nuanced assessment is provided by Hyde-Price, who 
suggests that "the end of the Cold War has given the united Germany the opportunity 
to define a new role for itself in the international system. This search for a new role 
and identity has clearly affected German security policy, which exhibits both elements 
of continuity and change" (Hyde Price, 1996: 190). Only a focus on the intrinsic value 
of Atlantic security institutions for German policy makers can capture the reflexive, 
norm governed character of the development of their attitudes with respect to the use 
of force outside the NATO area over the 1990s. 
A distinctive mix of change and continuity is also revealed in terms of the evolution 
of Germany's position with regard to the European integration process since 1991. 
Many constructivist analysts have been quick to stress the strong element of 
continuity in Germany's foreign policy preferences over this issue during the post 
Cold War period (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996; Pond and Schoenbaum, 1996; 
Katzenstein, 1997a, Bulmer, 1997; Banchoff, 1997). Contrary to institutionalist 
predictions, they see no necessary contradiction between Germany making 
commitments to both broaden and deepen the EU simultaneously. Bulmer and 
Paterson, for example, identified the 1996 IGC as an "important test of Germany's 
role, influence and policy in the European integration process" (Bulmer and Paterson, 
1996: 9). In their assessment, German diplomacy during the run up to the IGC reflects 
the way in which "the dramatic changes of 1989 have not yet led to a correspondingly 
dramatic change in Germany's role (in the European integration process)..... The 
principle response has seen the FRG reiterate its European identity" (Bulmer and 
Paterson, 1996: 13). Despite pressures for the enlargement of the EU, they suggest that 
"(t)he co-ordination reflex developed over the years of European political co- 
operation ... continues to 
be the basis for German action in the post-Maastricht era" 
(Bulmer and Paterson, 1996: 17). Similarly, Pond and Schoenbaum see Germany's 
exaggerated level of support for European institutions as reflecting its Europeanised 
or "post-national identity" (Pond and Schoenbaum, 1996: 180-181). Indeed, over the 
1990s, Germany has been consistently generous in its financial support of the EU, 
continuing to fund 28% of the total EU budget (Pond and Schoenbaum, 1996: 181-2). 
In practical terms, this has meant that "by 1996 the EU was costing the average 
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German twice as much as a Netherlander and four times as much as a Briton" 
(Kirshcner, 1996: 159). Major specialists on Germany's foreign affairs therefore 
support the argument that there has been strong underlying continuity in Germany's 
policy preferences over the issue of Europe over the post Cold War period. 
A related assessment is presented by Goetz, who links his analysis to the emerging 
literature on multi-level governance within the European Union. Goetz discusses 
Germany's integration policy in the run up to the 1996 IGC. He argues that "(t)he 
continued German commitment to a further deepening and widening of the EU is no 
longer primarily the result of a reasoned assessment of the costs and benefits of such a 
policy; rather, ... the political preference 
for further political integration has become 
part of the institutional logic of the German state. What was originally a rationally 
calculated policy priority has evolved into a fundamental value informing institutional 
behaviour" (Goetz, 1996: 36). To support this argument, Goetz identifies important 
"structural, procedural and policy adaptations" made by the. German state (Goetz, 
1996: 36-37; see also Rometsch, 1996; Rometsch and Wessels, 1996). However, more 
fundamentally, he discusses the significance of constitutional changes that have taken 
place in Germany since the ratification of the Treaty On European Union which imply 
that "All German public institutions are obliged to pursue actively the development of 
the EU ... with the aim of creating a united Europe" 
(Goetz, 1996: 38). He stresses the 
changes in Article 23 of Germany's Basic Law which have replaced its provisions for 
the Federal Government's jurisdiction over the German Lander with a commitment to 
participation in the establishment of a united Europe committed to federal principles 
and the principle of subsidiarity (Goetz, 1996: 38). He argues that the pervasive nature 
of the process of institutional adaptation throughout the German state indicates the 
extent to which it has taken on an "in-built integrationist orientation" (Goetz, 
1996: 39). European policy in Germany has undergone a process of "internalisation" 
whereby domestic and integration policy display high levels of "interwoveness", a 
process which is intimately linked to the emergence of mutli-level tiers of governance 
encompassing the Lander and European institutions (Goetz, 1996: 40). He refers to the 
process as the "Europeanisation" of the German state (Goetz, 1996: 25) On Goetz's 
analysis, therefore, Germany's deeply internalised European identity is reflected in its 
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foreign policy preferences, and which lay behind its continued support for deepening 
the process integration in the run up to the 1996 IGC, despite the simultaneous 
pressures for enlargement. 
However, more recently, a number of analysts sympathetic to the argument that 
Germany's distinctive foreign policy preferences over the issue of Europe have 
displayed underlying continuity over the 1990s have begun to modify their analysis in 
order to produce a more nuanced account of the evolution of Germany's strategies. In 
particular, Anderson, who was the first to characterise Germany's tendency towards 
multilateralism as reflexive, has identified tensions in Germany's European polices 
over the mid-late 1990s in three areas: competition policy, the CAP, and structural 
funds (Anderson, 1997). In each of these areas, Anderson documents the way in 
which German unification has led to an inability for Germany to maintain 
unconditional support for European polices, and the way in which this has given rise 
to increased German assertiveness. He suggests that "between 1990 and 1992, the 
German government attempted to conduct business as usual, and willingly submitted 
to - indeed, requested the application of - established procedures and related outcomes 
despite the huge costs imposed on domestic actors, especially those in the former 
German Democratic Republic .... (However, ) (s)ince then, as a result of changes in 
domestic politics flowing from unification, the German government has shifted its 
approach to regulative polices in Brussels, paying more attention to issues of 
distribution and redistribution" (Anderson, 1997: 82). Anderson does note policy 
continuity in one area, specifically over trade policy (Anderson, 1997: 92-95). Thus 
overall he concludes that whilst "Unification did not precipitate a major domestic 
revaluation of Germany's role in Europe. ... (T)o describe the united Germany's 
relationship towards Europe in terms of seamless continuity would be inaccurate.... 
(Overall) what emerges is a mixed pattern of change and continuity" (Anderson, 
1997: 104-105). 
Tewes similarly acknowledges that since 1994 German statesmen have been 
addressing the potential tensions in their involvement in both deepening and widening 
the EU by attempting to develop a merger between these conflicting roles (Tewes, 
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1998: 127; see also Letourneau and Rakel, 1997: 122-125). This role merger first 
surfaced in proposals by leading members of the CDU in 1994 for a "variable 
geometry" Europe in which the "precondition for the enlargement towards the East 
was a tightly integrated core" (Tewes, 1998: 127). Janning, who has himself been 
influential in the formulation of this approach to integration policy in Germany, puts 
forward the related concept of "differentiated integration: a mix of deeper integration, 
greater responsibilities for committed member states and the notion of sectoral cores 
for high integration areas such as monetary or security integration" (Janning, 
1997: 41). He notes that a strategy of differentiated integration "would lead to the 
concentration of leadership roles on those member states which are actively involved 
in all or most of these sectoral deepenings ... (In turn this would) open up new 
possibilities for active participation and a higher density of integration" (Janning, 
1997: 41). It might also be added that-it would potentially strengthen the degree of 
reciprocity embodied by European institutions, which have been disproportionately 
funded by Germany in the past. Other analysts have identified the way in which 
German integration policy is informed by a pragmatic multilateralism in which a 
concept of institutional flexibility provides a "Gezamptkonzept" for the European 
order (Mayer, 1997: 733-734; Hellmann, 1996: 5). By pursuing differentiated 
integration and institutional flexibility, Germany would be able to sustain its deep 
commitment to multilateral institutional frameworks. Understood in these terms, the 
mix of continuity and change embodied in Germany's approach to European 
integration over the 1990s reflects its distinctive foreign policy preferences and 
identity. As Tewes notes, to understand Germany's attempt at role merger, "one .. has 
to look first at ... 
German identity and at the way it shaped foreign policy culture" 
(Tewes, 1998: 130). 
Paradoxically, therefore, analysts such as Katzenstein, Bulmer and Paterson, Pond and 
Goetz actually underestimate the extent to which Germany has internalised the norms 
European institutions embody. Goetz's stress on the Europeanisation of the German 
state provides a pertinent example of the case in point. Goetz highlights the 
importance of Germany's distinctive Europeanised identity in bringing about these 
developments, therefore drawing attention to underlying continuities in Germany's 
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integration policy preferences over the 1990s and the links which exist between this 
process and the emergence of multi-level structures of governance in Western Europe 
as a whole. However, he is wrong to suggest that there is a sharp dichotomy between 
Germany's assessment of the costs and befits of pursuit of both broadening and 
deepening the EU, and its internalisation of norms of integration. Instead, it has been 
precisely Germany's awareness of the costs of deepening and broadening the 
integration process simultaneously which has indicated the enormous extent to which 
it has internalised an orientation to multilateralism. It was the intrinsic value these 
institutions had to German policy makers which led them to develop a reflexive, norm 
governed response to the evolution of their policy preferences towards integration in 
order to preserve their underlying `Europeanised' identity. In turn, this process of 
reflexive adaptation has actually strengthened Germany's involvement in the 
European integration process by increasing the degree of reciprocity embodied in 
European institutions. Furthermore, it has heightened Germany's participation in 
emerging patterns of multi-level governance in Europe by encouraging its further 
participation in a patchwork of overlapping tiers of European institutions along the 
lines suggested by the concept of variable geometry and differentiated integration. 
Overall, therefore, only a liberal focus on Germany's distinctive foreign policy 
preferences over the 1990s can explain the particular mix of continuity and change its 
polices reflected during this period. Germany's distinctive foreign policy preferences 
have encouraged it to remain committed to a significantly higher level of 
institutionalised activity than might be expected from the perspective of neorealism 
and institutionalism. Both the Atlantic security framework and the process of 
European integration took an intrinsic rather than an instrumental value as normative 
frameworks for German policy makers during this period. Thus the characterisation 
offered by Anderson and Goodman in 1993 of Germany's foreign policy preferences 
during the unification period as reflexively institutionalist holds for its behaviour over 
the duration of the 1990s. What has become clear since the time at which they 
developed this characterisation, however, is the extent to which Germany had 
internalised multilateral norms. Germany's commitment to multilateral institutions 
was not simply a passive policy reflex inherited from the early post-war era, but 
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embodied active and reflexive adaptation to the changing circumstances of the post- 
Cold War period. However, such a conclusion merely raises the deeper and more 
fundamental issue of the extent to which Germany's strongly multilateral foreign 
policy orientation is sustainable in future. To do so requires an examination of the 
agenda for Germany's political choices in the contemporary international system. 
Germany's Choices 
In the literature on Germany's foreign affairs during the 1990s, five broad positions 
have emerged on the issue of the sustainability of its current foreign policy and the 
related issue of the strategic choices Germany is likely to face in the coming years. 
These positions may be understood as operating along a spectrum. At one end of the 
spectrum, neorealists anticipate a sharp break in the policies being pursued by the 
united Germany. Moving along the spectrum, the more moderate position adopted by 
conservative historians is similarly sceptical of the coherence of Germany's current 
strategies, and suggests Germany will find its polices increasingly constrained in 
future. In the middle of the spectrum, institutionalists argue that Germany has and will 
pursue a civilian power strategy, but to do so coherently it must in future make a clear 
strategic choice between pursuit of either broadening or deepening the European 
Union. Towards the other end of the spectrum, a fourth position associated with 
constructivist theory argues that the civilian power strategy which has been pursued 
by Germany remains viable, but maintains that Germany will not have to make a 
choice between broadening and deepening the EU. At the other extreme of the 
spectrum, a liberal position suggests that changes in Germany's attitude towards both 
the use of its military force abroad and its approach to European integration represent 
significant shifts in Germany's strategies. However, contrary to the views of both 
neorealists and conservative historians, the liberal position suggests that these shifts 
represent a coherent and sustainable attempt to respond to changes which have taken 
place in the international system since 1989. By reflexively adapting its foreign policy 
preferences in a norm governed manner, Germany has not undermined but has 
actually strengthened considerably its commitment to multilateralism, and has played 
a major part in reinvigorating these institutions for the post Cold War period. In this 
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section of the chapter, each of these five `choices' for Germany will be discussed in 
turn, before returning to reflect on the appropriateness of the theme of `second 
chances' as a metaphor for understanding Germany's process of adjustment to the 
post Cold War world. 
The most extreme position in the debate over Germany's future strategic choices is 
adopted by neorealists. Most notably, Mearsheimer stresses the direct incentives 
generated by the changes in the structure of the international system over the post- 
Cold War period for a revival of German hypemationalism (Mearsheimer, 1990: 21). 
On the basis of these arguments, he suggests that the security dilemma generated by 
the emergence of a reunified Germany in the centre of Europe "could spark a renewed 
sense of persecution amongst the Germans, and with it, a rebirth of German 
nationalism" (Mearsheimer, 1990: 56). Moreover, according to the neorealist model, 
states which persistently fail to respond to the incentives for behaviour and constraints 
imposed by international structure will risk punishment and even possible elimination. 
Thus Germany's failure to adopt a much more tightly defined notion of its national 
interests since 1989, particularly in the wake of the costs of unification, might be 
expected to have had a major effect on the stability of German domestic politics. 
Indeed, some changes in German domestic politics over the post-Cold War period 
would seem to fit the pattern predicted by neorealism. Extreme parties of the so called 
`new right', notably Schonhuber's Republikaners and Frey's DVU, have enjoyed a 
significant revival since German unification (Minkenberg, 1995; Heilbrun, 1996). The 
process of unification "reaffirmed a traditional sense of German nationhood ... (and) 
Bismarckian heritage" (Minkenberg, 1995: 264; see also Heilbrun, 1995: 49). 
Furthermore, as neorealists might expect, extended commitments to multilateral 
institutional frameworks combined with the problems of managing the unification 
have mounted a serious challenge to the health of the post war German economic 
model. Structural unemployment coupled with inflationary pressures has become a 
major feature of the unified German economy since unification, and became 
particularly acute during the 1993 recession (Dyson, 1996: 201-202; see also Flockton, 
1996). These economic pressures might be interpreted as reinforcing the electoral 
appeal of new right parties, especially when combined with waves of immigrants and 
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asylum seekers from eastern and southern Europe (Minkenberg, 1995: 255). Heilbrun 
goes as far as to suggest that "the refusal of the Bonn political class to face Germany's 
new position was creating an opening for the new right" (Heilbrun, 1996: 96). Finally, 
the extreme right's revisionism appears compatible with a neorealist assessment of its 
emergence. Its parties adopt a formerly revisionist outlook, and have campaigned on 
policies such as outward German expansion over the Oder-Neisse border with Poland 
(Minkenberg, 1995: 266). They are also overtly nationalistic. They define themselves 
in opposition to the Western orientation, and in their assessment, Germany must 
"rethink its relationship to Europe and the United States" (Heilbrun, 1996: 92). They 
appeal to the argument that "the self-effacing Bonn republic .... must be replaced by a 
self-confident Berlin republic that returns to nationalist doctrines respectable before 
the Nazi regime took power. A `normal' Germany freed of the ... Nazi past will be 
able to assert its interests like any other nation" (Heilbrun, 1996: 83). 
However, whilst it is clear that a tendency towards a degree of right wing 
fundamentalism has been present in German politics since 1989, it is important not to 
overstate the case for such an extreme interpretation of changes in the nature of 
German domestic politics. Most commentators agree that, since unification, the West 
German three party system has, by and large, successfully transplanted itself 
eastwards to the German state, particularly when wider dealignment trends in party 
systems and voting behaviour in industrialised democracies are taken into account 
(see post unification election results in Kreile, 1993: 64; see also 1994 election result 
in Smith, 1996: 59). This is also reflected in the way in which extremist parties in 
Germany have not made real inroads into the mainstream party system (Conrandt, 
1996: 168-169; Smith, 1996: 56-57). Similarly, the German economy remained robust 
over the 1990s. Dyson notes that "(t)he impact of the structural challenges to the 
German model, the 1993 recession and the Deutsche Mark appreciation of 1994-95 
has to be put into perspective. Most strikingly, the German political economy has 
absorbed the challenges in a way that demonstrates its remarkable versatility and 
resilience. Notably, excessive budget deficits and inflationary pressures have been 
kept under control" (Dyson, 1996: 208). Thus whilst it is important not to under- 
estimate the significance of the emergence of the new right in German politics since 
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1989, it is difficult to present a strong case in favour of neorealist claims about the 
direction within which Germany is being pushed in the wake of unification. 
A second and significantly more moderate position on Germany's choices within the 
international system has been offered by a number of conservative historians, most 
notably Hans Peter Schwarz and Timothy Garton Ash (Schwarz, 1994; Garton Ash, 
1995; see also Baring, 1994; Bluth, 1995; Gillessen, 1994; Joffe, 1994 and Schollgen, 
1994 for similar views). This is a position held mainly by an intellectual elite, 
although it can also claim increasing support from the wider German public 
(Hellmann, 1996: 19-20). It is important to recognise that, unlike neorealists and more 
extreme German historians such as Zitleman, these commentators generally accept 
that international institutions have an important role to play in the conduct of 
Germany foreign policy (Paterson, 1996: 139; Pulzer, 1995: 6-7). However, the views 
offered by these historians share in common with a neorealist perspective a sense of a 
deep unease at what they see as the unified Germany's reluctance to "articulate its 
interests in a changed political climate" (Schwarz, 1994: 111; also Garton Ash, 
1995: 75). This has become most clearly apparent in Germany's European integration 
strategies. Garton Ash and Schwarz have been among the first to identify that the 
costs imposed on Germany by unification as well as attempting broadening and 
deepening the EU simultaneously means that it has strong incentives to reduce its 
overall level of institutional commitments by choosing between the two integration 
strategies (Schwarz, 1994: 111; Garton Ash, 1995: 76-79). However, they remain 
confident that by making a choice between competing integration strategies, Germany 
can continue to benefit from participation in European institutions, and recommend 
that Germany concentrates its efforts on broadening the EU as its most fruitful path 
forward (Schwarz, 1994: 119; Garton Ash, 1995: 82). Another area where these 
analysts highlight tensions in Germany's current policies is in its pursuit of security 
within both NATO and the WEU. Schwarz argues that "(i)n the final analysis, 
Germany will have to decide whether it is better served by a broadly based North 
Atlantic system of defence such as has existed up till now, or by a West European 
system in which the United States no longer plays a central role" (Schwarz, 
1994: 121). Similar logic could even be extended to Germany's evolving attitudes 
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towards the use of military force abroad. Analysts such as Garton Ash and Schwarz 
might reason that by not adjusting its attitudes towards the use of force abroad, 
Germany found that its diplomatic prestige and leverage in international affairs were 
limited in comparison to its new status within the international system. It therefore 
began to re-assert itself in this area of policy, without abandoning its commitment to 
NATO altogether. Indeed, writing in 1994, Schwarz argued that Germany's 
tendencies towards `crypto-pacficism' were noticeably hampering Germany's ability 
to pursue its national interest in developing an effective NATO (Schwarz, 1994: 123). 
In Garton Ash's assessment, by attempting to maintain all the multilateral 
commitments it inherited from the pre-1989 period, Germany has attempted to 
"choose not to choose" (Garton Ash, 1995: 82). However, in his view, the danger of 
such a strategy is that "with increased demands on limited resources ... to choose not 
to choose does not mean that you make no choices. It only means that the choices will 
be made reactively, as a response to the combination of unexpected external 
developments ... and 
internal pressures from political, published and public opinion" 
(Garton Ash, 1995: 82). Similarly, Schwarz argues that "(i)n the future, Germany will 
find itself compelled on objective grounds to make its foreign policy, and also its 
European policy, more self centred and tightly budgeted and less flexible than it has 
been, all in the service of a relatively narrowly defined national interest ... (Germany 
must face the) objective constraints ... arising from changes in the international system 
and the cost of unification. A political establishment which prides itself on its 
international outlook and `post-national and European' ideology is now coming to the 
painful realisation that both at home and abroad such attitudes are no longer effective" 
(Schwarz, 1994: 117). Whilst such analyses differ considerably from some of 
neorealism's starker predictions about Germany's position in the new international 
order, it does support the claim that it is being pushed by changes in the international 
system towards a foreign policy orientation which is considerably more assertive, and 
that this will encourage it to behave more independently within multilateral 
institutions than it has in the past. 
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At the mid-point on the spectrum of opinions in the debate on Germany's future 
strategic choices, a third possible position accords with an institutionalist analysis. As 
has been noted, institutionalism suggests that the multilateral institutional frameworks 
within which Germany participated over the post-war period will continue to have 
instrumental value for it during the post-unification period. This position would 
advocate a civilian power strategy for Germany, but importantly would also accept the 
need for it to make choices of priorities over the process of European integration. 
Similarly, Germany might continue to gain net economic benefits from participation 
in the process of European integration if it is willing to make a choice between either 
broadening or deepening the European Union. Such polices are in line with the 
predictions of institutionalist international relations theory. They are also broadly 
compatible with many of the features of the body of expert and public opinion 
Hellmann categorises as favouring a form of `pragmatic multilateralism' for Germany 
(Hellmann, 1996: 5-9). However it could not be categorised as being particularly 
representative the pragmatic multilateralism position, or as. having a particularly 
strong base of domestic political support. The most plausible reason why this is the 
case is that it adopts a rather `weak' formulation of a civilian power argument which 
concedes that whilst Germany might retain a strongly multilateral, non-military and 
economic orientation, it is likely to have to make important reductions in its level of 
commitment to continued"European integration based on instrumental calculations of 
its interests. In practice, however, most advocates of a civilian power strategy for 
Germany are not inclined to accept that Germany might be compelled to reduce its 
commitment to the process of European integration over the post-Cold War period. 
Similarly, professional analysts of Germany's foreign policy who adopt this position 
tend not to rely on arguments compatible with the instrumental logic suggested by 
institutionalist international relations theory. In combination, the limited level of 
domestic support for this strategic option plus the lack of support for it in the 
professional literature indicate that it is unlikely that Germany is being pushed in this 
broad direction. 
A fourth position in the debate over the strategic choices faced by the united Germany 
has therefore emerged which develops arguments which are broadly compatible with 
107 
constructivist international relations theory. This position suggests that a civilian 
power strategy remains viable, but maintains that Germany will not have to make a 
choice between broadening and deepening the EU. This is because Germany's power 
within the European Union is over its constitutive politics (the power to shape the 
rules, norms and framework of integration) rather than over its regulative politics (its 
specific policies) (Bulmer, 1997: 50). In particular, the close correspondence between 
German and European political institutions grants Germany an indirect , and 
unintended influence within the EU far greater than it might achieve through the 
exertion of its more tangible political resources in any specific policy area (Bulmer, 
1997; Katzenstein, 1997a). According to Bulmer, a key example of the occurrence of 
this in practice is the way in which the Bundesbank's autonomy and its influence of 
interest rate decisions within the EU has put Germany in a strong position to influence 
both the terms of transition to the EMU and its subsequent evolution (Bulmer, 
1997: 74). Bulmer and Paterson have explicitly applied this reasoning to Germany's 
ability to engage in both broadening and deepening the EU simultaneously. They 
suggest that "Germany's role as the `paymaster' of the EU is increasingly likely to be 
exploited to secure side-payments on other policy areas, for instance on eastward 
enlargement" (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996: 31). Similarly, writing from a Marxian 
perspective, Markovits and Reich note that the close fit which exists between 
Germany's non-military orientation and the primarily economic focus of European 
institutions has also been a source of constitutive power for it (Markovits and Reich, 
1997; see also Markovits and Reich, 1991). They suggest that "armed forces are not 
the basis of Germany's influence and power. Power lies in the prominence of the 
German economy: the Deutsche Mark's strength ... ; the Bundesbank's role as de 
facto central bank for all Europe; the volume and profitability of German exports; the 
size of German foreign investment; and varied forms of foreign `subsidies' .... The 
costs and benefits are palpable. Germany makes the most, Germany pays the most - 
and on balance Germany wins" (Markovitz and Reich, 1997: 180-181). Understood in 
these terms, Germany's lack of willingness to assert its interests independently of the 
framework of European institutions may become a source of empowerment, endowing 
Germany with the role of a `gentle giant' rather than an emergent leader within the EU 
(Bulmer and Paterson, 1996: 31-32). In Pond's analysis, "The Federal Republic is 
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leading the way towards the European future not only because it is converting its 
economic weight to political power, but also because it made the original conceptual 
leap to a post-national identity four decades ago" (Pond, 1992: 114). 
In the literature on Germany's foreign policy over the 1990s, the chief focus of the 
debate about the coherence of its current strategies and its choices for the future has 
been between the conservative historians and those advocating some formulation of 
civilian power arguments (see Pulzer, 1995). By far the most prominent body of 
opinion amongst the wider German public has been provided by those who have 
adopted a `strong' formulation of a civilian power strategy for Germany. There is an 
extremely strong domestic constituency opposed to significant changes in Germany's 
post-war foreign policy orientation. Hellmann notes that within Germany, attitudes 
"remain favourable toward European integration", and there is "support the further 
development of its institutions" (Hellmann, 1996: 20). Similarly, he identifies that "the 
German population continues to hold serious reservations about the role of the 
military in general and the use of force in particular" (Hellmann, 1996: 20). This 
reluctance to accept changes in Germany's foreign policy orientation could be 
interpreted by constructivists as signalling that Germany is being pushed further in the 
direction of a civilian power strategy by the nature of change in the post Cold War 
international system. In turn, this could be used to bolster the case against the analysts 
of trends in Germany's foreign policy presented by conservative historians. However, 
it is possible to identify important weaknesses in the positions adopted in both sides of 
this debate in as much as they are both significantly out of step with German 
statesmen's behaviour and preferences as they have been articulated over the 1990s. 
Those who have adopted a strong formulation of civilian power arguments have 
indeed, as the conservative historians have suggested, underestimated the significance 
of the changes which have taken place in Germany's strategic orientation over the 
1990s. As has been identified, Germany's attitudes towards the security institutions 
within which it operates has shifted in important ways over the I 990s, in terms of the 
upgrading of its support for the WEU and the closely related NACC/PfP initiative 
with the US, and in terms of its shifting attitudes towards the use of its military force 
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abroad. It has done so despite the increased economic and human costs and risks to 
which this would expose Germany, and in the face of considerable domestic 
opposition. Similarly, in the latter half of the 1990s it has also begun to take very 
seriously the potential costs to Germany of pursuing a strategy of both broadening and 
deepening the European Union simultaneously. Again, this is contrary to a strong 
body of domestic opinion which opposes changes in Germany's European integration 
strategies. These changes indicate that there has been a major shift in the manner in 
which Germany has constructed its interests over the 1990s. By inference the analysis 
of `power' in the international system offered by constructivists and proponents of a 
strong formulation of a civilian power strategy are faced with important limitations in 
providing an account of Germany's behaviour during the post-Cold War period. 
Germany's `constitutive power' within multilateral institutional frameworks has 
simply not provided it with enough leverage to prevent it from making choices about 
its overall pattern of institutional commitments based on some underlying conception 
of its `hard' political and economic interests. 
Nevertheless, as has been identified, the changes which have taken place in 
Germany's strategies over the 1990s have been highly successful in fulfilling 
Germany's aim of ensuring continuity in the underlying normative fabric of the 
multilateral frameworks within which it operates. Contrary to the analysis presented 
by conservative historians, this success points the way forward to a fifth possible 
position in the debate about Germany's future strategic choices compatible with the 
analysis presented by a liberal model of the international system. A liberal analysis 
suggests that the emphasis placed by constructivists on the importance of Germany's 
distinctive identity and preferences as an actor within multilateral institutions, and on 
its appreciation of the changing nature of power within the international system is not 
wholly displaced, but must also be modified and developed. Germany's identity and 
preferences as an actor are distinctive, and do demonstrate a deep commitment to 
multilateralism as constructivists suggest. However, it is important to recognise that 
Germany's identity and preferences have undergone important shifts over the post 
Cold War period as part of a reflexive process of norm governed adaptation. This has 
not in any way undermined its deep commitment to multilateralism. On the contrary, 
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it has revealed the great extent to which Germany has internalised multilateral norms, 
and has strengthened its participation in multilateral frameworks. A liberal analysis 
also retains the focus of constructivism on the changing nature of power in the 
international system. However, instead of emphasising the assertive or `constitutive' 
aspects of Germany's power, it emphasises the active or `generative' nature of 
Germany's power (see the use of the term `generative power' made by Bertram, 
1990: 61). Germany today "requires a more active and sustained German approach to 
building partnerships than has been evident in the past" (Wallace, 1995: 63). To realise 
its generative power, Germany must move from being a passive `policy taker' to 
taking a more active policy maker role in the international order (see Anderson, 
1997: 105). This approach offers Germany's partners the reassurance which allows it 
to maintain the credibility of its institutional commitments whilst simultaneously 
altering the terms on which it participates in multilateral frameworks. In this way, 
sustaining the trust of others about its underlying strategic intentions has become a 
major source of power for Germany. It allows it flexibility in its relations with its 
partners which would not otherwise be available to it by strengthening the degree of 
reciprocity embodied in its institutional commitments. It thereby opens up the 
possibility of maintaining its pursuit of policies which would otherwise be 
incompatible such as developing a stronger European defence identity within the 
Atlantic Alliance framework, remilitarising significantly without provoking a negative 
reaction from other powers, and pursuing broadening and deepening the EU in 
tandem. 
Indeed, over the 1990s it appears to have been German statesmen themselves who 
have been most aware of the significance of reflexively adapting their preferences and 
taking a more active approach to managing their relations. First, there has been a 
remarkable degree of consensus amongst Germany's foreign policy elite about the 
need for significant adaptations in order to preserve its basic multilateral 
commitments. Comparing a recent article by the spokesperson of the SPD's Foreign 
Policy Working Group with similar articles by CDU members reveals no 
fundamentally significant policy differences - even on the issue of Germany's role in 
multilateral intervention outside of NATO's sphere (Voigt, 1996; Kinkel, 1992; Ruhe, 
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1993, Stuth, 1992). Second, German statesmen have ensured that the nature of the 
changes which have taken place in Germany's foreign policy orientation have been 
highly transparent. From a very early stage the German government realised the 
importance of clearly and publicly conveying Germany's benign strategic intentions 
towards its old allies and new neighbours. As their post unification strategies took 
shape, members of the German government published articles in the professional 
foreign policy literature coinciding with their major strategic initiatives. In an article 
in NATO Review in 1992, the then Foreign Minister Kinkel announced the founding 
of NACC late the previous year (Kinkel, 1992: 4-5). In 1993, former Defence Minister 
Ruhe published an article in the IISS journal Survival publicly declaring the 
introduction of a motion to the Federal Parliament to clarify Germany's constitutional 
provisions on the use of force abroad (Ruhe, 1993: 130). Finally, in an article in 
International Affairs in 1997, a member of a leading German foreign policy think tank 
with close connections to government circles published an article outlining the 
concepts of differentiated integration and a variable geometry Europe (Janning, 
1997: 41; see also Meiers, 1997: 711). German statesmen and strategists appeared to be 
using public and professional literature as a means of communicating their changing 
strategic objectives transparently to its partners. Indeed, the routine nature of this 
practice in the wake of major strategic developments indicates that they recognised 
that the reassurance and trust in Germany this could promote was a major source of 
power for Germany. As they reflexively developed their foreign policy orientation, 
German politicians appreciated that transparency was a major source of power for it. 
Thus its use of the public and professional foreign policy literature itself became part 
of its grand strategy and its more active approach to managing its partnerships. 
By contrast to the smooth and transparent evolution of the views of the German 
foreign policy elite, the wider public debate in Germany about its changing foreign 
policy orientation has proved perhaps the most difficult aspect of its transition in the 
post Cold War international system. The problems of economic and political 
adjustment raised during Germany's transition in the post Cold War period have 
raised deeper and more fundamental questions about German national identity which 
were largely suppressed during the Cold War period due to the division between east 
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and west (Pulzer, 1996: 303). This has been reflected most acutely in the huge 
controversy caused by the public debate over Germany's use of military force abroad 
in the mid-1990s (Smith et al, 1996: 11; Meiers, 1995: 84; Dorff, 1997: 60-65). 
Germany's conception of itself as an actor within the international system is therefore 
in a process of profound change, and this has exposed Germany's crisis of identity in 
the post Cold War international system. As Glees identifies, the view that Germany 
can remain a `post-national' democracy "sounds almost too good to be true. It is too 
good to be true. There is no real evidence that such a thing exists or could ever exist. 
German unification was a clear expression of German nationalism. No serious 
politician could hope to win power by seeking to rubbish nationalism, nor would they 
be believed, either at home or abroad, if they did so" (Glees, 1996: 259). There is 
therefore a desperate need for Germany to go through a process of "reinventing" itself 
and its conception of its national identity (Glees, 1996: 279). Similarly, Dorff notes the 
way in which debates between realists who suggest that Germany is becoming a 
normal actor and those who see Germany as still far from. normal because of its 
exaggerated multilateralism set up a false dichotomy. He suggests that "it is worth 
considering that the two theses are not really mutually exclusive .... (because) what we 
understand normalcy to include ... may be changing" (Dorff, 1997: 66-67). That is to 
say, in the emerging international system Germany's `normalisation' as an actor with 
a legitimate sense of its national identity is an essential precondition of its deep 
commitment to multilateralism, not its antithesis. Today, Germany requires a reflexive 
reconstruction of its underlying sense of national identity as a prerequisite to its 
effective participation within the emerging international community. 
However, over the 1990s, the German political elite has showed considerable skill in 
managing this process of identity transition. In particular, unlike many in the Japanese 
and Chinese foreign policy elites, they have identified that they do face a major crisis 
of identity in negotiating the changes taking place in post Cold War international 
order. In turn, this has enabled them to take important steps towards squarely 
addressing and finding workable solutions to the problems this has generated for 
them. It remains to be seen whether the new SPD/Green government which came into 
office in September 1998 will continue along the route charted by Kohl's CDU/FDP 
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coalition. Nevertheless, Germany has certainly gone a long way down the road 
towards a purging or catharsis of the historical legacy it inherited from its role in the 
global conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century. The progress Germany has 
made in this process of catharsis returns this chapter to the theme of `second chances' 
introduced in the opening paragraphs. In an essay entitled, "Germany's New 
International Loneliness", Christoph Bertram personifies Germany as an individual 
struggling to avoid loneliness in a changing world. He suggests that "Germany's 
foreign policy establishment has been haunted by the nightmare that Germany might 
become isolated and singularised. All its efforts ... were devoted to avoiding 
international loneliness. But as international structures weaken and Western collective 
bodies lose cohesion, domestic priorities impose themselves over foreign policy 
considerations and foreign policy itself becomes a much less easily defined 
choreography; and Germany runs the risk of finding herself lonely again" (Bertram, 
1994: 91). In terms of the metaphor of second chances, Bertram identifies that 
Germany's post war separation and its aftermath created deep and long lasting 
anxieties which resulted in Germany's fear of greater `international loneliness'. This 
has led to its attempts to avoid loneliness by embedding itself in a network of 
relationships with states in both the east and the west, the overall aim being to avoid 
isolation. 
Bertram acknowledges that the changes which have taken place in the international 
system since 1989 have caused "uneasiness and even anxiety" in both Germany and 
its closest partners (Bertram, 1994: 101). Yet he is also optimistic that Germany has 
much to gain from making the adjustments in its collective personality and identity. 
He argues that "loneliness will not be Germany's choice. There will, on the contrary, 
be a deeply ingrained preference by present as well as future generations of political 
leaders to pursue Germany's interests within a collective framework" (Bertram, 
1994: 102). He concludes that Germany's fear of international loneliness is unlikely to 
return it to its violent past at the risk of antagonising its friends and partners. He 
argues instead that "the real problem for German power in the future will not be how 
to constrain but how to generate ways to use it, how to get Germans to think of their 
contribution as essential for the common good, and how to get them to accept 
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responsibility for leadership as the major power in West and Central Europe. This will 
require restraint and confidence at the same time: it needs recognition that leadership 
is most effective though persuasion, not imposition, and confidence that ... Germany 
has become a mature democracy like others, exposed to all the problems and dangers 
which this implies - except a return to the past" (Bertram, 1994: 104-105). For 
Germany, therefore, going through a phase of introspection and loneliness provided it 
with the key to successfully reclaiming itself after its period of separation, and offered 
new opportunities for its self-development. This has created problems and risks, but 
has also opened up new opportunities for intimacy and self expression that were 
lacking in its previous relationships. As with a separated or divorced person, Germany 
needs moral courage to try new relationships and find new interests. As with a 
separated or divorced person, Germany needs to have the resolution to establish a new 
sense of its identity as a basis for its relations with others in order to grasp the 
opportunities available to it. Today, a reunited Germany has been presented with an 
unprecedented opportunity to make up for the errors of its past history - it has been 
presented with a `second chance'. Germany needs the confidence in its own 
judgement and capacities to break decisively with the loneliness of its turbulent past. 
This process will not be simple or without anxiety for it, and will require great 
statesmanship and skill on the part of German politicians. Yet Germany shows every 
sign today that it has begun to establish the new sense of identity which is crucial to 




Japan: Towards Self Reliance? 
Building on themes developed in previous chapters, this discussion of Japanese state 
strategies since 1989 will utilise a metaphor taken from the trials and tribulations of 
day-to-day life and personal experience in the contemporary world, as documented in 
Anthony Giddens' Modernity And Self Identity. In this book, Giddens discusses what 
he terms `the trajectory of the self' under the conditions of late modernity. During late 
modernity, Giddens argues, the self becomes "a reflexive project, for which the 
individual is responsible. ... (W)hat the 
individual becomes is dependent on the 
reconstructive endeavours in which she or he engages" (Giddens, 1991: 75). With the 
decay of sources of self-identity anchored in tradition, individuals must learn to 
negotiate a plurality of life choices in ways which are historically distinctive. The key 
to achieving this, he argues, is "building ... a coherent and rewarding sense of 
identity" (Giddens, 1991: 75). Individuals must learn to become more se f reliant in 
terms of the way in which their personal identity is defined and understood - more 
able to make decisions for themselves which previously would have been passively 
inherited from pre-established social practices. Giddens notes that this process of 
change presents both opportunities and dangers to the individual. In terms of 
possibilities, it opens up the chance of establishing relationships on the basis of trust 
and mutual commitment. Thus "(1)etting go of the past, through the various techniques 
of becoming free of oppressive emotional habits, generates a multiplicity of 
opportunities for self-development. The world becomes full of potential ways of being 
and acting, in terms of the ... involvements which the individual is now able to 
initiate" (Giddens, 1991: 78). On the other hand, however, "'(t)aking charge of ones 
own life' involves risk because it means confronting a diversity of open possibilities. 
The individual must be prepared to make a more or less complete break with the past, 
if necessary, and to contemplate novel sources of action that simply cannot be guided 
by established habits. Security attained through sticking with established patterns is 
brittle, and at some point will crack" (Giddens, 1991: 73). As a result, "(t)he individual 
must confront novel hazards as a necessary part of breaking way from established 
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patterns of behaviour, including the risk that things could possibly get worse than they 
were before. ... (A) 
book on self therapy describes things in the following way: `If 
your life is ever going to get better, you'll have to get out of your rut, meet new 
people, explore new ideas and move along unfamiliar pathways. In a way the risks of 
self-growth involve going into the unknown ... the paradox is that until we give up all 
that feels secure, we can never really trust the friend, mate or job that offers us 
something. True security does not come from without, it comes from within. When we 
are really secure, we must place total trust in ourselves"' (Giddens, 1991: 78). 
Many features of the literature on `self-help' Giddens identifies as symptomatic of 
distinctive processes of self identity formation under late modernity resonate strongly 
with themes developed in the literature on the new position Japan finds itself in the 
post Cold War international system. Kenneth Pyle's "The Japanese Question: Power 
And Purpose In A New Era" is a suitable case in point. According to Pyle, the 
`Japanese Question' concerns the manner in which Japan constructs its own sense of 
purpose in the emerging international system as the basis for its relations with others 
(Pyle, 1996: 6-7). Japan's crisis of national purpose has its origins in the highly 
dependent manner in which it has defined its role in the international system. In the 
past "(t)he Cold War structure of international politics allowed Japan to rely on the 
United States to guarantee its security and at the same time to maintain the 
international free trade order, while Japan was free to follow the policies of economic 
nationalism" (Pyle, 1996: 3-4). It was these geopolitical circumstances which, 
combined with the skilful opportunism of Japan's post-war diplomacy, underpinned 
what Pyle has termed the `Yoshida Doctrine'. The Yoshida Doctrine had two broad 
components - one political, and one economic. In political terms, the Yoshida 
Doctrine accepted and worked within the parameters of Japan's post war constitution, 
Article 9 which was generally interpreted at renouncing Japan's sovereign right to 
declare war on other states (Pyle, 1996: 10). For its security, Japan relied for its 
defence on the guarantees provided to Japan though the Mutual Security Treaty 
(MST) signed in the early 1950's with the United States (Pyle, 1996: 29-30). In 
economic terms, the Yoshida strategy was underpinned by the pursuit of economic 
nationalism oriented towards Japan's economic rehabilitation (Pyle, 1996: 25). The 
117 
principles of the Yoshida Doctrine, Pyle argues, provided "a sense of national purpose 
that has guided the country to the present" (Pyle, 1996: 21). Underpinned by a 
powerful national consensus able to unite both the right and the pacifist left in its 
support, "(t)his strategy was a brilliant success. In contrast to every other major 
power, Japan was spared the domestic controversy and disruption that an active 
foreign policy would have engendered and was free to concentrate its resources and 
energies on achieving economic growth. ... (As a result), the nation achieved 
its 
century's old goal of overtaking the industrial powers of the West" (Pyle, 1996: 4). 
However, in Pyle's view, the resurgence of the Japanese Question today reflects the 
way in which the Yoshida strategy has become inappropriate to contemporary Japan. 
He suggests that Japan is increasingly unable to live in the past and must actively 
confront the present and future: "(t)he wartime experience did leave a radical legacy, 
but ... 
(it) has increasingly lost its vitality and taken more a form of isolationism and 
resistance to an activist role in the world" (Pyle, 1996: 120). AA strategy which once 
provided a coherent and successful basis for Japan's sense of purpose in the world has 
been thrown into question by the changes that have occurred in the international 
system over the post war period, and particularly since 1989. The definition of the 
`Japanese Question' offered by Pyle is significant because it begs the question of 
whether or not it is a country faced with an identity crisis in the emerging post Cold 
War international system. Is a country which previously relied upon others for its 
sense of political purpose in the world whilst it focused exclusively on economic 
issues being faced with the task of constructing its own sense of identity in the world? 
Is Japan today faced with the task of achieving greater `self-reliance', in much the 
same way that Giddens suggests that individuals must in their personal relations? 
Although realist and institutionalist accounts of international relations are reluctant to 
draw parallels between trends in interpersonal and international relations, the theme of 
Japan moving towards `self reliance' could be interpreted as having strong realist 
overtones. Yet it is important to recognise the distinctive features of an understanding 
of the metaphor of `self-reliance' from a perspective informed by Giddens analysis of 
self identity formation. In the realist account, the presence of mistrust in the 
international system means that asymmetries in power provide the basis for 
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relationships between actors. To Giddens, however, secure relationships are 
negotiated on the basis of mutual consent by equal and independent partners. 'Self- 
reliance' in this context means developing a sense of self-identity which allows 
relationships to be sustained on the basis of trust and equality, rather than mistrust and 
inequality. 
This chapter seeks to examine the issue of whether or not Japan is becoming more 
`self reliant' in the manner in which it constructs its identity as an actor in the 
international system. It does so by examining post Cold War Japanese state strategies 
with respect to the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models. Conclusions will then 
be drawn as to the validity of each of these theoretical perspectives before returning to 
reflect on whether Japan is moving `towards self reliance' in the post Cold War 
period. 
Neorealism 
A number of analysts have used the neorealist model to make predictions about the 
behaviour of Japan in the post Cold War international system. Most notable of these 
have been Kenneth Waltz, and Christopher Layne (Waltz, 1993, Layne 1993; Layne, 
1996). Both Waltz and Layne make similar predictions as to Japan's future role in the 
emerging structure of international politics. They both see Japan as locked into a 
defensively positional location in the post Cold War international power structure. 
They predict that its position within the structure of the post-Cold War international 
system will encourage it to define its interests within that system according to its 
relative power capabilities in order to ensure its continued security. The outcomes 
compatible with this behaviour are a move to conflictual multipolarity within Asia as 
part of a more general pattern of such behaviour at a global level. 
In the case of Japanese state strategies since 1989, there is a significant body of 
evidence which tends to weigh in favour of neorealist hypotheses and predictions. The 
basic evidence in support of neorealist claims offered is that Japan has undoubtedly 
acquired the potential capability to become a serious geopolitical rival to the United 
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States (Layne 1996: 71; Waltz, 1993: 55; Buzan, 1988: 558). From this insight, 
neorealists build their analysis of both political and economic dimensions of Japan's 
post Cold War state strategies. In political terms, neorealists see Japan's status as a 
potential strategic rival to the US as leading to signs of relative gains tensions in the 
US-Japan security alliance. Thus instances of both Japan's failure to remilitarise 
leading to tensions within US-Japan relations, and signs of its increasingly active and 
independent political and military involvement in international affairs having the same 
effect will be discussed in the account which follows. This is not contradictory to the 
kind of behaviour predicted by the neorealist model which locates the source of 
conflict between the two states in terms of their potential military capabilities. 
The Gulf War has been the most important single event which has highlighted the 
`politics of burden-sharing' within the US-Japan security relationship (Pharr, 1993). 
Japan's most significant contribution came in the form a somewhat belated $9 billion 
contribution, in addition to their previous $4 billion of financial assistance to the 
allied efforts (Lincoln, 1993: 233 and 219-238; Itoh, 1995: 285). This response was 
made largely because "Japan would be severely criticised by the United States if the 
nation did nothing" (Lincoln, 1993: 233). Japan's `cheque book diplomacy' provoked 
criticisms of freeloading from the US (Sasae, 1994: 30), which in turn prompted 
criticism of American ingratitude from the Japanese side (Inoguchi, 1993: 253). Such 
tensions provide evidence of the relative gains problems that neorealists predict will 
come to dog the US-Japan relationship. In the course of the Gulf conflict, it was 
Japan's failure to contribute militarily which was at the root of the politics of burden 
sharing with the United States. However, there are also signs of strains emerging in 
the US-Japan relationship arising from increased Japanese political assertiveness. 
Hughes notes the way in which Japan has adopted an increasingly independent stance 
towards North Korea in response to indications that it is moving towards nuclear 
weapons capability (Hughes, 1996[b]). This has frustrated the attempts by the US to 
orchestrate sanctions against North Korea to help reduce the possibility of nuclear 
proliferation in the region (Yahuda, 1996: 251). Developments such as these can be 
interpreted from a neorealist perspective as evidence of emerging tensions between 
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Japan and the United States which have their ultimate source in the changed structure 
of the international system in 1989. 
Furthermore, there is significant evidence that the `politics of burden sharing' with the 
US interacts with Japan's relations with its East Asian counterparts. Buzan and Segal 
identify the reduction in US forces in the region in the early 1990s as at the root of a 
significant arms build-up in East Asia, although they do not see this as having yet 
become a regional arms race (Buzan and Segal, 1994: 7). They identify Sino-Japanese 
relations as central to this arms dynamic, and indeed there have been signs of 
significant tensions emerging between China and Japan. These tensions have been 
most apparent over Chinese nuclear testing, China's moves towards acquiring a blue- 
water naval capability, and growing support in Japan for closer ties with Taiwan 
(Garrett and Glaser, 1997: 397; Calder, 1996: 144; see also Green and Self, 1996: 36- 
37). By the same token, there is particular concern in China over the possible 
acquisition by Japan of a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system which may allow it 
to neutralise China's nuclear deterrence system (Garrett and Glaser, 1997: 392-4). 
Tensions between Japan and China also interact with the question of policy towards 
the two Koreas, particularly in response to indications that North Korea is moving 
towards nuclear weapons capability (Buzan and Segal, 1994: 10). Moreover, there are 
signs that Japan's attempt to normalise relations with North Korea in order to secure a 
more independent political influence in the region has strained relations with South 
Korea (Ahn, 1993: 270-272). These developments may all be interpreted by neorealists 
as emerging as a result of the withdrawal of the bipolar Cold War overlay. 
There is also evidence that the presence of local rivalries and animosities within the 
East Asian security complex are likely to reinforce the structural incentives for Japan 
to play its part within the emerging regional arms dynamic. Japan is in direct 
territorial dispute with both China over the Senkaku Islands and Russia over 
ownership of the Northern Territories, and relations over these issues have both shown 
some signs of deterioration over the 1990s (for, the former see Garrettt and Glaser, 
1997: 397; Pyle, 1998: 135; for the latter see Carlile, 1994: 421; Berton, 1993: 32-42). 
Indeed, until Germany brokered a compromise, the Japanese were very reluctant to 
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participate in the IMF's economic assistance package to the Soviet Union in 1991 
because of the way in which this issue rebounded over the Northern Territories 
dispute (Saito, 1993: 278). There are also important indirect sources of geopolitical 
dispute within the region which have had implications for Japan. Closer Japanese ties 
with Taiwan have become a source of tension with China, and conversely Chinese 
military manoeuvres in the Taiwan Straits in 1995 and 1996 have heightened concerns 
in Japan (Garrettt and Glaser, 1997: 397-9; Yahuda, 1996: 250). The prospect of 
Korean unification is a central underlying source of concern to Japan (Pyle, 
1998: 133), particularly when combined with the prospect of nuclear proliferation in 
this area. Disputes between China and ASEAN members over the Spratly Islands also 
have implications for Japan though its acute vulnerability to its oil supply from the 
Middle East and precedents set in international law (Calder, 1996: 144; Er, 1996: 998- 
1001). It is plausible to suggest that it is this which lies behind Japan's attempt to 
broker tensions over China's erection of structures on Mischief Reef in the Spratleys 
in 1995 (Er, 1996: 1005). Moreover, the complexity of these disputes is reinforced by 
the legacy of Japanese imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
in East Asia, notably in China and the Koreas (Buzan and Segal, 1994: 4). This legacy 
could be understood by neorealists as lying at the source of the outstanding issue of 
Japan's failure to formally apologise for the atrocities committed under imperial 
Japan, especially during the Second World War. The sheer number as well as the 
historical and geopolitical complexity of these signs of emerging tensions between 
Japan and other regional players can be cited as evidence of relative gains problems 
resulting from the structural change in the distribution of power at a global level. 
Japan's apparently contradictory stance with respect to its involvement with the 
United Nations is also amenable to a neorealist analysis. Since the early 1990s Japan 
has displayed an inconsistency in its behaviour towards the United Nations which 
suggests that it places its own vital interests and policy making autonomy over the 
wishes of the international community. Since 1994, Japan has made demands for a 
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (Itoh, 1995: 283). However, 
unlike Germany, Japan has not to date reinterpreted its constitution so as to allow Self 
Defence Forces (SDF) participation in the multilateral use of force in an international 
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context in response to the criticism it sustained during the Gulf crisis. In 1992, Japan 
did establish a law allowing SDF participation in non-combat UN Peacekeeping 
Operations (UNPKO), and since that time has participated in a number of such 
activities, notably in Cambodia (Itoh, 1995). However, as George comments, "the 
successful launching of the PKO proposal ... did not represent a unilateral, ... 
unprompted gesture ...; the Gulf 
War dictated its timing, while external pressures 
largely shaped its content" (George, 1993: 563). Akaha brings out the contradiction in 
Japan's stance to the UN when he notes that "(t)here is a near consensus among the 
Japanese that they deserve such a status .... However, there 
is widespread concern that 
this would be contingent on Japan's willingness to participate in ... combat activities 
but that this would require a currently impossible revision of the constitution" (Akaha, 
1995: 68). Such views fit well with a neorealist account which emphasises the 
tendency of Japan to seek to obtain the benefits of membership in international 
institutions (such as the power of veto and the prestige of a permanent UNSC Seat) 
without incurring the associated costs of membership.. Moreover, it is not 
contradictory for neorealists to interpret Japan's PKO legislation as a first step on the 
road to Japan's remilitarisation, as well as being a reluctant response to the pressures 
imposed by the international community. From this perspective, Japan may be 
pursuing both these strategies simultaneously, using diplomacy and brinkmanship in 
order to maximise its interests whilst minimising its commitments. 
Economic dimensions of Japan's state strategies also provide considerable evidence in 
favour of neorealist predictions about its behaviour within the post Cold War 
international system. Once again, most importantly there have been signs of increased 
economic tensions emerging in US-Japan relations since 1989. Realists such as Gilpin 
identify the underlying cause of these emerging tensions as Japan's structural status as 
a potential economic rival to the United States: "the long term problem for the United 
States ... 
is the repayment of the vast accumulated US debt ... to the Japanese. ... To 
accomplish this task, the United States will have to devalue the dollar even more 
substantially than it has already and achieve a trade surplus ... (Yet this would in turn) 
require appreciation of the Yen and Japanese importation of huge quantities of foreign 
products" (Gilpin, 1989: 339). Examples of US-Japanese economic conflicts which 
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may be interpreted in this light have included the US's unilateral Super 301 provision 
of the 1989 US Trade Act, the bilateral US-Japan Structural Impediments Initiatives 
(SII) talks in 1990, and disputes over sharing technology over the codevelopment of 
the FS-X fighter aircraft for Japan (see Mastanduno, 1991: 84-101; Lincoln, 1990: 2; 
Inoguchi, 1993: 80; Sasae, 1994: 22-23). Bhagwati also documents the increased 
tensions between the US and Japan over trade in the automobiles industry during the 
1990s (Bhagwati, 1996). Most importantly, however, throughout the 1990s there has 
been a tendency of the Japanese only to make concessions to open their relatively 
highly restricted markets in response to what they have termed "gaitsu" or foreign 
pressure. In a study of a key strategic sector of Japan's trade liberalisation, Mulgan 
notes that "the consensus amongst analysts of Japan's agricultural trade policy is that 
foreign pressure (particularly US pressure) has been the single most important factor 
accounting for market opening" (Mulgan, 1997: 171). Such behaviour would seem 
characteristic of the kind of relative gains seeking behaviour predicted by the 
neorealist model. 
Japan's economic relations with the EEC/EU also provide significant evidence in 
favour of neorealist predictions about its behaviour in the post Cold War international 
system. Inoguchi notes that relations between Japan and Europe, have also been 
dogged by disputes over trade (Inoguchi, 1991). Once again, industrial competition 
has been particularly fierce in the automobiles industry (Lehmann, 1992). 
Furthermore, it is important to recognise the ways in which developments in relations 
between Japan and Europe have fed back into further corroding US-Japanese 
relationships. For example, Nuttall notes the de facto alliance between the Europeans 
and the Japanese which emerged during the US-Japan car parts dispute (Nuttal, 
1996: 120). Similarly, over the development of the FS-X fighter, Europeans have 
displayed a willingness to undercut the US by selling Japan advanced equipment 
cheaply in order to capture the emerging weapons market in Pacific Asia (Inoguchi, 
1993: 80). Signs of tensions in Japan's increasingly independent relations with Europe, 
and the way this can be seen as in turn further exacerbating US-Japanese tensions 
once again may all be cited as evidence of emerging structural conflict within the 
international system. 
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Furthermore, Japan's economic strategies with respect to East Asian countries have 
displayed strong mercantilist tendencies. Its polices towards foreign investment, 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), and the multilateral development banks 
(MDBs) all reflect this pattern. In terms of foreign investment, East Asia has become 
the prime focus of Japan's attention. As Pyle notes, "(w)hat began to emerge in the 
1990s were polices involving close business-government co-operation and the use of 
private investment and official aid to help Japanese multinationals build vertically 
integrated production networks throughout Asia". This in turn helped give Japanese 
industry great leverage in Asian markets (Pyle, 1998: 128). This foreign investment 
strategy has been supported by Japan's use of ODA and its role in the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). Japan's aid policy, which has been one of the largest in 
the world over the 1990s, has a "strongly commercial orientation" and its aid is 
donated largely on a bilateral basis (Lincoln, 1993: 111 and 118). Japan plays a 
relatively low key role in both global and regional multilateral development banks, 
with the exception of the Asian Development Bank, within which it plays a leading 
role. Lincoln notes that although technically the US and Japan share equal voting 
rights within the ADB, "Japan actually has the dominant voice at the bank" (Lincoln, 
1993: 134; also Yasutomo, 1993). This tendency towards mercantilism in the East 
Asia region could again be used to support the neorealist arguments about emerging 
structural tensions within the international order. 
Indeed, such behaviour has begun to attract the criticism that Japan is moving towards 
establishing economic hegemony within an Asian context. Such accusations became 
particularly strong in the wake of Malaysia's calls in 1991 for the formation of an East 
Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) to be led by Japan. Unlike other regional 
economic institutions, the proposal would have included Japan but excluded the US 
from the grouping. In the event, Japan distanced itself from the proposal (Buzan, 
1998: 82-83). Nevertheless, Lincoln notes that "Japanese government officials ... 
talked openly in the early 1990s about emerging regionalism under Japan's 
leadership" (Lincoln, 1993: 1658). Indeed, Hall has argued that he "suspect(s) that the 
Japanese - avoiding offence to America by letting others do the talking - have been 
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very much behind Malaysia's proposal" (Hall, 1994: 24). He sees this as part of 
Japan's "`cultural gap' ploy ... to encourage and amplify the recent postulation 
by 
certain Asians of a monolithic set of common values under attack" (Hall, 1994: 22). 
Further evidence for such a `cultural gap' ploy is available in the form of Japan's 
policies with respect to human rights in an Asian context. Arase notes that a "pattern 
of Japanese effort to shield Asian governments from Western pressure emerges when 
one examines Japanese responses to the other major cases of flagrant violence against 
unarmed civilians demonstrated by East Asian regimes" (Arase, 1993: 945). Overall, 
although no firm evidence exists for or against whether or not Japan lies behind 
proposals for an EAEG, it remains a distinct possibility, especially given Japan's 
broader attempts to enhance its links with East Asian states. These developments 
could be interpreted by neorealists as evidence of an incipient Japanese strategy for 
the achievement of regional economic hegemony in East Asia, especially given the 
pronounced tendency for mercantilism in the region displayed by Japan. 
Overall, it would appear that there is a significant body of evidence which would 
favour a neorealist interpretation of Japan's state strategies since 1989. Important 
aspects of Japan's political and economic behaviour during this period indicate that 
Japan has begun to pursue a more active, self-assertive and narrowly self-interested 
role in both global and regional affairs. 
Institutionalism 
According to institutionalist theory, international institutions can take on instrumental 
value for states. Consequently, states will be encouraged to institutionalise aspects of 
their inter-relations so as to maximise their absolute gains from interaction. However, 
where institutionalisation imposes net costs on states in the form of requiring 
considerable flexibility, accommodation and adjustment on their behalf, they are 
likely to reject institutional options. Within institutionalist theory, the conditions 
under which institutions can become valued by states are those of complex 
interdependence. Japan's relations with states in North America and Western Europe 
may be regarded as fitting broadly within this ideal typical situation. However, it is 
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important to recognise that Japan's integration into the world economy varies across 
the regional and global levels in a way which reverses the situation in which Germany 
finds itself. Unlike Germany, Japan is more tightly integrated into the US and the 
wider global economy than it is in a regional context, despite the economic emergence 
of East Asia during the 1980's and 1990s. Thus whilst roughly 50% of Germany's 
exports are intra-regional, this figure is only around 35% for Japan, and whilst 30% of 
Japan's exports are to the US, this is the destination for only 10% of Germany's 
exports (see Figure 9.1 in Grieco, 1999: 326; also Gangopadhyay, 1998: 14). This trend 
is also reflected in patterns of Direct Foreign Investment made by Japan. Despite 
Japan's deep and growing involvement in intra-regional investment, Japan continues 
to invest more in the United States in both relative and absolute terms (Lincoln, 
1993: 175-181). Indeed, institutionalists have themselves recognised that a situation of 
complex interdependence may not be said to exist between many states in an Asian 
context. It is for this reason that the prominent institutionalist Joseph Nye, in his 
capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for Defence in 1995, recommended that the 
US maintain a strong forward US defence presence in East Asia as a basis for 
developing multilateralism in the region (Office For International Security Affairs, 
1995; see also Nye, 1995). Whilst not fully substituting for a well developed pattern 
of interdependent relations in an East Asian context, Nye suggests that by maintaining 
its forward defence presence in East Asia the US can provide some of the 
preconditions necessary for international institutions to take on value for states such as 
Japan. 
Important aspects of Japanese political and economic strategies since 1989 are 
amenable to an institutionalist interpretation. In political terms, institutionalists could 
point to evidence that counters neorealist claims about US-Japanese relations. In 
particular, the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty has shown signs of endurance in the 
post Cold War period. Firm US commitment to Japan was made concrete by the 1995 
US Department Of Defence report supervised by Nye. This development could be 
linked by institutionalists to debates over the status of Japan as a `civilian power' in 
the post Cold War international system (Maull, 1990; also Funabashi, 1991,1992, and 
1995; Nye, 1992-3). Pyle notes important ways in which the "commonly heard 
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assertion that Japan has the world's third or fourth largest defence budget gives a 
wholly mistaken impression" (Pyle, 1996: 126). However, the strongest evidence of 
Japan's civilian power status comes from the lack of any significant remilitarisation 
by Japan in the post Cold War period. The 1995 National Defence Program Outline 
(NDPO), published shortly after the Nye Report, indicates no significant change in 
Japan's long term defence planning strategy. Whilst it does suggest the strengthening 
of Japan's theatre missile defence capabilities which, as has been noted, has caused 
some alarm in China, what is most remarkable about the NDPO is that it suggests a 
possible reduction in the level of its SDF personnel from the current 180,000 to 
150,000 (Sasae, 1994: 17). Thus institutionalists can point to significant evidence to 
argue that, despite some `transitional' tensions in the post 1989 US-Japan relationship, 
its underlying centrality to both countries remains intact. This would strongly support 
Nye's claim that the way in which "The United States and Japan have become 
interdependent on many levels" can underpin a strong US-Japanese relationship even 
in the absence of a common Soviet threat (Nye, 1992-3: 99). 
Institutionalists could also point to Japan's involvement in emerging regional security 
institutions in East Asia, notably the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to bolster their 
arguments about the degree to which Japan's response to regional security dynamics 
is contained by its relationship with the United States. The ARF was founded in 1994 
as a forum for the discussion of security issues pertaining to the East Asia region 
(Mak, 1998: 116). Its membership is exceptionally broad, including amongst others 
India, the European Union and the US as well as both Japan and China (see Buzan, 
1998: 75). Japan played an instrumental role in the establishment of the ARF (Yahuda, 
1996: 248). What Yahuda characterises as the "preventive diplomacy" aims of the 
institution are modest (Yahuda, 1996: 274), and the ARF has been criticised for its 
weakness and vulnerability, particularly to China (Segal, 1998: 325). Nevertheless, 
institutionalists could identify Japan's support for the ARF as an indication that its 
wider global commitments are tempering its response to emerging patterns of local 
tension in the East Asia region in the post Cold War period, and that it has the 
orientation towards multilateralism characteristic of a civilian power. Such arguments 
could be supported further by Japan's increased involvement in European regional 
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security institutions through its acquisition of observership status in both NATO and 
the CSCE (now OSCE) in the early 1990s (Inoguchi, 1992: 83-84). Again, such 
developments could be seen as reflecting Japan's strong and increasing linkages with 
the wider world, and its interest in participating within multilateral security forums. 
`Civilian power' type arguments could also, in principle, be extended to explaining 
constitutional debates within Japan over the extent and scale of its wider military role 
in the world, notably its extreme reluctance to revise the dominant interpretation of 
Article 9 of its constitution limiting the external involvement of the SDF in overseas 
conflicts, its non-military involvement in the Gulf conflict and its subsequent 
acceptance of a degree of involvement in UNPKO. However, it is revealing that 
neither of these interpretations are endorsed by advocates of a civilian power position 
such as Nye and Funabashi. Even prominent institutionalists appear cautious about 
adopting a benign interpretation of Japan's standing on this issue. 
Nevertheless, institutionalists can supplement the evidence they present about Japan's 
political and military strategies with argument's deriving from Japan's global and 
regional economic strategies since 1989. Central to institutionalist arguments in this 
regard has been Japan's use of formal global and regional international economic 
institutions during this period. At the global level, Japan has continued its 
membership in major economic co-ordination institutions such as GATT, the G7 and 
the OECD. Inoguchi argues that Japan's role in international trade, money and 
technology transfers is essentially that of a "supporter" rather than a leader (Inoguchi, 
1993: 58-62). This accords with institutionalist claims that under situations of complex 
interdependence, the presence of international institutions can help secure policy co- 
ordination by different actors. Such arguments may be supplemented by 
institutionalists by examining Japan's recent role in emergent regional economic 
institutions in East Asia, notably its involvement in Asia Pacific Economic Co- 
operation (APEC). Established in 1989, APEC is the dominant regional international 
institution with an economic focus (Yahuda, 1996: 276). As with the ARF, Japan, 
together with the United States, was instrumental in bringing this institution into 
being (Yahuda, 1996: 248). Like the ARF, its function as merely a forum for 
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discussion makes it a relatively weak institution, and it also suffers from the problem 
that its is overshadowed by GATT/WTO (Segal, 1998: 325). Nevertheless, at APEC's 
first meeting in 1989, ministers issued a declaration which stressed their firm 
commitment to timely completion of GATT's Uruguay Round (Soesastro, 1995: 480). 
Japan's formal resistance to the EAEG proposal takes on particular significance in this 
regard because its decision was crucial in determining the failure of this institutional 
option. This could be seen as providing a strong signal about Japan's commitments to 
an open East Asia within the global trading system. Similarly, Japan's participation in 
the emerging Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) institution since its first meeting in 1996 
provides further evidence of Japan's commitment to open economic multilateralism in 
the face of its growing dependence on world trade (Smith, 1998). Such developments 
bolster institutionalists' case that Japan's integration into the global economy has 
placed limits on the f ingability of its political power, and reduced its incentives to 
attain regional hegemony over the emerging East Asian economy. They support the 
view that Japan has adopted a `trading state' function in the international system as 
part of a broader civilian power strategy which prioritises economic security goals. 
Finally, it is possible for institutionalists to offer an interpretation of Japan's aid and 
investment policies which attempts to stress the non-political incentives for pursuing 
such strategies. Inada, for example, has made the argument that strategic 
considerations are "not the only factor behind the provision of aid. Japan's own desire 
to maintain good relations with the country in question and to demonstrate its 
readiness to fulfil its political responsibilities also come into play" (Inada, 1989: 412). 
He sees Japan's aid policy "as a hybrid that reflects both its reconfiguration of the 
forces of realpolitik and its striving for a world of `complex interdependence"' (Inada, 
1989: 412). With regard to its policies on overseas investment, Japan has showed some 
signs of increased involvement with MDB's at the global and extra regional levels. Its 
share of voting rights in both the IMF and the World Bank increased in the early 
1990s (Lincoln, 1993: 133-134). Similarly, in 1989, Japan announced its decision to 
join the then newly established European Bank For Reconstruction And Development 
(EBRD) as part of a more general process of strengthening trilateral relations between 
the US, Europe and Japan (Yasutomo, 1993: 330). From an institutionalist perspective, 
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these developments could support the view that Japan is responding to increased 
functional incentives to co-operate at a global level created by its interdependence 
with the world economy, and in doing so it is adopting an economics oriented 
`civilian power' foreign policy. 
Overall, there would seem to be significant evidence that Japan's use of international 
institutions reflects the way in which its economic interdependence varies across 
regional and global levels. At the level of the global economy, within which Japan is 
tightly integrated, Japan makes extensive use of both international security and 
economic institutions. At a regional level, its use of institutions is weaker, but still 
significant. Indeed, in important respects, the account offered by institutionalism is 
more convincing than that offered by the neorealist model, at least in regard to the 
policies Japan has so far pursued since 1989. Whilst neorealism can highlight signs of 
tensions in Japan's relationships with other powers, institutionalists could respond by 
arguing that Japan's incentives to remain committed to the global international 
institutions would appear to be strong on the basis of its recent and present behaviour. 
Liberalism 
Liberalism stresses the significance of states' foreign policy preferences, which in turn 
reflect an underlying political identity, as a factor in determining international 
behaviour and outcomes. Liberalism's precise predictions vary according to the 
preferences of the particular state under analysis and the configuration of preferences 
in the international system as a whole. However, the liberal model defines a set of 
predictions directly relevant to Japan's state strategies over the post Cold War period. 
First, it opens up the possibility that Japan can pursue strategies which fall outside the 
ranges predicted by both neorealist and institutionalist models due to the influence of 
its domestic politics on its foreign policy behaviour. Second, in the case of Japan it is 
important to recognise that patterns of non-liberal behaviour are entirely compatible 
with the predictions of the liberal model. Such behaviour can be explained with 
reference to the articulation of non-liberal political preferences within the international 
system as a direct function of a state's underlying political identity as an actor. 
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There is strong evidence that Japan's political preferences have influenced its 
behaviour in the post Cold War international system in a way which poses significant 
anomalies to both neorealist and institutionalist models. First, Japan's failure to 
remilitarise is problematic from the point of view of neorealism. It is difficult for 
neorealists to sustain an overall interpretation of Japan's state strategies in the light of 
its failure to revise its defence planning commitments in 1995. Unlike Japan's 
attitudes towards its involvement in the Gulf and UNPKO, for Japan to pursue a `free- 
riding' strategy with regard to potential direct threats to its own security from East 
Asia requires it to run definite risks, and by implication involves significant costs for 
Japan. As neorealists themselves identify, Japan finds itself in a regional context in 
which potential instability looms large (Layne, 1996). To some extent, the conclusions 
of the Nye Report could help persuade Japanese policy makers that there is still a 
strong US commitment to the East Asia region. However, as Buzan recognises, "(F)or 
Japan, this raises the possibility that the guarantee might be hollow, and would not be 
honoured if Japan got into difficulties with a regional neighbour"(Butan, 1995: 33). 
Under these circumstances, Japan's tight interpretation of Article 9 of its constitution 
is no longer a convenient diplomatic fig leaf for Japan, but becomes a major liability 
for it. Yet in the face of these highly consequential risks, Japan is not responding in 
the way neorealists predict by moving away from a reliance on the US for its defence 
capabilities. On the contrary, as the NDPO indicates "there is little evidence that 
Japanese planners are thinking seriously about a defence strategy independent of US 
forces" (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999: 193). 
Similarly, as Heginbotham and Samuels note, "(p)erhaps the oddest thing from the 
perspective of structural realism .... has been the Japanese failure to exhibit a 
sensitivity to the relative distribution of gains that have accrued to China from its 
economic relations with Japan" (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999: 195). As 
neorealists identify, China is Japan's strongest potential military rival in the East Asia 
region. Yet "Japan has done little to stifle China's economic growth. To the contrary, 
Japan has competed vigorously for a major investment presence in China. It has used 
its influence in the Asian Development Bank and elsewhere to argue actively for the 
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early lifting of the sanctions imposed on China after the suppression of the Tiananmen 
demonstrators in 1989, and Japanese business leaders visited China within months to 
reaffirm the commercial relationship. Today, more Japanese ODA goes to China than 
to any other country. As a partial consequence of Japanese ... investments, the Chinese 
economy has grown at a double digit pace for over a decade" (Heginbotham and 
Samuels, 1999: 195). Yet this economic growth has enabled China to create a credible 
blue water navy and improve its airforce substantially. Furthermore, in the face of the 
signs of increased Chinese assertiveness in East Asia, Japan's 1991 announcement 
that in future Japan's ODA decisions would be tied to political criteria has proved a 
hollow one: "the Japanese government announced in 1994 that annual economic aid 
for the three year period after 1996 would be increased by more than 40%" 
(Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999: 21-2). Such behaviour runs heavily against the 
grain of neorealist predictions about Japan's behaviour within the post Cold War 
international system. 
Equally, the nature of Japan's economic relationships poses significant problems for 
institutionalist predictions. Institutionalist arguments tend to gloss over the 
significance of Japan's troubled economic relations with industrialised states and the 
role played by gaitsu as a general feature of Japan's economic relations with the West. 
They also suffer from the limitation that Japan's aid and investment strategies are 
strongly bilateral and oriented in favour of Japanese business interests rather than free 
trade. Indeed, the degree of politicisation of Japan's investment strategies in the ADB, 
the major international institution used by Japan with regard to its investment in 
China, is so strong that Wan has interpreted it as evidence that it has taken on intrinsic 
rather than instrumental value for Japanese policy makers (Wan, 1995-6: 526). Such 
behaviour is beyond explanation using institutionalism's functionalist logic, and in 
Wan's view reflects Japan's preferences for multilateralism. He insists that "This 
cannot be explained away simply as a coincidence of what Japan wants and what the 
ADB wants. One may argue that Japan defines what it wants in the light of what the 
bank wants in the first place" (Wan, 1995-6: 527). Wan's argument that Japan's 
preferences over its investment strategies in East Asia are fundamentally multilateral 
in orientation, however, remains an unconvincing one. Japan's use of the ADB is 
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highly distinctive when compared with its use of all other regional and global MDB's 
(Yasutomo, 1993). This can only cast doubt on Japan's motives for using the ADB in 
the manner that it does. Nevertheless, Wan's account does serve to identify the 
limitations of an institutionalist account of its economic strategies in China and East 
Asia more generally by bringing out the importance of Japan's distinctive political 
preferences in determining its aid and investment policies. 
Heginbotham and Samuels have developed a characterisation of Japan's foreign 
policy preferences which is capable of explaining the anomalies faced by both 
neorealist and instititionalist accounts of Japan's post Cold War state strategies. They 
argue that Japan's strategies in the post Cold War international system reflect 
`mercantile realist' preferences on the part of the Japanese state. Meracantile realism 
shares several common elements with other forms of realism, including the 
assumption that states are the most important actors in world politics, that states seek 
to maximise their power, and that states are in competition for relative power and 
security (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999: 198). However, unlike other forms of 
realism, mercantile realism stresses the primacy of techno-economic strategic goals in 
the making of foreign policy decisions. Importantly Heginbotham and Samuels argue 
that a state with mercantile realist preferences may pursue techno-economic interests 
at the expense of politico-military interests (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999: 200- 
201). It will define its strength in the international system in terms of its wealth and 
technology, and its position in terms of its industrial structure. As a result, mercantile 
realists will balance against wealthy states endowed with strong, technology intensive 
industries, and simultaneously will not see states with different industrial structures to 
its own as threatening (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999: 200). 
A mercantile realist characterisation of Japanese state preferences can explain the 
distinctive features of Japan's foreign policy behaviour within the post Cold War 
international system. First, Japan's failure to remilitarise significantly fits well into a 
mercantile realist explanation of its state strategies. From a mercantile realist 
perspective, "the debates over the role of Japan's conventional forces and on whether 
or not Japan should become a `normal' nation is coloured by economic considerations 
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and the exigencies of economic diplomacy" (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999: 205). 
That is to say, it reflects the priority Japan gives to techno-economic rather than 
politico-military priorities in the formulation of its national security interests. This 
explains why Japan does not appear to be particularly concerned about the political 
risks involved in pursuing such a strategy. It is not that Japan is `free riding' on US 
politico-military capability as neorealists might suggest, but rather that politico- 
military risks simply do not receive a high priority in terms of its techno-economic 
foreign policy decision making calculus. Furthermore, the concept of mercantile 
realism can also explain aspects of Japan's relations with China which are anomalous 
to neorealism. Unlike the US and Japan, China and Japan have very different 
industrial structures, and so from a mercantile realist perspective are not rivals and 
may develop a complementary relationship. 
The concept of mercantile realism also explains why there are also anomalies in using 
Japan's failure to remilitarise in interpreting its strategies in institutionalist terms. The 
concept of mercantile realism shares with institutionalism the prediction that states 
will give highest priority to their economic interests. In this sense they both predict 
that Japan will adopt a non-military response to the end of the Cold War. However, 
institutionalism cannot explain the particular manner in which Japan has gone about 
pursuing an essentially non-military strategy. As has been noted, Japanese economic 
relations with Asia in general and China in particular fit poorly with the predictions of 
the institutionalist model because they are highly politicised. Yet it is precisely such 
tendencies which fit well with the idea that Japan has mercantile realist preferences. 
At the same time Japan's economic relations with its Asian neighbours have been 
good whilst those with the Western powers continue to be troubled. Again, this fits the 
pattern of behaviour suggested by mercantile realism. States which adopt mercantile 
realist preferences will balance against rivals with similar industrial structures, 
whereas institutionalism will predict that states which share advanced industrial 
structures will be encouraged to cooperate to achieve absolute gains from economic 
interaction. 
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Thus, unlike both neorealism and institutionalism, a focus on Japan's mercantile 
realist state preferences can develop a single consistent account of the characteristic 
way in which Japan prioritises techno-economic over politico-military goals. From a 
mercantile realist perspective, these different aspects of Japan's strategies are not only 
more amenable to a single overall explanation, but are also mutually reinforcing. 
Indeed, other specialists on Japan's foreign policy have also identified these general 
characteristics of its state strategies over the post Cold War period (Blaker, 1993; 
Pyle, 1998: 122-124). Even the prominent neorealist Joseph Grieco is prepared to 
accept that Japan's distinctive foreign policy preferences present anomalies to 
neorealist explanation of Japan's post Cold War state strategies (Grieco, 1999). More 
fundamentally, however, a characterisation of Japan's foreign policy preferences as 
mercantile realist accords remarkably with the fundamental tenets of the Yoshida 
Doctrine -a low political profile for the Japanese state combined with economic 
nationalism. Noting that the break-up of the Soviet Union has "elicited no sharp 
changes" in Japan's security policies, Katzenstein and Okawara conclude that "(w)hen 
international structures change as rapidly as they have in the late 1980's, Japanese 
policy makers have defined the objectives and modalities of their political strategies 
partly in response to the cues that domestic structures provide and in part accord with 
the standards of appropriateness that the normative context for action suggest to them" 
(Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993: 116 and 117; see also Macleod, 1997: 110). Despite 
dramatic changes in the structure of the international system, Japan appears to be 
continuing to articulate today the strategic preferences that it developed during the 
post war period. 
Overall, then, it would seem that a strong case can be made for the prediction of the 
liberal model. This is not to claim that Japan itself has articulated a broadly liberal set 
of foreign policy preferences, 
but rather that its foreign policy preferences fall outside 
the ranges predicted by both neorealist and institutionalist models due to the strong 
influence of the distinctive characteristics of Japanese domestic politics on its 
international behaviour. As a result, a mercantile realist characterisation of Japan's 
political preferences provides the most consistent overall account of patterns of 
behaviour which are anomalous to both neorealist and institutionalist models, notably 
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the way it combines a non-military, non-political orientation with strong elements of 
economic nationalism. Moreover, it enables what are otherwise contradictory 
elements of Japan's foreign policy to be seen as mutually reinforcing aspects of a 
single underlying strategy. This strategy, which has its origins in the post-war Yoshida 
Doctrine, strongly reflects domestic structures and norms which grew up during the 
period of the Cold War, and in this sense Japan's post Cold War foreign policy would 
seem to be marked by a high degree of continuity. However, such a conclusion merely 
raises the deeper and more fundamental issue of the extent to which the course upon 
which Japan is currently set appears to be proving a sustainable one. To do so requires 
an examination of the way domestic and international politics have interacted so as to 
define the agenda for Japan's political choices in the contemporary international 
system. 
Japan's Choices 
In 1989, Van Wolferen famously made a case for seeing Japan's distinctive political 
characteristics as both sustainable, and also as presenting a viable and coherent way 
forward for it within the emerging international system (Van Wolferen, 1990). After 
noting that the argument is often made that fundamental changes are in store for 
Japan, he argued that "(t)oday (it) ... is stuck at the same crossroads as twenty-five 
years ago: one where the Japanese people are expected to choose a new approach to 
the world, helped along by the supposed changes in their own society, but always in a 
direction mapped out by Westerners" (Van Wolferen, 1990: 16). What the `Japan at 
the crossroads' argument failed to take into account, according to Van Wolferen, was 
that "(t)he systematic deprivation of choice in practically all realms of life bearing on 
the political organisation of Japan is essential for keeping the (Japanese political) 
System on an even keel. " (Van Wolferen, 1990: 409). Notably, he identified absence 
of choice in the Japanese party system, and in its highly integrated, kieretsu 
dominated economy (Van Wolferen, 1990: 409). Van Wolferen concluded that despite 
the changes forecast by many in the late 1980's in the wake of mounting international 
pressures, "nothing ... 
has made me want to revise my assessment of the basic 
working of the Japanese power system" (Van Wolferen, 1990: 434) 
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Developments in Japan in the 1990s call radically into question Van Wolferen's 
assessment of the prospects for underlying continuity of the Japanese domestic 
`System' in the face of international change. Two have been particularly important in 
this regard: changes in Japan's party system, and changes in the structure of its 
domestic economy. In 1993, Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) found itself 
unable to sustain a large enough majority in the Diet to form a government for the first 
time since it was founded in 1955 (Pyle, 1996: 147). Pyle has identified that 
"(a)lthough issues of electoral reform were the proximate cause of the vote of no 
confidence ... the primary motive 
force was change in the international system" in the 
form of mounting pressure for the abandonment of the Yoshida strategy (Pyle, 
1996: 149). Moreover, this fluid situation in Japanese party policies has continued to 
the present day (Jain, 1997). Changes in the structure of Japan's economy have been 
more recent, but equally dramatic. After years of slow down, Japan's economy went 
into recession in 1998. Japan's economic problems are structural rather than cyclical, 
and concern its basic system of economic management (Funabashi, 1998a: 28). In 
combination, these dramatic changes have seriously challenged the very aspects of the 
Japanese `System' identified by Van Wolferen only in 1989 as being so distinctive 
and durable. 
Such developments have equally important implications for the future viability of the 
pursuit of mercantile realist strategies by Japan. In the conclusions to their article, 
Heginbotham and Samuels speculate briefly on this issue (Heginbotham and Samuels, 
1999: 207-209). Citing the precedent of fifteenth-century Venice, they argue that 
skilful use of statecraft and diplomacy may allow Japan to succeed and even prosper 
in its pursuit of mercantile realist axioms: "Japan may ultimately pay a high penalty 
for its apparent adherence to a different causal model of what makes states succeed or 
fail. Then again, by following a different, equally rational strategy, it may avoid these 
costs and emerge stronger and safer than before" (Heginbotham and Samuels, 
1999: 208). Indeed, Tadokoro identifies a high degree of domestic support in Japan for 
what he refers to as a `conservative' position whose "adherents are reluctant to change 
Japan's existing stance on foreign policy and domestic economic policy ... (and 
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whose) appeal lies in their promise of stability in politics and people's daily lives" 
(Tadokoro, 1994: 1011). However, he also recognises that conservatives in Japan face 
severe difficulties in the face of the changes their country confronts because "their 
approach would perpetuate the kind of difficulties Japan now faces" (Tadokoro, 1994: 
1011; see also Blaker, 1993: 31). Further pursuit of the kind of policies favoured by 
conservatives would only exacerbate Japan's political and economic difficulties, and 
thereby increase the pressures for fundamental reform. In this way, the political and 
economic changes taking place within Japan have undermined the very basis of the 
Yoshida strategy, which presupposed that both a politically reactive international role 
and economic nationalism could be pursued simultaneously. In the present context it 
would seem that both pillars of Japanese foreign policy have been seriously 
undermined, and at least one of them has to give. 
Institutionalists could interpret the domestic changes taking place in Japan as evidence 
that Japan is being pushed in the direction of a more fully developed civilian power 
strategy within the emerging international system. For Japan to take on a civilian 
power international role would require it to undertake both significant domestic 
political and economic adjustments. In political terms it must "evolve into a wholly 
new type of power that helps furnish international public goods such as refugee 
resettlement, natural disaster relief, development of economic infrastructure, and 
human resources improvements. It must also exercise leadership in guaranteeing 
human rights and cleaning up the Earth's environment" (Funabashi, 1992: 37; see also 
Funabashi, 1995; Lincoln, 1993: 258-266). Such a strategy is potentially attractive for 
Japan because it allows it to respond to international pressures for it to play a larger 
political role in the world whilst not engaging in remilitarisation which would, it is 
argued, necessarily "stimulate 
fears and countermeasures by its Asian neighbours that 
would limit any advantages of rearming" (Nye, 1992-3: 107). In economic terms, a 
civilian power strategy would mean a move away from the economic nationalism of 
the past, towards a more active and fully supportive role in managing the international 
economy. Institutionalists could argue that Japan's economic difficulties suggest that 
it "cannot continue to sustain its position as a global economic power while 
maintaining a 
keiretsu-organised domestic economy" (Inoguchi and Jain, 1997: 3-4). 
139 
As Nye notes, "(s)mall states may be able to act as free riders, but a country of Japan's 
size cannot" (Nye, 1992-3: 108). The failure of Japan's tightly integrated economy is 
likely to make it unable to continue to afford to pursue expensive overseas aid and 
investment strategies. Moreover, the tightly integrated domestic economic base which 
these policies presuppose for their effectiveness has been severely eroded in the wake 
of internationalising trends, leading to over-investment and poor returns (Funabashi, 
1998a: 27). Institutionalists could also identify a significant group of civilian power 
advocates within Japan as evidence that there is substance to their arguments 
(Tadokoro, 1994: 1013). 
However, an institutionalist interpretation of the domestic changes taking place in 
Japan faces two important difficulties. The first has already been touched upon - 
Japan's failure to remilitarise requires it to run significant security risks and leaves it 
dependent on the US for its security. The second is that advocating a civilian power 
strategy for Japan plays directly into the hands of conservatives who oppose 
fundamental change in its international outlook. As Pyle notes, Japan's postwar 
diplomats were careful to stress Japan's commitment to internationalist goals as a 
pretext for their more genuine concern with the exclusive pursuit of economic 
nationalism (Pyle, 1996: 122). Thus it is not surprising that "(d)ie hard adherents to the 
Yoshida strategy were elated by the Nye report" (Pyle, 1996: 173). The inadequacy of 
an institutionalist interpretation of domestic change in Japan is reflected even in the 
very language they use in their discussion of Japan's post Cold War foreign policy. 
The title of Nye's 1992 article in Foreign Policy, "Coping With Japan", provides an 
excellent example of the case in point. In Nye's analysis, Japan is a source of potential 
difficulties which it is the burden of the US to cope with. This language underscores 
the degree to which institutionalists implicitly accept deeply held assumptions about 
the nature of the `international system' that they share in common with neorealists - 
that, in the context of international anarchy, Japan is incapable of being trusted by the 
US. Although, unlike neorealists, they would argue that it is precisely for this reason 
that the current US-Japan security alliance must be preserved, institutionalists do not 
recognise the essential contradiction 
involved in adopting such a position. It is 
precisely, this outlook which actively 
discourages a more internationalist Japanese 
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orientation, so undermining the credibility of an institutionalist interpretation of 
domestic trends in Japan. Furthermore, by restricting themselves to the view that it is 
the United States, rather than Japan itself, which must shoulder Japan's security 
problems, institutionalists foreclose debate about Japan's current international 
position in a number of important ways. First, institutionalists are limited to making 
the argument that the US-Japan bilateral security alliance as it currently stands must 
remain the central focus of Japan's security polices since it represents the only way in 
which it can provide for its own protection whilst not triggering regional geopolitical 
instability. Second, they allow Japanese statesmen to continue to support a civilian 
power orientation for Japan in public whilst in practice they pursue mercantile realist 
strategies (see statement by PM Kaifu, 1991). In turn this produces a lack of 
transparency in the articulation of Japan's foreign policy preferences. Thirdly, 
institutionalists restrict the possibility of seeing Japan's changing role in the world as 
providing new opportunities for a stronger, US-Japan security alliance which has been 
renegotiated on the basis of greater equality. Thus an institutionalist interpretation of 
domestic trends in Japanese society is not only internally contradictory, but places 
political debate about Japan's future within the intellectual straightjacket provided by 
core neorealist assumptions. 
A third possible interpretation of domestic change in Japan can be provided by 
neorealist analysis. From a neorealist perspective, Japan's failure to respond to the 
incentives provided by structural change in the international system since 1989 is not 
necessarily problematic. Rather, neorealism predicts that Japan will be punished for 
failing to respond to the incentives for behaviour provided by the emerging structure. 
Neorealists could therefore interpret the dramatic domestic changes in Japan as 
signalling that it is being reluctantly edged towards shaking off the shackles imposed 
on it by its position within Cold War bipolarity. Changes in its party system could be 
understood as indicating that it is beginning to overcome the political passivity 
inherent in the Yoshida strategy. As has been discussed, Japan has shown significant 
signs of greater political independence and assertiveness in its post Cold War foreign 
policy, and moreover these incidents have caused alarm at both the regional and 
global levels. It might also 
be argued that Japan's current economic difficulties have 
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left it exposed and vulnerable within the international economy. Contrary to the logic 
of institutionalist analysis, neorealists could suggest that these pressures are likely to 
lead to increased domestic incentives for the pursuit of mercantilism and closed 
regionalism by Japan. Contrary to mercantile realism, Japan's economic difficulties 
would mean that Japan's aid and investment strategies with respect to China would 
become tighter as limitations on Japan's finances encourage it to prioritise between 
potential recipients of its assistance within the region. In turn, these economic 
developments would be likely to reinforce Sino-Japanese political rivalries in the East 
Asia region, and in the longer term spark a contest between these two powers for 
regional hegemony. Finally, such developments would play to a definite domestic 
constituency within Japan - that of `traditional nationalism' (Tadokoro, 1994: 1014). 
Although at present this is not a position which has gained much popularity amongst 
reformers, neorealists could argue that support for such a political standpoint is likely 
to grow in the future. Neorealists could supplement this argument by pointing to the 
lessons provided by history for states which persistently - ignore the incentives 
provided by the structure of the international system. An obvious historical parallel is 
the Anglo-Dutch conflict in the Seventeenth century, in which the Dutch were drawn 
reluctantly and unexpectedly into a war which they were to lose between their trading 
partners and former allies in the face of protectionist trade legislation (Hisahiko, 
1990: 16). However skilful Japanese statesmanship and diplomacy is, from a neorealist 
perspective, there are strong precedents to indicate that Japan runs a high risk of being 
eliminated as a significant actor within that system if it fails to respond to the 
structural changes in the international system taking place. 
Nevertheless, the largest and most influential domestic constituency within Japan 
pushing for political reform is neither the traditional nationalists nor the advocates of 
a civilian power role for Japan. Instead they are proponents of what Tadokoro refers to 
as Japan as a `normal state' (Tadokoro, 1994: 1012). These reformists are at present 
spearheaded by Ichiro Ozawa's New Frontier Party (NFP), formed in late 1994 (Jain, 
1997: 23). The emergence of Ozawa's party has been interpreted as a direct response 
to the "mounting external pressures and internal demands that Japan contributes more 
fully to the multilateral solution of regional and global problems" (Inoguchi and Jain, 
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1997: 10, emphasis added; see also Fukushima, 1996: 55). By `normal nation', it is not 
meant that Japan is to become a highly centralised state which responds as any other 
to the incentives of the international system's anarchic structure, as might be implied 
by neorealist analysis. Contrary to neorealism, `normalisation' is actually associated 
with the cause of a major decentralisation of political power towards local authorities 
(Nakano, 1998: 508; see also Ozawa, 1994: 62-90). Moroever, it represents a desire to 
become a normal member of international society and thereby "actively participate in 
the international community" in both economic and political terms (Jain, 1997: 27; see 
also Nanako, 1998: 510). Neorealists assume, and institutionalists tacitly accept, that 
any such desire is inherently contradictory because their analysis suggests that, by 
remilitarising to any significant degree, Japan will trigger responses by other powers 
which will undercut its ability to contribute to global multilateral institutions. 
However, it is important to consider the possibility that the emergence of the `normal 
nation' school of thought in Japanese politics is not merely a temporary anomaly, 
but 
rather represents a coherent and direct response to systemic pressures at the 
international level. Indeed, even institutionalist analysts who have advocated a civilian 
power strategy for Japan have recently begun to acknowledge that its structural 
inability to respond effectively with the East Asian economic crisis and the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia in the late 1990s has highlighted 
its 
deep need to exercise political leadership in the international community (Funabashi, 
1998a). However, this would involve a shift away from Japan's predominantly 
economic orientation without triggering fear and alarm in East Asia about its 
increasing independence and political assertiveness. It therefore implies a third 
possible interpretation of the international sources of domestic changes in Japan since 
1989 to counter those put forward by both institutionalists and neorealists. 
It is, the thorny issue of Japan's ability to engage in a significant degree of 
remilitarisation without triggering a regional 
balance of power struggle within East 
Asia which is the central obstacle to seeing Japan's pursuit of `normal nation' polices 
as a coherent response to its new position within the post Cold War international 
system. In this context, 
Buzan's recent suggestion that "a policy of non-offensive 
defence (NOD) could solve many of the difficult defence questions that Japan now 
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faces" (Buzan, 1995: 25) is suggestive because it fits poorly within both neorealist and 
institutionalist positions. This is because a NOD policy challenges the assumption of a 
direct link between the existence of international anarchy and automatic mistrust of a 
Japan which engages in significant militarisation. A NOD strategy for Japan would 
contain the following four ingredients: a robust capacity for self-defence; a high 
sensitivity to the concerns of neighbours; a capability to play a significant role in 
international aid and peacekeeping; and a capability for recessed deterrence (Buzan, 
1995: 40-41). Neorealists would no doubt criticise the plausibility of such a strategy by 
making the argument that in strategic terms it is fundamentally problematic to engage 
in a `non-offensive' form of remilitarisation. For example, Buzan suggests that for 
Japan to acquire a `robust capability for territorial defence' it must acquire tactical 
missile defence (TMD) systems. ' As has been noted, the possibility of precisely this 
development has sparked concerns in China. It is at this stage, however, that the full 
significance of Buzan's advocacy of a NOD strategy for Japan becomes apparent. 
That Buzan questions the existence of a direct link between international anarchy and 
mistrust within the international system begs the question of identifying the 
underlying reasons why NOD might be applicable to Japan's strategic situation. 
Buzan's suggestion of NOD for Japan scratches the surface of deeper underlying 
issues facing Japan in the world today. In particular, it touches upon the idea that 
sustaining trust about Japan's strategic intentions has become a major source of 
potential power for it within the emerging international system. The case of Japan's 
acquisition of TMD itself provides a good example of precisely this point. Buzan 
suggests that for Japan to acquire a TMD system need not spark serious anxiety in 
Japan's neighbours "(s)o long as it was not combined with an offensive capability", 
and is reinforced by reassurance 
diplomacy which is sensitive to the security concerns 
of neighbours (Buzan, 1995: 40). In other words, through self-restraint and reassurance 
'Christensen notes that, after five years of US pressure over TMD, the Japanese have recently agreed to 
joint TMD research with the Untied States after the launch of a North Korean rocket across Japanese 
territory on August 31st 1998 (Christensen, 1999: 64). He also identifies that the initial US proposal for 
joint TMD development with Japan came in 1993, and was subsequently "folded into" the Nye 
initiative. Japan's five year procrastination over the issue and its reactive response to the North Korean 
rocket incident in 1998 indicate the way in which the proposals for joint TMD development are 
incompatible with the general thrust of the Nye Report. By maintaining a strong US forward defence 
presence in East Asia, the 
US invites and encourages Japanese passivity on security issues. 
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to others, Japan will be able to take measures which it otherwise would not be able to 
do. Buzan generalises this principle to broader aspects of Japan's post Cold War state 
strategies. He argues that NOD would make Japan able to deal with the possibility of 
regional military threats even in the absence of US support, whilst at the same time it 
would not intimidate its East Asian neighbours. It would also allow Japan to achieve 
this whilst remaining non-nuclear, and in this way remain compatible with 
mainstream domestic public option in Japan (Buzan, 1995: 39-40). Furthermore, NOD 
would actually help strengthen an increasingly brittle US-Japan security alliance 
because it would "make Japan more self-reliant ... thereby allowing the United States 
to reduce its commitments to Japan" (Buzan, 1995: 40). Others have echoed the insight 
that trust about its strategic intentions has become a major source of power for it 
within the international system when they identify the importance of transparency 
measures for Japan's regional security policy (Hughes, 1996[a]: 244; Kawasaki, 
1996: 494). Both neorealist and institutionalist models suggest that in a regional 
context where levels of interdependence are low and . unevenly distributed, 
transparency measures should be difficult to implement and ill suited to diffuse 
reciprocity. Yet this is precisely what makes their identification highly significant 
from a liberal perspective. It suggests that the international system has taken on 
distinctive properties which make information about states' intentions important for 
determining outcomes, and as such an important source of power for Japan. 
In as much as it suggests that by becoming more self reliant Japan might strengthen its 
relations with its partners, Buzan's discussion of the relevance of NOD for Japan also 
has important implications for the degree of equality its relationships embody. This 
has become most acutely apparent in Japan's interactions with the United States over 
the 1990s, as has been highlighted by the most extensive recent analysis of the US- 
Japan security alliance (Mochizuki et al, 1998; see also Mochizuki and O'Hanlon, 
1998; Spruyt, 1998). In the attempt to outline their "liberal vision" for their security 
alliance, Mochizuki et al recommend that the 
US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty be 
restructured in order to strengthen 
its foundations. They advocate the removal of US 
marine combat forces from bases on Okinawa by 2003 (whilst leaving air force force 
and naval units plus 
logistical supports), reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution 
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to allow it to participate in collective self defence, and cooperative US-Japanese 
research into TMD systems (Mochizuki et al, 1998: 195-196,196-198, and 201-202). 
These steps would imply major shifts from the US strategy recommended by the Nye 
report through a significant reduction in the US's forward defence posture in East 
Asia. Mochizuki et al argue that such measures would strengthen the US-Japan 
security relationship by making it a "more reciprocal partnership". It would encourage 
Japan to become an "active ally" rather than a "passive partner" (Mochizuki et al, 
1998: 7 and 8). Moreover, Mochizuki also identifies that such a vision of the US-Japan 
alliance could strengthen the prospects of engaging China successfully. By reducing 
the US forward defence presence against China, it could decrease the overall threat to 
China's security posed by the alliance "without weakening (its overall) ... deterrent 
capabilities" (Mochizuki and O'Hanlon, 1998: 128). Furthermore, in as much as it 
would be founded on a community of interests, it would provide a stronger long term 
framework for broadening the security treaty from a bilateral to a multilateral basis 
(Mochizuki and O'Hanlon, 1998: 133). Sato has extended this analysis further, noting 
the way in which greater equality in the US-Japan relationship would strengthen a 
strategy aimed at the engagement with China. In particular, it would allow the US and 
Japan to formulate a more consistent set of principles for China's engagement. This, 
he suggests, would allow the West to convey their benign intentions more 
transparently to China, and reduce the scope for China to play off the US and Japan 
against one another to achieve its own objectives (Sato, 1998). Indeed, in their critique 
of the conclusions of the Nye report, Johnson and Keehn go as far as to make the 
argument that "a United States that continues to distrust Japan's ability to act as a true 
ally" is a greater threat to security in East Asia than a rising China (Johnson and 
Keehne, 1995: 110). As well as providing a more flexible basis for Japan's relations 
with the US, a more equal US-Japan security relationship might also strengthen 
Japan's relations with China. 
The principle of negotiating its relationships on the basis of trust and equality 
therefore has a general strategic significance for it in terms of its more routine 
interactions with other major powers in the international system. Yunling identifies 
the positive sum triangular structure of strategic interaction which he sees emerging 
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between the US, Japan and China in East Asia. He argues that it is possible for Japan 
to "(m)aintain the US-Japan Alliance while developing stable relations with China. 
The critical issue here is how Japan handles the US-Japan alliance. If Japan uses its 
alliance to confront China, the foundation of Sino-Japanese relations will become 
antagonistic ... . If Japan 
demonstrates that it will not take advantage of the US- 
Japanese alliance in its dealing with China, Sino-Japanese friendship will increase" 
(Yunling, 1997: 463). Yunling's logic starts from the proposition that Japan must 
renegotiate the basis of the US-Japan Security Treaty on the basis of greater 
independence from and equality with the United States. This requires the United 
States to trust Japan not to abuse this new degree of strategic latitude. In turn, 
however, renegotiating the US-Japan security alliance provides the key to Japan 
simultaneously developing stable relations with China by having the effect of 
reducing the forward US defence presence against China in East Asia. In this way, 
establishing its relationships with the United States and China on the basis of trust 
between equal and independent partners will allow Japan to do something it would not 
otherwise have been able to do - develop relations with them both simultaneously. In a 
separate analysis, Wang reinforces Yunling's claim by suggesting that a similar logic 
works the other way around i. e. in the way in which Sino-Japanese relations interact 
with US-Japan relations. Again, however, both stress that this presupposes a more 
independent and proactive Japanese role in this chain of relationships (Wang, 
1994: 181). Interestingly, the themes of transparency, trust and `equilateralism' have 
also emerged prominently in the twin track diplomacy being conducted between the 
US, Japan and China as part of the ARF dialogue (Abramowitz, 1998: 40; Jisi, 
1998: 22,23 and 29; Funabashi, 1998b: 53; see also the summary of these debates in 
China chapter: 186 below). 
The principle of negotiating its relationships with other powers on the basis of trust 
between equal partners provides a strong possible alternative to a neorealist 
interpretation of the increasing independence Japan has shown in its post Cold War 
foreign policy behaviour. It has been noted that neorealists have stressed the 
significance of the ways in which Japan has been (somewhat reluctantly) encouraged 
to negotiate its relations with the US, Europe, China, Russia and the Koreas on a more 
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active basis. Yet the identification of trust as a source of potential empowerment for 
Japan suggests that its relations with these states may not necessarily lead directly to 
zero sum system conflict between them. Rather, strategic interaction between them 
may be mutually reinforcing and increase the incentives for them to establish their 
relations on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Bridges notes the way in which 
Japan must "rebalance" its relations with Europe within the "skewed triangle" of US- 
Japan-Europe relations in order to strengthen this structure of relationships (Bridges, 
1992: 230). However, perhaps the best example is provided by instances where this 
has not occurred, such as Japan's disputes with the Soviet Union over the Northern 
Territories in 1991. On the surface, Japanese intransigence over this issue might seem 
to confirm a neorealist analysis? However, Carlile suggests that Japan's response was 
shaped more by its dependent relations with the US than structural conflict with the 
Soviet Union (Carlile, 1994: 415). That is to say, Japan's reliance on the US for its 
polices towards the Soviet Union prevented it from using the opportunity presented by 
a softening of the Soviet's line on this issue to establish relations with them on a more 
independent basis. Menon similarly proposes that Japan's response reflects the 
increasingly outdated focus of the US-Japan security alliance on the containment of 
Russia (Menon, 1996: 74). The subsequent way in which, after German mediation, 
Japan decided economic assistance to the Soviets was in its interests after all, despite 
the outstanding issue of the territorial dispute, reinforces Carlile's analysis (Germany 
chapter: 90). Such inconsistency would seem to highlight the way in which its policy 
responses were not structurally determined, but rather reflect its preference for 
maintaining a low political profile. Moreover, the way in which Germany took the 
diplomatic credit for bringing about Japan's change of heart over the issue of 
economic assistance to the Soviet Union also contains lessons for Japan. The general 
principle implied is that adopting a more active political stance may allow Japan to 
encourage a more flexible response from what is now Russia, which may allow it to 
begin to renegotiate the future of these islands. Japan may actually strengthen its 
relations with Russia by developing them on a more independent footing. 
2Although given the rapid decline in Russia's position in the global distribution of power, one might 
also expect an 
improvement in its relations with Japan as part of a strategy of balancing against a rising 
China. 
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This focus on the way in which Japan sustains its relations with other states in the 
international system is of crucial importance because it raises the issue of trust in 
relation to what Buzan refers to as "Japan's relationship with itself' (Buzan, 1995: 38). 
The question of degree to which Japan can be trusted within the international system 
weighs perhaps more heavily on Japan itself than on its neighbours and partners. 
Buzan recognises that pursuit of a NOD strategy "would require Japan to get serious 
about constructing its image as a great power with a low military profile" (Buzan, 
1995: 40). Again, however, the issue of the construction of Japan's image touches on 
much deeper and more general aspects of Japan's position in the post Cold War 
international order. The clearest expression of this has been its severe difficulties in 
coming to terms with the atrocities it committed during its imperial past, which in turn 
have rebounded on the way in which it has handled the issues of remilitarisation and 
of apologising to the victims of its wartime aggression. Berger traces Japan's 
reluctance to remilitarise since 1989 to its domestic politics, and in particular what he 
refers to as its "anti-military culture" (Berger, 1993: 131). Similarly, it is possible to 
challenge a neorealist interpretation of Japan's failure to apologise for its past 
atrocities as being symptomatic of emerging structural conflict within the international 
system. Instead this may be seen as what Mukae characterises as "a symbolic 
manifestation of the ongoing identity crisis in the Japanese political system today" 
(Mukae, 1995: 1030). Horlemann, a German diplomat, traces Japan's failure to 
apologise for its past atrocities to the way in which "Japan lacks a catharsis of the kind 
experienced by Germany" (Horlemann, 1995: 392; also Berger, 1993: 145). Moreover, 
contrary to neorealist analysis, the issue of apologies for its imperial legacy may be 
identified as a major source of potential power for Japan within the international 
system. Horlemann notes that facing the past would open up new opportunities for 
Japan because "(o)nly (its) ... constructive engagement in the region - this has been 
shown by Germany's experience with regard to European integration - will overcome 
the deep rooted fear among Asian neighbours of an all too powerful Japan and relieve 
Japan of the burdens of its imperial past" (Horlemann, 1995: 385). It is at this stage, 
however, that the full extent of Japan's identity crisis in the post Cold War 
international system is revealed. Japan's refusal to face its recent past strongly affects 
even apparently mundane aspects of daily life in Japan such as the content of school 
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textbooks on Japanese history (lenaga, 1993). Furthermore, deeply ingrained attitudes 
persist in Japan even when this means that Japan itself which pays the highest price of 
all for failing to address the issues they raise. As Mukae notes in his discussion of 
Japan's failure to apologise for its wartime atrocities in the Diet Resolution on the 
50th Anniversary of the Pacific War, rather than manifesting Japan's extreme identity 
crisis, the incident "might instead have been a rare opportunity to turn around that 
very crisis .... In that sense, the 
Japanese government failed not only other nations but 
also its own" (Mukae, 1995: 1030). 
At the source of this crisis is a search for a legitimate Japanese nationalism and a new, 
non-exclusively economic role in the world (Buzan, 1988: 560-562). Japan is "divided 
and confused about what its national self-image should be and how it should project 
its identity into the international system" (Buzan, 1988: 561). Japan requires a new 
sense of national identity compatible with both political co-operation with its partners 
and an increasingly open and liberalised domestic economy. It is searching for a sense 
of national identity compatible with full participation in the international community 
and trends towards decentralisation arising from its increased participation in the 
global economy (Nakano, 1998). In turn, it is important to recognise that these shifts 
in the underlying structure of Japan's political identity are intimately related to the 
changes that are taking place in the international system. As Pyle suggests, the 
domestic adjustments within Japanese politics represent a search for a new sense of 
Japanese national purpose appropriate for the post Cold War period. He notes that 
"assertions of Japan's inability to play a broader role in the international community 
are now losing much of their persuasive power as a result of changes in the 
international system. Japan's emergence as an economic power and the end of the 
Cold War have ... raised questions about Japan's future national purpose, its policies 
towards collective security arrangements, and its capacity to change from a country 
intent solely on its own mercantilist aims to one capable of international leadership" 
(Pyle, 1996: 121). Pyle gives full accord to the dominant causal role played by change 
within the international system in producing domestic adjustments. However, his 
analysis challenges neorealist assumptions about the nature and trajectory of systemic 
level change in post Cold War international relations. Far from pushing Japan away 
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from the international community, Pyle sees systemic level change as providing it 
with strong incentives to actively participate in strengthening it. He notes that 
"(e)ngagement in multilateral organisations offers not only a way to respond to 
foreign suspicions as well as criticism of its self-absorption but also a way of 
overcoming domestic resistance to a more active international role" (Pyle, 1996: 170). 
Thus, on Pyle's interpretation, it is mounting pressure to take a full economic and 
political role within the international system which lies at the origin of Japan's current 
crisis of national purpose. 
Pyle's analysis of Japan's struggle for a new sense of national purpose in the post 
Cold War era returns this chapter to the theme of `towards self reliance' introduced in 
the opening section. As was noted, Pyle's very definition of the `Japanese question' is 
bound up with the idea that Japan today faces a crisis of national purpose. His 
diagnosis for the position Japan finds itself in is for it to build a more coherent and 
rewarding sense of identity within the international system by establishing a new 
sense of national purpose. In as much as this would provide Japan with the key to 
developing its relationships with others on a more equal and independent basis, Pyle's 
analysis suggests that Japan must become more self reliant in the way its identity 
within the international system is constructed and sustained. The Japanese political 
system, which less than ten years ago Van Wolferen identified as characterised by `the 
systematic deprivation of choice' in almost all arenas, is now faced with the task of 
making decisions for itself which will enormously affect the future well-being of its 
citizens throughout its society. This involves Japan actively confronting a diversity of 
open possibilities which it has not previously faced, and in so doing presents it with 
both dangers and opportunities. It must let go of the deference and dependency that 
characterised its relationships in the past, or run 
the risk that these relationships will 
become brittle and at some point crack. On the other hand, by actively confronting the 
situation in which it finds itself, Japan has the opportunity to negotiate its 
relationships with others on the basis of trust and mutual commitment rather than 
inequality and dependency. To achieve this, however, requires Japan to break with 
established patterns of behaviour and move along unfamiliar pathways. More 
fundamentally, the idea that Japan is moving towards self reliance in terms of the way 
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its defines its national purpose within the international system has even greater 
implications for the extent to which it is able to trust itself. In Ozawa's words, 
"Japan's most pressing need is a change in the consciousness of our people. Let us 
begin by removing the fences and educating the people to their own responsibility for 
themselves" (Ozawa, cited Stockwin, 1997: 75). Until Japan has learned to develop its 
relations with other powers on a more equal and autonomous basis, it will not be able 
to break down the fences preventing it from achieving a true sense of security within 
the emerging international system. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
China: Mid-Life Crisis? 
As with previous chapters, this discussion of China's state strategies after the Cold 
War will utilise a metaphor taken from transformations in aspects of personal 
experience documented by Anthony Giddens' Modernity And Self Identity (1991). In 
this book, Giddens discusses the replacement of a traditional life cycle structured 
around rites of passage with the emergence of a `lifespan' understood in terms of a 
reflexively organised biographical narrative of self-identity. Under conditions of late 
modernity, "the lifespan becomes more and more freed from externalities associated 
with pre-established ties to other individuals and groups..... Lacking external referents 
provided by others, the lifespan again emerges as a trajectory which relates above all 
to the individual's projects and plans" (Giddens, 1991: 147). In consequence, "(t)he 
lifespan becomes structured around `open experience thresholds', rather than 
ritualised passages. ... Each phase of transition tends to 
become an identity crisis - and 
is often reflexively known to the individual as such. The lifespan is, in fact, 
constructed in terms of the anticipated need to confront and resolve such crisis phases, 
at least where an individual's reflexive awareness is highly developed" (Giddens, 
1991: 148). Thus, "(n)egotiating a significant transition in life, leaving home, getting a 
new job, facing up to unemployment, forming a new relationship, moving between 
different areas or routines, confronting illness, beginning therapy - all mean running 
consciously entertained risks in order to grasp the new opportunities which personal 
crises open up. It is not only in terms of the absence of rites that life passages differ 
from comparable processes in traditional contexts. More important is that such 
transitions are drawn into, and surmounted by means of, the reflexively mobilised 
trajectory of self-actualisation" (Giddens, 1991: 79). Failing to reflexively confront 
and resolve such crises can result in what Giddens refers to as ontological insecurity. 
Drawing on the work of a social psychologist, Giddens notes that "the ontologically 
insecure individual ... tends to 
display one or more of the following characteristics. In 
the first place, he or she may lack a consistent feeling of biographical continuity.... 
Second, in an external environment full of changes, the person is obsessively 
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preoccupied with apprehension of possible risks to his or her existence, and is 
paralysed in terms of practical action. ... Thirdly, the person fails to develop or sustain 
trust in his own self-integrity. The individual feels morally `empty' because he lacks 
... `self regard'. 
Quite often, paradoxically, the actor subjects his behaviour and 
thoughts to constant scrutiny" (Giddens, 1991: 53-54) 
As with the other cases analysed, it is possible to identify themes in the literature on 
China's new position in the post Cold War international system that resonate strongly 
with features of Giddens' discussion of self-identity formation over the lifespan. In a 
book published shortly after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, David Goodman 
and Gerald Segal discuss the possibility that China is faced with the task of 
negotiating a significant transition in its development, and pose the question: "Is 
China at forty having a mid-life crisis? ". They suggest that China is having such a 
crisis "in the sense that the rulers recognise that the policies of the past are insufficient 
to cope with the major challenges of the future and they are not agreed on what needs 
to be done as a result" (Goodman and Segal, 1989: 1). Segal has elaborated on this 
point in a more recent study, locating the origins of China's `mid-life crisis' in the 
failings of communism as a unifying ideology around which it could project itself 
onto the world stage. In the immediate post war era, Segal suggests, communist 
ideology was able to underpin the emergence for the first time in history of a strong 
and nationally unified Chinese state (Segal, 1994: 9). However, the unity provided by 
this ideology came increasingly under threat for two reasons. Firstly, the split with the 
Soviet Union which became apparent from the early 1950's onwards, and particularly 
acute from the early 1970's, meant that "nationalism was never far removed from the 
rhetoric of (Chinese) communism" (Segal, 1994: 9). Second, after the death of Mao 
Tse Tung in 1976, the Chinese leadership increasingly came to accept the need for 
economic reform, a process which inevitably raised questions about political reform 
that went to the heart of China's socialist identity (Segal, 1994: 9). According to Segal, 
these developments came to a head in the late 1980's, such that "by the 1990s, China 
had reached a crisis of self-definition. ... 
(It) seemed to be losing its already suspect 
and recently forged national identity at a time of major change at home and abroad". 
Indeed, Segal goes as far as to note that "(f)ailure to meet these challenges may put in 
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jeopardy the very fabric of the Chinese state" (Segal, 1994: 10). Segal's analysis begs 
the question of whether China is faced with an identity crisis in its attempt to 
negotiate the transition to the post-Cold War world. Is a country which previously 
relied on Communist ideology to provide it with a sense of domestic and international 
purpose now faced with the task of sustaining its political development in a more 
open environment increasingly free from both pre-established frameworks and 
external referents? 
This chapter seeks to examine China's post Cold War state strategies in the light of 
neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system in order to 
shed light on how seriously the metaphor of `mid-life crisis' can be taken when 
applied to its current situation. After reviewing each of these theoretical perspectives, 
the chapter shall return to reflect on whether China is facing a crisis of identity 
transition in the post Cold War period. 
Neorealism 
A number of analysts have used the neorealist model to make predictions about the 
behaviour of China in the post Cold War international system. Most notably Waltz, 
and Layne see China as a `rising power' within the contemporary international system 
(Waltz, 1993; Layne, 1996). Writing in 1993, Waltz suggested that if China "managed 
to sustain an effective government and a measure of economic freedom for its 
industrious people, within a decade it will be in the great power ranks" (Waltz, 
1993: 68). As Waltz has proposed, there are strong reasons to believe that China is 
rapidly acquiring the potential capabilities to become a serious geopolitical rival to 
both Japan and the United States. Dibb identifies the general consensus that "China 
can sustain growth rates of 6-9% per year, implying a doubling of its GDP every 8-11 
years", a development which would "herald the emergence of a new international 
power" (Dibb, 1995: 27). Other major analysts have echoed this view (Roy, 1994: 149; 
Layne, 1996: 69; Bernstein and Munro, 1997: 18; Nye, 1997: 70). Neorealists predict 
that, China's position within the emerging structure of international politics will 
encourage it to 
define its interests according to its rising relative power capabilities. 
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The outcomes compatible with this behaviour are a move to conflictual multipolarity 
within Asia as part of a more general pattern of such behaviour at a global level. 
Indeed, neorealists could identify the way in which over the 1990s the rise of China's 
economic status has been accompanied by the modernisation of its military 
infrastructure. Estimates of increases in China's defence expenditures over the 1990s 
vary widely and are the subject of a considerable divergence of opinion (Mak, 
1998: 99). Some have suggested that trends in China's defence expenditure should not 
be over-estimated (Nathan and Ross, 1997: 146-148). Yet even prominent 
institutionalists have cautioned against too sanguine an interpretation of China's 
military modernisation programme. After discussing the arguments put forward 
by 
Nathan and Ross, Nye warns that "even after stripping way the hyperbole and 
exaggeration, the rise of the Chinese military ... power must 
be taken seriously as a 
new factor in the (East Asia) region" (Nye, 1997: 70). 
Indeed, all areas of China's 
defence capabilities have been significantly upgraded over the 1990s. In terms of its 
nuclear strategy, there is evidence that China is upgrading its nuclear defence doctrine 
so as to allow a more flexible response to escalation, moving from a strategy of 
`minimum' to `limited' deterrence (Godwin, 1996: 180 and p. 183; see also Johnston, 
1995). The PLA's armed forces have been dramatically downsized as part of a process 
of qualitative upgrading (Godwin, 1998: 179; Godwin, 1996: 482). The PLA Navy 
(PLAN) and Airforce (PLAAF) are paying attention to increasing their power 
projection capabilities. The PLAN's aim has become "an offshore-capable navy by 
2000, and a `blue water' navy ... 
by 2050" (Godwin, 1998: 179). As well as 
establishing military bases in the South China Sea the PLAN's fleets of major surface 
combatants and submarines are undergoing generational change (Ji, 1997: 79 and 80 
respectively). This has been supplemented 
by major purchases of military hardware 
such as advanced fighter aircraft, 
diesel-electric submarines and destroyers from 
Russia (Godwin, 1998: 181). These purchases were accompanied by reports of 
possible future deals over aerial refuelling and 
Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS) aircraft (Godwin, 1998: 181). Bernstein and Munro go as far as to argue 
that "(w)hatever the exact figures, China is now engaged in one of the most extensive 
and rapid military 
build-ups in the world" (Bernstein and Munro, 1997: 25-26). Whilst 
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such claims may be exaggerated, there is certainly available evidence to support the 
neorealist prediction that China's rapid economic rise has encouraged it to pursue an 
increasingly threatening military posture. 
Moreover, in line with neorealist theory, China's defence policies over this period 
have been linked directly to a conception of its role as a rising power within an 
emerging global multipolar structure. Major analysts have identified that "China feels 
it is fully within its rights to change the territorial status quo (within East Asia), even 
though most other countries view such action as aggressive and dangerous" (Buzan 
and Segal, 1994: 6; see also Dibb, 1995: 26). This revisionism can be related to China's 
elites' analysis of the nature of change in the international system. Tow notes that 
"Chinese analysts have concluded that `the original bipolar pattern (of global security 
politics) is being replaced by a multipolar one... in which it plays a more influential 
role (Tow, 1994: 146; see also Godwin, 1998: 177; Jisi, 1997: 14). Whilst this is a long 
term trend dating from the Sino-Soviet split in the 1970's neorealists could argue that 
this trend has persisted in the 1990s. In particular, Robinson notes that concern over 
the need to balance against US unipolarity in the wake of the Gulf War was a 
particularly strong factor influencing China's defence modernisation programme in 
the 1990s (Robinson, 1994: 597). There is also evidence that China's rising strategic 
capability is generating anxieties in line with neorealist predictions. Godwin identifies 
that "Beijing is now fully aware that it has become the focus of the (East Asia) 
region's long-term security concerns" (Godwin, 1998: 186; see also Roy, 1998a: 149). 
Moreover, it is also the case that "anxiety is fuelled by the lack of transparency in 
Beijing's strategic thinking" (To, 1997: 252; see also Hughes, 1996: 241). Such 
behaviour could be understood as being compatible with the neorealist prediction that 
states will seek to minimise their diplomatic commitments in line with a defensively 
positional diplomatic outlook. Thus in line with neorealist predictions, China's 
defence policies over the 1990s may be related to both its self-conception as a `rising 
power' and to emerging security tensions in the East Asia region. 
As well as its defence policies over the 1990s, a major area that neorealists could 
identify as compatible with their predictions is evidence of direct political tensions 
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emerging between China and other states in the post Cold War international system. 
China's relations with the United States provide perhaps the clearest signs of 
emerging structural conflict of the kind anticipated by neorealists. This first became 
apparent in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. The US 
responded to this development by leading Western economic sanctions against China 
which were lifted only gradually over a three year period (Robinson, 1994: 589). This 
was a clear signal that "(t)he end of the Cold War ... (has) ended the special exception 
from human rights criticism that China had enjoyed as a prospective US ally against 
the Soviet Union" (Roy, 1998a: 150). It is important to recognise that China's 
abstention with regard to UN Security Council Resolution 678 sanctioning the use of 
force against Iraq during the Gulf conflict must be understood in the context of its 
post-Tiananmen isolation. Thus the way in which "China managed to extract 
maximum payoffs from the United States with minimum support" (Kim, 1995: 423) 
fits squarely within a neorealist analysis of China's behaviour during the Gulf 
conflict. Moreover, conflict over human rights between China and the US has 
continued throughout the 1990s. America has continued to make either an explicit or 
an implicit linkage between human rights and China's trade status and has maintained 
diplomatic pressure on China on this issue over this period (Wan, 1997: 240-242). 
China has viewed this pressure as "interference in China's internal affairs" (Seymour, 
1998: 221; see also Yi, 1994: 687), and elites concerns over separatism within the 
provinces has meant that "China's leaders now openly attack the United States" over 
this issue (Jisi, 1997: 11). In line with neorealist logic, therefore, the collapse of Cold 
War bipolarity has resulted in increased tensions between the US and China over 
human rights issues which were at best plastered over during the Gulf conflict. 
Important security issues within the East-Asia region have also impacted on Sino-US 
political relations and may be seen to provide evidence in favour of neorealist 
predictions. One such area is over the US forward defence presence in East Asia. Roy 
identifies that "(i)n the 1990s ... many Chinese elites openly questioned the 
desirability of US military bases in Asia. ... The direction in which Chinese opinion is 
evolving ... suggests that the 
PRC will probably be a strong opponent of US Asian 
bases in the first decade of the twenty-first century" (Roy, 1998[b]: 141-2). Bernstein 
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and Munro note that the prospect of Korean unification could be an important factor 
in changing China's strategic attitude to the US military presence in Northeast Asia 
(Bernstein and Munro, 1997: 30). Such a shift in strategic attitudes in China would be 
in line with the neorealist prediction that as China's power rises, and as geopolitical 
circumstances change, it is likely to be brought into structural conflict with the 
political status quo in the region. However, it is the future of Taiwan or the Republic 
of China (ROC) which is considered by Beijing to be "the major issue between the 
United States and China" (Levine, 1998: 100). The PRC's 1993 `White Paper' on 
China's reunification publicly reiterated its claim to sovereignty over the ROC 
(Cooper, 1995). Gu identifies the zero-sum nature of Chinese claims to sovereignty 
over Taiwan (Gu, 1996: 199). Such a stance fits squarely with neorealist predictions 
about the significance of relative gains problems in the settlement of territorial 
disputes. Given China's rising military capabilities, neorealism predicts increasing 
Chinese assertiveness over this issue. Indeed, in March 1996, just prior to Taiwan's 
first presidential elections, the PRC carried out large scale offensive military 
exercises, including test firing live missiles in Taiwan's coastal waters, a development 
resulting in the US dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area (Levine, 
1998: 102). In the aftermath of this development, Rachman noted that "(e)ven if the 
present crisis in Taiwan blows over ... simple realism suggests that a huge, 
increasingly prosperous nation is likely to want to throw its weight around" 
(Rachman, 1996: 132). Friedman draws parallels between China's behaviour during 
the Taiwan missile crisis and Germany's behaviour as a rising power in the inter-war 
period (Friedman, 1997: 233). It is therefore the case that, over the important issues of 
US security concern in East Asia, there are signs that China's growing power is 
encouraging it to challenge the regional status quo as suggested by neorealist logic. 
Many of the emerging problems within the Sino-US relationship find echoes in 
developments in relations between China and Japan. In the wake of the 1996 
`revitalisation' of the Mutual Security Treaty, "the Chinese have become increasingly 
concerned that the alliance is aimed at ... containing China" (Garrett and Glaser, 
1997: 384; see also Klein, 1998: 144). A particular point of tension for China is the 
possibility that the 
US could encourage Japan to deploy a theatre missile defence 
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system which may significantly undermine China's capacity for nuclear deterrence 
(Garret and Glaser, 1997: 392). Moreover, more general indications that Japan is 
becoming more assertive have caused concerns within China. Significant here have 
been the freezing of Japan's aid grant to China in response to its continued nuclear 
testing, the Japanese government's toleration of extremist activities on the disputed 
Diaoyo/Senkaku islands in 1996, growing political backing in Japan for closer ties 
with Taiwan, increases in Japan's defence expenditure and Japan's participation in 
UNPKO (Garret and Glaser, 1997: 397; Roy, 1994: 163). China's worries about Japan 
are similarly reflected in Japanese anxieties over China's reiteration of its ownership 
of the Senkaku Islands, and the expansion in China's power projection capabilities. 
Prior to its stern response to China's nuclear testing in 1995, Japan had also expressed 
concern over China's possible acquisition of in-flight refuelling technology and 
it 
publicly warned it against purchasing an aircraft carrier (Roy, 1994: 163; Segal, 
1993: 30). Though they stress that there is not yet an arms race in East Asia, Buzan 
and Segal identify the relationship between China and Japan as central to an emerging 
regional arms dynamic (Buzan/Segal, 1994: 8-9). Trends such as these may be 
identified as fitting into neorealist predictions about emerging structural conflict 
between Japan and China within the international system. 
China's role in wider regional geopolitical dynamics within Asia provides further 
evidence which reinforces a neorealist interpretation of its post Cold War state 
strategies. China has displayed a zero-sum view of its sovereignty over Hong Kong 
and Macao in negotiations with Britain and Portugal (Hinton, 1994: 353). Moreover, 
China has been insistent that negotiations over the future of these territories are 
conducted on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis (Yahuda, 1996b: 14; Neves, 
1995). In line with neorealism, China's stance enables it to maintain maximum 
diplomatic leverage in its negotiations over the future of these territories. China's 
policies over the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands 
in the South China Seas may 
also be understood as providing evidence of 
incipient neorealist behaviour. In 1992 
China passed a Law On Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas that formalised 
its claim to sovereignty over these territories, as well as the Senkaku islands disputed 
with japan (Valencia, 
1995: 13). Furthermore, it granted an oil concession in the 
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Paracels, pledging to protect rights to the concession with force (Valencia, 1995: 13). 
In 1995, shortly after the withdrawal of US military forces from the Philippines, 
Chinese structures were discovered on Mischief Reef (Roy, 1998a: 147). These 
developments have heightened concerns about China's strategic intentions amongst 
ASEAN states (Leifer, 1997: 160) as well as Japan and the US (Godwin, 1998: 176). 
Moreover, China resolutely refuses to discuss possible solutions to the competing 
territorial claims within the region in international forums, and fudged its agreement 
in 1995 that the UN Conference On The Law Of The Sea would form the basis for the 
resolutions of conflicting territorial claims over the islands (Valencia, 1995: 12 and 
Foot, 1998: 433 respectively). The possibility that large deposits of oil and gas lie 
beneath the South China Sea greatly increases the incentive for China to stake a 
territorial claim to this area because of China's increased dependence on oil imports 
(Salameh, 1995: 133; Valencia, 1995: 15-16). Furthermore, this series of territorial 
rivalries is exacerbated by the historical animosities that 
have developed between 
China and other states in the region (Buzan and Segal, 1994: 4). The number and 
historical and geopolitical complexity of the territorial disputes in which China finds 
itself embroiled in East Asia may be cited by neorealists as symptomatic of deeper 
structural tensions emerging from China's increasingly revisionist stance within the 
post-Cold War international system. 
Developments in 'China's relations with Russia, India and Pakistan, and states in 
Africa over the 1990s are also amenable to neorealist explanation. As neorealism 
predicts, with the rapid decline in the threat posed to China by Russia, Sino-Russian 
relations have improved dramatically 
in a number of areas (Goo, 1993: 293; Garver, 
1998: 119-129; Paik, 1996). Moreover, Sino-Russian detente could be seen in terms of 
the effects of an emerging multipolar structure "in which a `continental' Russia- 
Chinese bloc balances a `maritime' American-Japanese bloc" (Garver, 1998: 131; see 
also Bilveer, 1998). China's relations with states 
in South Asia reinforces support for 
neorealist claims about China's post-Cold War behaviour. Sino-Indian relations 
thawed considerably in the early 1990s, culminating in an agreement over their 
disputed Himalayan border signed in 1993 (Malik, 1995: 317 Roy, 1998: 171). 
However, this improvement occurred in the wake of Beijing's diplomatic isolation 
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after the Tiananmen Square massacre (Malik, 1995: 325). There is evidence that 
underlying geopolitical tensions remain between the two powers in South Asia. In 
particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union, India's traditional ally against China and 
Pakistan, provides strong incentives for India to acquire a nuclear deterrent capability. 
Malik notes that "(i)t is the adversarial nature of the Sino-Indian relationship which 
has driven India's, and in turn, Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme" (Malik, 
1995: 346). It is this political logic, neorealists could argue, which lies behind the 
recent wave of nuclear testing in South Asia. Other issues, notably Tibet, continued to 
complicate the Sino-Indian relationship over the 1990s (Roy, 1998b: 171). Finally, 
China's relations with its traditional clients in Africa have also changed in line with 
shifts in international structure. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, China engaged in a 
major diplomatic offensive in Africa (Snow, 1994: 293). However, with China's 
continued economic modernisation, these contacts have become increasingly obsolete 
(Snow, 1994: 320). The overall pattern of China's relations with Russia, India and 
Pakistan, and African states, may therefore be understood -in terms of neorealist 
predictions. China deals favourably with these states when marginalised from global 
geopolitics, but as its marginalisation wanes its policies reflect interests derived from 
its changing capabilities within the international power structure. 
Important aspects of China's behaviour with respect to international institutions also 
provide evidence which fits the predictions of the neorealist model. There is strong 
evidence to suggest that China's behaviour with respect to the issue of UN 
peacekeeping merely reflects its underlying geostrategic interests. In October 1991 
China participated in a UNSC authorised deployment of a force to oversee elections in 
Cambodia (Tow, 1994: 151), and brought pressure on the Khmer Rouge not to disrupt 
the peace-process (Yahuda, 1996a: 214). However, it is important to recognise that 
these actions coincided with its own geostrategic interest in the area in the light of the 
cessation of Soviet aid to Vietnam leading to Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia 
(Yahuda, 1996a: 214). Moreover, in order not to create awkward future legal 
precedents for itself, China rejected the suggestion of bringing the perpetrators of 
Cambodian genocide to an international tribunal (Seymour, 1998: 229). With respect 
to its general stance towards UNPKO over the 1990s China has upheld the principle 
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of respect for state sovereignty with regard to UN intervention and as such has 
"consistently opposed non-traditional aspects of peacekeeping" (Fravel, 1996: 1117, 
author's emphasis). China's stance over UNPKO may be understood as reflecting the 
way in which the Chinese leadership fears that multilateralism "may limit China's 
diplomatic leverage or even directly challenge China's claims over Taiwan and the 
South China Sea" (Fravel, 1996: 118). Thus China's behaviour with respect to 
UNPKO over the 1990s has been compatible with neorealist predictions about its 
international behaviour. 
Aspects of China's stance with regard to international nuclear non-proliferation issues 
and regimes may be interpreted as reflecting behaviour compatible with neorealism. 
China acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, to the NPT extension in 1995, 
to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1994 (Godement, 1997). In 
1995 China also co-operated with the Untied States in exerting pressure on North 
Korea over the issue of nuclear proliferation (Yahuda, 1996a: 214). However, each of 
these developments may be explained in a manner consistent with neorealist theory. 
The NPT and the NPT extension "in no way constrained China's ability to develop its 
nuclear weapons" and therefore does not conflict with China's security needs 
(Godement, 1997: 103). China's actions to control North Korean proliferation are 
entirely compatible with neorealist predictions because of its interest in taking such 
measures. Moreover, China did not endorse economic sanctions imposed by the 
UNSC, but instead insisted on bilateral action so as to make its efforts "contingent 
upon American concessions on the human rights issue and upon unconditional 
extension of the most-favoured nation (MFN) arrangement so vital for China's 
exports to the United States" (Gu, 1995: 312). Such behaviour may be understood as 
reflecting neorealism's prediction that China will prefer to work outside of an 
institutional framework to maximise its diplomatic leverage. At a superficial level, 
China's decision to join the MTCR may seem surprising from a neorealist perspective 
because this regime was targeted at China after allegations that it provided missile 
technology to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and Syria (Mullins, 1995: 138). However, 
China only joined when the US agreed to rescind sanctions in the high technology 
area, and has since stressed that its pledge is by no means irreversible and is 
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dependent on others not imposing sanctions on China for whatever political 
motivation (Godement, 1997: 102). Moreover, allegations have continued to be made 
that China is violating the rules of the regime (Mullins, 1995: 138). Thus in line with 
neorealist predictions, the MCTR is either so weak that it imposes no real constraints 
on China's missile transfers, or the regime is likely to be ineffective. 
Finally, aspects of China's international economic behaviour provides evidence which 
can be used to support neorealist predictions. China's trade surplus with the US now 
rivals Japan's, in the face of which China has come under increasing pressure from the 
US to cut trade barriers and increase the transparency of its legal system (Levine, 
1998: 104-105). China's attempts to gain admission to GATT/WTO have been 
persistently blocked by the United States on the grounds that China needs to liberalise 
its economy more extensively, a problem further complicated by China's desire to 
join this organisation with developing country status (Feeny, 1998: 257-259). It has 
been argued that the US has covertly discriminated against China. Harris identifies 
that "(t)he US is the one major trading country not unconditionally applying MFN 
treatment to China ... (because) 
its capacity to do so is limited by the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment that requires that the President extend MFN treatment annually to 
communist countries" (Harris, 1997: 147). Between 1992 and 1994, the Clinton 
administration linked the granting of MFN status to China's progress regarding 
human rights issues (Levine, 1998: 106). Yet this can be seen as unfair trade 
competition by the US (Ferdinand and Cable, 1994: 255). Such debates could be 
interpreted as signs of emerging relative gains tensions between the two states. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that China uses mercantilist strategies to encourage 
trade and investment competition both between Europe, Japan and the US, as well as 
amongst European states (Klein, 1998; Maull, 1997; Moller, 1996). Such behaviour 
could be understood in terms compatible with the emerging structural conflict 
anticipated by the neorealist model. 
Overall, it would appear that there is a significant body of evidence which favours a 
neorealist interpretation of China's state strategies since 1989. Important aspects of 
China's political and economic behaviour over the 1990s are compatible with 
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neorealist predictions. Furthermore, in line with China's rising economic power, it has 
begun to pursue an increasingly revisionist agenda at both the regional and global 
levels over the post-Cold War period, and in turn this has led to emerging patterns of 
structural conflict with other powers in the international system. 
Institutionalism 
According to institutionalist theory, international institutions can take on instrumental 
value for states. Consequently, states will be encouraged to institutionalise aspects of 
their inter-relations so as to maximise their absolute gains from interaction. However, 
where institutionalisation imposes net costs on states in the form of requiring 
considerable flexibility, accommodation and adjustment on a their behalf, they are 
likely to reject institutional options. When considering the implications of 
institutionalist theory for China's post Cold War foreign policy behaviour, it is 
important to recognise that there are important qualitative differences between China 
and either Germany or Japan in terms of its integration into the world economy. In 
particular, unlike Germany and Japan, China could not be said to have developed 
complex patterns of interdependence with other states in the international system. In 
terms of absolute levels of interdependence, China's economy has indeed developed 
important ties. Over the last twenty years, China's economic interdependence with the 
world has risen dramatically, both in terms of trade and foreign investment. China's 
exports and imports as a percentage of GDP rose from less than 10% in 1978 to over 
35% in 1996. (Robinson, 1998: 204; see also Funabashi et al, 1994: 35). Moreover, 
China has become the world's largest recipient of Direct Foreign Investment (DFI). 
Levels of contracted DFI have risen from between 3 and 7 US$ billion per year 
between 1979 and 1990 to 100 US$ billion in 1993 (Funabashi ct al, 1994: 36). 
However, in terms of its distribution, China's economic interdependence with the 
outside world is highly uneven across both geographic regions within China and 
economic sectors (Robinson, 1998: 206; see also Segal, 1994: 34-52). In consequence, 
Robinson concludes that "in the mid-late 1990s, China was not highly, interdependent 
in many arenas that influenced its foreign policy" (Robinson, 1998: 210). Indeed, 
institutionalists have themselves recognised that a situation of complex 
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interdependence may not be said to exist between many states in an Asian context. It 
is for this reason that the prominent institutionalist Joseph Nye, in his capacity as 
Assistant Secretary of State for Defence in 1995, recommended that the US maintain a 
strong forward US defence presence in East Asia as a basis for developing 
multilateralism in the region (Office For International Security Affairs, 1995). Whilst 
not fully substituting for a well developed pattern of interdependent relations in an 
East Asian context, Nye suggests that by maintaining its forward defence presence in 
East Asia the US can provide some of the preconditions necessary for international 
institutions to take on value for states such as China. 
Aspects of China's political and economic strategies since 1989 are amenable to an 
institutionalist interpretation. In political terms, institutionalists could identify 
evidence that China has moderated its international behaviour significantly, even in 
core areas of its security strategies. Firstly, institutionalists have argued that China has 
pragmatically accepted a degree of toleration of the US-Japan MST because it checks 
an expansion in Japan's military role in the Asia-Pacific region. In Nye's words, "(i)n 
the absence of other institutions, Washington's presence in East Asia provides 
stability. As long as the US exercises its power reasonably so that other countries 
(including China) continue to benefit from its stabilising influence ... no country or 
coalition is likely to challenge it" (Nye, 1997: 77). Thus institutionalists could argue 
that the MST has helped to moderate China's behaviour and reshape its expectations 
about regional security arrangements. Related to this argument, institutionalists could 
suggest that, as well as being economically costly to China, its use of force to settle 
regional territorial disputes entails major military hazards. Gallager applies this logic 
to the Spratly's dispute (Gallager, 1994). Segal is less inclined to support any such 
claim with regard to the Spratly's case, yet he concludes from China's failure to resort 
to its threats of unilateral action over Hong Kong that "Chinese behaviour was to 
some extent constrained" in its actions (Segal, 1996: 21). Perhaps most significantly, 
similar arguments can be made with respect to the issue of Taiwan. The PRC's future 
economic vitality is linked closely to its extensive and rapidly growing trade and 
investment links with Taiwan (Roy, 1998b: 205-206). Most importantly, invading or 
blockading Taiwan would be extremely risky militarily, especially given the 
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continuation of the US forward military presence in the region and the US-Japan 
alliance (Nye, 1997: 75-77; see also Shinn, 1996: 75). Overall, therefore, it is possible 
for institutionalists to downplay the significance of signs of rising Chinese 
assertiveness in the East Asia region. 
It is also possible for institutionalists to identify China's growing participation in 
regional multilateral security arrangements to bolster their claims. Notable here is 
China's participation as a founding member in the ARF regional security dialogue 
since 1993 (Yahuda, 1996a: 215). It is important to recognise that China uses the ARF 
as a purely consultative institution (Garrett and Glaser, 1994: 21). Nevertheless, Foot 
identifies a number of specific achievements it has made in relation to the moderation 
of China's security behaviour. Firstly, it has encouraged Chinese officials to make 
public statements which have "reiterated their government's commitment to peaceful 
settlement of disputes within the region", albeit with the notable exception of the 
Taiwan issue (Foot, 1998: 429). Second, discussion within the ARF has led to China's 
"acceptance that some level of transparency does contribute to security" (Foot, 
1998: 430; see also Garrett and Glaser, 1994: 28). As well as participating in high level 
military exchanges, in late 1995 China issued its first defence white paper (Godwin, 
1998: 187). Godwin notes that "though far from meeting the (desired) standards for 
openness ... (this action) was a 
first step" (Godwin, 1998: 187). Furthermore, Chinese 
international relations specialists are participating in track two diplomacy with their 
US 
. and 
Japanese counterparts (Abramowitz et al, 1998). Finally, Foot identifies that 
working within the ARF does impose constraints on China's international actions 
because "(t)he image costs associated with any transgression of embryonic norms or 
obstructionist behaviour once items reach the agenda are steadily increasing" (Foot, 
1998: 439). There is thus some evidence that the ARF has had a significant moderating 
effect on China's strategic behaviour and expectations, albeit of a limited kind. 
China's stance with regard to international non-proliferation regimes may also be 
interpreted as compatible with institutionalist predictions. Firstly, institutionalists 
could construct counter arguments to neoreal ist claims about China's use of both the 
NPT and the MTCR. The NPT can reduce the likelihood that China's neighbours will 
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acquire nuclear weapons and thereby moderate its expectations about the nuclear 
proliferation in the region (Garrett and Glaser, 1995: 76). With regard to the MCTR, 
Rynhold similarly suggests that "(t)he Chinese appear to perceive the proliferation 
issue as a bargaining chip negotiable in the context of China's overall relationship 
with the US, either as a means to smooth over the relationship, or to extract 
concessions on more vital matters such as Taiwan" (Rynhold, 1996: 109; see also 
Wallerstein, 1996: 64). Such behaviour on the part of the Chinese would seem to 
reflect the way in which the norms of the MTCR are tacitly recognised by China, and 
in this sense help `moderate' China's overall strategic behaviour. Second, whilst the 
issue remains an open one, it could also be argued that the case of China's accession 
to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in June 1996 provides even stronger 
evidence in favour of institutionalist predictions. Whilst China did carry out a nuclear 
test in 1995, the acceptance of a zero-level CTBT has the effect of freezing China's 
nuclear capabilities, and as such "signing, ratifying and implementing a CTBT would 
constitute an unmistakable signal of Chinese acceptance, however limited, of security 
interdependence" (Garrett and Glaser, 1995: 76). Commentators have explained 
China's acceptance of the CTBT by pointing to the way in which the Chinese "see 
security gains for China in a test ban that further discourages nuclear proliferation, 
freezes the gap in nuclear weapons development between China and India, and 
prevents the gap between Russia and the United States from widening (Garrett and 
Glaser, 1995-6: 76; see also Mak, 1998: 106). Furthermore, the CTBT allows China to 
elevate its status to that of a `Second World' power such as France or Russia 
(Godement, 1997: 104). However, such explanations involve China running the risk of 
facing proliferation in South Asia, as has indeed recently occurred. Indeed, in line 
with neorealist theory, Carpenter suggests that any Chinese attempt to lock India into 
the status quo using the CTBT framework furthers India's incentives to close the 
widening gap between its capabilities and those of China by engaging in nuclear 
testing (Carpenter, 1998: 2-3). China's accession to the Treaty is therefore notable 
from an institutionalist perspective, all the more so if it continues to abide by its terms 
in the face of recent developments. 
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Finally, over the 1990s China has made important adaptations to the norms of the 
major global and regional international economic regimes. In 1994 and 1996 China 
took major steps to comply with IMF exchange rates procedures and rules (Feeny, 
1998: 244). Moreover, China "has been singularly successful over the 1990s in gaining 
World Bank financial assistance for its modernisation program" (Feeny, 1998: 245- 
248). It has pushed throughout the 1990s for membership of GATT and the WTO, 
progressively lowering its tariffs and making adjustments to meet standards on 
economic transparency (Harris, 1997: 139-140). This has been despite Taiwan's 
`customs territory' status within this institution, and the significant adjustment costs 
associated with membership (Roy, 1998b: 92-94). China's use of regional international 
economic institutions over the post-Cold War period also provides evidence in favour 
of institutionalists' predictions, notably China's involvement since 1991 in APEC 
(Yahuda, 1996a: 215). As well as enhancing China's international status, China "has 
seen APEC ... as a means of pursuing 
its WTO accession objectives, and especially to 
put pressure on the US with respect to non-discrimination (MFN)" (Harris, 1997: 138). 
APEC commitments "have been less specific than for the WTO but they have 
generally required constructive and co-operative participation" in its activities (Harris, 
1997: 142). Nevertheless, this has required China to become involved in routine 
dialogue with APEC members, including Taiwan under the name of Chinese Taipei 
(Funabashi et al, 1994: 44; Yahuda, 1996a: 215). Institutionalists also make the policy 
prescription that investment and ODA could be used to provide incentives to China to 
participate further in regional and global international institutions (Funabashi et al, 
1994: 76-77). Lastly, China's participation in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
process since its first meeting in 1996 could be identified as further evidence by 
institutionalists as strengthening its ties to the emerging East Asian economy as part 
of its more general integration into the world economy (Smith, 1998; Maull et al, 
1998: 183-197). China's extensive use of and anticipatory adaptation towards the rules 
of global and regional economic regimes over the 1990s could be interpreted by 
institutionalists as evidence that the constraints on China imposed by interdependence 
are affecting significantly its behaviour with regard to international economic 
institutions. 
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Overall, however, it is important to note that certain general qualifications must be 
made concerning the strengths of an institutionalist interpretation of China's post Cold 
War state strategies. Firstly, the evidence in favour of institutionalists predictions is at 
best ambiguous. It is far from clear that China has moderated its behaviour in core 
areas of its foreign policy. As has been noted neorealists can present highly 
convincing evidence that directly counters institutionalist claims, particularly with 
regard to signs of increased Chinese assertiveness in its security strategies. Second, 
institutionalism suggests that, at best, it is only at the margins of change that China's 
international behaviour has been significantly moderated. Yet any such argument in 
effect concedes that underlying trends in China's foreign policy behaviour over the 
1990s lie beyond the scope of an institutionalist explanation. This is not to claim that 
there is no evidence favouring institutionalist hypotheses in the case of China's 
foreign policy since 1989. Indeed, as has been discussed, there is available evidence 
that international institutions have affected important aspects of post Cold War 
China's foreign policy behaviour. However, it is equally important to recognise that it 
is difficult to make a convincing positive case that underlying features of China's 
post-1989 strategies have been shaped by international institutions. The case for 
institutionalism relies on the negative argument that whilst China has shown signs of 
increasing assertiveness, its assertiveness may have been tempered in significant ways 
by institutional frameworks. 
Liberalism 
Liberalism stresses the significance of states foreign policy preferences, which in turn 
reflect an underlying political identity, as a factor in determining international 
behaviour and outcomes. Liberalism's precise predictions vary according to the 
preferences of the particular state under analysis and the configuration of preferences 
in the international system as a whole. However, the liberal model defines a set of 
predictions directly relevant to China's state strategies over the post Cold War period. 
Firstly, it opens up the possibility that Japan can pursue strategies which fall outside 
the ranges predicted by both neorealist and institutionalist models due to the influence 
of its domestic politics on its foreign policy behaviour. Second, in the case of China it 
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is important to recognise that patterns of non-liberal behaviour are entirely compatible 
with the predictions of the liberal model. Such behaviour can be explained with 
reference to the articulation of non-liberal political preferences within the 
international system as a direct function of a state's underlying political identity as an 
actor. 
Indeed, there is considerable evidence that neorealism and institutionalism fail to 
account for important dimensions of China's post-Cold War state strategies. 
Neorealism and institutionalism share a common focus on the way in which a state's 
foreign policy behaviour will primarily be driven by the way in which external 
developments can enhance its international status. In this view, states are motivated 
primarily by their relative or absolute positions within the international system. A 
liberal model of international relations draws attention to the way in which explaining 
China's foreign policy motivations may be primarily influenced by domestic political 
considerations. Kim, for instance, comments that China's "defining feature .... 
is the 
high level of internal threats to the government's security and legitimacy. External 
events ... are seen primarily 
in terms of how they affect the state's internal stability 
and legitimacy" (Kim, 1998: 19, author's emphasis). His analysis suggests that 
China's concern with its relative or absolute status had yielded to a more immediate 
and pressing consideration with its domestic cohesion as a source of motivation for its 
international behaviour. 
In terms of its internal political organisation, China faces profound changes at all 
levels of society that threaten to undermine the very existence of its domestic regime. 
These changes are of three broad types - economic, social and ideological. In 
economic terms, China's pursuit of an export-led growth strategy has been associated 
with the devolution of "(f)unctional and executive control over the economy and 
foreign trade..., from ... central ministries ... to provincial, municipal and even county 
levels" (Segal, 1994: 12). In consequence of this process of regionalisation, the 
Chinese executive has lost much of its authority over core areas of economic planning 
such as taxation policy and control of the money supply (Segal, 1994: 14; see also 
Kitano, 1994: 154). Economic decentralisation has also been associated with wider 
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social changes which have seriously undermined the hierarchical organisation of the 
Chinese state. China is undergoing a "general transition to a new generation of 
civilian and military elites" (Swaine, 1995: 1). This has been accompanied by a rise in 
social and political mobilisation in the form of "increased ability and desire of social 
groups to influence domestic and foreign policy issues" (Swaine, 1995: 1). These 
developments have impacted on core areas of security concern to the Chinese state. 
Most obviously, they have directly affected the succession politics surrounding the 
death of Deng Xioping in 1996. Deng Xioping's successor, Jiang Zemin, must "rely 
primarily on instruments of power other than personal authority" such as his 
institutional positions within the Chinese executive and/or support from bureaucratic 
groupings, notably the PLA (Joffe, 1997: 56). Yet even the PLA itself is no longer the 
cohesive entity it once was because widespread corruption and its extensive 
involvement in non-military sectors of China's export economy have severely 
undermined military discipline and professionalism. (Segal, 1994: 26; Joffe, 1997: 31). 
Segal goes so far as to note that "(t)he PLA is no stronger than the rest of Chinese 
society as a whole, at least not in the long term" (Segal, 1994: 27). In combination, 
therefore, economic change and social modernisation within China threaten core 
aspects of the CCP's internal sovereignty. 
A third challenge to the integrity of the Chinese state are the increasing threats 
brought to the legitimacy of Communist ideology by economic and social change. 
Analysts have depicted this development in terms of the `legitimation crisis' or a 
`crisis of faith' in Communism (Hamrin, 1994: 94; Harding, 1993: 38). As a 
consequence of this development, Levine identifies a shift from what he terms formal 
ideology (Communism) to "(i)nformal ideology ... (in the from of) a generic Chinese 
nationalism rooted in a sense of Chinese national identity" (Levine, 1994: 43). 
However, even here Chinese authorities are facing mounting problems. Firstly, as Pyc 
notes, it is difficult for Chinese authorities to bridge the gap between communism and 
nationalism "because for forty years the party has been denouncing just about every 
feature of Chinese culture as a feudal abomination that should be obliterated. 
(Moreover, ) ... 
it is not easy to articulate what exactly are the Chinese qualities that 
should be defended ... (except) the belief that leaders have a claim to moral superiority 
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as the defenders of the moral order, even if this means acting in erratic and arbitrary 
ways" (Pye, 1991: 63). Second, the Communist party's attempt to appeal to 
nationalism to underpin social cohesion is dogged by troubles arising from the way in 
which regionalisation within China has been associated with the emergence of a 
severe nationalities problem, particularly in China's outer provinces. Separatist 
disturbances in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia have been widespread, and have 
been taken very seriously indeed by China's ruling elite (Segal, 1994: 30-31). Overall, 
therefore, China's state elite faces an ideological vacuum at the heart of its attempts to 
consolidate its sovereign authority. 
Many of these pressures on China's political regime have their roots in the 
liberalisation that began in the 1970's. However, it is only after the developments in 
Tiananmen Square in 1989 that the full scale of the challenges that the Chinese state 
faced became apparent. Tiananmen "dramatised China's neiluan (internal disorder) for 
both domestic and global audiences" (Kim and Dittmer, 1993: 258). It was "(o)nly 
after the 4th June 1989 ... (that) CCP hardliners attempted to address the accumulated 
ideological problems of the past decade. Unfortunately, no ready solution was at hand. 
Having drained the fouled oil of Maoist identity from the crankcase of Communist 
power, Deng and his associates had nothing to replace it with. So after the 4th June 
they poured the oily sludge back in, hoping the engine would still run" (Levine, 
1994: 32). In this way, Tiananmen forced the Chinese elite to recognise the problems 
posed to their own legitimacy by the modernisation strategy. Yet, in so doing it only 
made them aware of the necessity of continuing with this strategy to preserve their 
own position in power. Thus in the wake of the Beijing massacre, "many observers 
expected China to back away from economic reforms for fear it would lead to the 
collapse of Communist Part rule in China. Deng Xioping drew precisely the opposite 
conclusion. ... His solution was to speed up economic reform in order to reinforce the 
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party" (Segal, 1994: 13). Furthermore, it is 
important not to underestimate the extent of China's crisis of political identity. Given 
the scope of the social changes taking place in contemporary China, there is no easy 
way out of its predicament without widespread political upheaval affecting the whole 
of Chinese society. As Segal notes, "this is not just a crisis of the regime; it has 
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important elements of a crisis of national identity" (Segal, 1994: 62). However, it is 
only since 1989 that the Chinese elite itself became fully aware of the political 
significance of the changes taking place inside their country. In Kim and Dittmer's 
words, "(m)ore than any other event, the 1989 Tiananmen massacre reflected and 
affected a profound crisis of national self-definition" for China (Kim and Dittmer, 
1989: 257). 
One major analyst has attempted to develop a conceptual framework which is able to 
relate China's ongoing internal political crisis during the 1990s to its behaviour in the 
emerging international system. Johnston argues that China has adopted what he refers 
to as `identity realism' as an underlying set of foreign policy preferences. Identity 
realism suggests that "Chinese leaders believe the primary dangers in their 
environment come from ... challenges to the cohesiveness of internal order. One 
consequence is that the Chinese leadership has tried to intensify popular identification 
with the regime and the nation-state, with the result that we have seen a ... hardening 
of realpolitik discourse and behaviour" (Johnston, 1999: 263-264). The concept of 
identity realism "flows from work in social constructivism and social psychology on 
group identity formation and intergroup conflict. ... (T)his literature ... holds that the 
creation of in-group identities leads directly to the devaluation of outgroups. This in 
turn leads to competitive interpretations of the relationship with the outgroup" 
(Johnston, 1999: 288). Johnston stresses that "the ingroup does not resent or distrust 
the outgroup because of some tangible threat to ingroup interests (as 
neorealism/realism would posit ... ). Rather it is socialised and learned whether or not a 
tangible threat exists" (Johnston, 1999: 288). Thus "the causal arrow runs the other 
way (to the direction suggested by neorealism): identity construction - and its 
intensity - determine anarchy and how much fear and competition results" (Johnston, 
1999: 289). Under these circumstances, "the group .... needs to provide arguments 
about the competitiveness of the environment in order to reinforce ingroup 
identification. This is what realpolitik as ideology does" (Johnston, 1999: 291). The 
notion of identity realism therefore postulates that realism can become a means of 
self-identification for states within the international system, rather than being imposed 
by external structures of constraint. 
174 
Johnston argues that "efforts to increase the intensity of identification with the 
Chinese state - while never absent in post-1949 history, of course - picked up ... after 
June 4,1989" (Johnston, 1999: 294). He notes that Tiananmen "provided information 
to Chinese leaders that suggested more work needed to be done to intensify ingroup 
identification ... and ... that 
differences with the outgroup were ... more pressing ... 
than they had previously acknowledged" (Johnston, 1999: 293-294). Furthermore, 
Johnston stresses that "the regime does not believe the crisis in internal legitimacy has 
passed. The crisis has been accentuated ... by American pressure on China ... (and) by 
a deep concern about ... processes of identity creation or consolidation within China" 
(Johnston, 1999: 294). Finally, Johnston is clear that the critical shift in the intensity of 
ingroup identification occurred in response to the Tiananmen incident in 1989 rather 
than the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and is therefore "not a product of 
(structural changes associated with) the end of the Cold War" (Johnston, 1999: 295). 
Nevertheless, Johnston also recognises that the end of the Cold War has been 
extremely important for China's crisis of identity. This is because the end of the Cold 
War has "reinforced information about ingroup-outgroup differences that were made 
especially apparent with June 4th" by reducing US incentives to downplay political 
differences with China (Johnston, 1999: 295). Moreover, the demise of the Soviet 
Union has dramatically reduced China's vulnerability to a direct large scale invasion 
of its territory, such that "(f)or the first time in the history of the People's Republic ... 
China does not face an identifying or pressing external threat" (Shambaugh, 1994: 48). 
As Segal notes, under these circumstances "central government ... (has) more 
difficulty appealing to the myth of national unity" (Segal, 1994: 10). Thus 
paradoxically, the relatively benign systemic context poses a threat to the domestic 
legitimacy of the ruling elite. In this way, the close coincidence of the Tiananmen 
incident of 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had similar and 
mutually reinforcing effects. Together they starkly revealed the fragility of the 
regime's domestic legitimacy so that, within the space of a few years, Chinese elites 
dramatically changed perception of the strength of their political authority, both 
domestically and internationally. 
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The literature on China's foreign policy frequently develops themes which resonate 
strongly with the motivational logic suggested by the concept of identity realism. For 
example, Johnston points out that although China's defence modernisation drive 
"persists under near unipolarity, it is not because the Chinese believe this structural 
condition is especially dangerous for China at the moment - indeed Chinese 
assessments condition the post-Cold War period as the most benign period in Chinese 
strategic security since at least 1949" (Johnston, 1999: 263; see also Kim, 1992: 151- 
152). Other analysts recognise that one way to explain China's aggressive stance over 
its territorial claims in the South China Sea is to recognise the way in which 
"economic reforms .... 
have put China's conservatives on the defensive, and they are 
using nationalistic issues, like sovereignty over the Spratly's, to assert themselves" 
(Valencia, 1995: 18; see also Segal, 1994: 45). Austin argues that it is China's public 
order crisis which lies behind increasingly assertive Chinese rhetoric over its disputes 
over Taiwan and Hong Kong and with Japan (Austin, 1995: 15). More generally, 
Shambaugh comments that "(t)he end of the Cold War and the absence of an overt 
threat ... 
belies a complex picture. China still feels insecure despite an unprecedented 
peaceful national security environment. This gives rise to an increasingly assertive 
nationalism and military build-up" (Shambaugh, 1994: 55; see also Shambaugh, 
1992: 89). Overall, then, the concept of identity realism suggests that it is plausible 
that the domestic pressures faced by the Chinese state have led it to pursue a foreign 
policy which, whilst superficially resembling neorealist type behaviour, is actually 
underpinned by a very distinctive kind of political realism. 
Moreover, the concept of identity realism is capable of providing a consistent overall 
explanation of apparently contradictory features of China's post-Cold War foreign 
policy behaviour. As has been noted, whilst China has displayed a pronounced 
tendency towards a predominantly `realist' oriented foreign policy, it has also made 
significant use of international institutions over the 1990s. However, it is important to 
recognise that China's significant use of international institutional frameworks has not 
been motivated by a mix of pragmatic acceptance and functional incentives as 
institutionalism suggests. Instead, this behaviour arises because the regime has found 
that some form of engagement with the outside world through international 
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institutional frameworks has become a necessary component of its foreign policy. As 
Yahuda identifies, "it is not that the entanglement with the outside world has tied their 
hands ... or taught them the value of co-operative approaches to security, 
but rather 
that the harsh realities of the problems of maintaining their rule at home has persuaded 
China's rulers of the imperatives of deepening economic engagement with the outside 
world" (Yahauda, 1997: 7; see also Roy, 1998b: 104). Thus in line with identity realist 
behaviour, it has been the over-riding concern of the ruling elites with their internal 
sovereignty which has led them into participation in international institutions. In this 
way, an identity realist explanation of China's post-Cold War foreign policy reveals 
structural tensions at the core of China's management of its interdependent relations 
with the outside world. Whilst the elite have become reliant on certain levels of 
interdependence with the outside world for their continued legitimacy, it is this very 
interdependence which increasingly poses a threat to their sovereign authority. Under 
these circumstances, elites adopt realpolitik discourse and behaviour as the only 
means available to them to strengthen in-group identification. In turn, however, this 
generates deep problems in China's relations with the West which are crucial to 
sustaining regime legitimacy. 
Indeed, Johnson himself identifies the structural tensions at the core of China's 
diplomatic conduct. He notes that "China's self-identification has undergone ... a 
blurring. The traditional sovereign-centric, autonomous major power identity ... has 
been uneasily linked to a newer identity ... (associated with responsible) participation 
in institutions ... . This 
linkage has created a tension in diplomacy between China's 
desire to show itself as an active, involved participant in international institutions 
(even those that offer no obvious material costs or benefits, or indeed are somewhat 
costly), and the desire to minimise commitments and constraints that are required by 
this participation" (Johnston, 1998: 77). Similarly, Robinson recognises the way in 
which as China's interdependence has risen, "Beijing's foreign policy could only 
become highly interactive, participatory and co-operative. But these attitudes by 
themselves did not spell interdependence. Rather a complex mix of dependence, 
autonomy (termed independence by the leadership), and interdependence ensued. 
There was no objective way to arrive at some bottom line as to the balance between 
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the three in China's foreign relations" (Robinson, 1998: 40). This mix of inconsistent 
motivations is impossible to capture through a focus on China's relative or absolute 
status as neorealism and institutionalism explanations suggest. As Beylerian and 
Canivet conclude, "when conceiving of their countries international roles, China's 
leaders real preoccupation (over the 1990s) was not with status ... but with identity" 
(Beylerian and Cavinet, 1997: 222). Thus, unlike neorealist and institutionalist 
alternatives, the concept of identity realism neatly captures the distinctive way in 
which China's foreign policy reflects the complexity of the relationship between its 
regime's domestic authority and its external environment. 
Overall, therefore, a convincing case can be made for the prediction of the liberal 
model with respect to China's post-Cold War state strategies. Unlike either neorealism 
or institutionalism, an identity realist characterisation of China's foreign policy 
preferences provides a plausible explanation of its predominantly realist orientation 
whilst simultaneously being able to account for the deep tensions introduced into its 
diplomatic conduct by interdependence. Indeed, because it suggests that China's 
realist diplomatic conduct arises precisely because of the way in which its ruling elite 
is both deeply reliant on the benefits of interdependence and fears its consequences, 
the concept of identity realism is able to explain apparently contradictory elements of 
China's preferences as consistent dimensions of a single underlying strategic identity. 
However, the conclusion that China's foreign policy behaviour may be explained as a 
consequence of its regime's structural inability to manage the impact of 
interdependence on its domestic politics raises the deeper question of the extent to 
which China will be able to continue along its present path in future. In turn this 
requires an examination of the way in which the relationship between China's 
domestic and international politics is likely to develop so as to define the agenda for 
China's political choices in the emerging international system. 
China's Choices 
In the English language literature, the `engagement-containment debate' has provided 
the most prominent way of framing the discussion about China's political choices in 
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the post-Cold War international system. This debate is concerned primarily with how 
the United States and the West more generally should conduct their relations with a 
`rising China'. However, more fundamentally it raises the issue of what strategic 
options China is likely to take in the post-Cold War world. The engagement school 
follows institutionalist logic in advocating "enmeshing China in as many international 
regimes and binding commitments as possible so as to minimise its potential for 
disruptive behaviour and maximise the smooth integration of China into the 
international order" (Shambaugh, 1996: 184). The most comprehensive statement of 
this position has come from Shinn who argues for extensive engagement with China 
on a wide range of economic and security issues (Shinn, 1996: 9). By contrast, the 
containment school follows neorealism in regarding conflict with China as either 
inevitable or highly likely in the face of its rising relative capabilities. They see China 
"as a disruptive threat to regional security and the international system, and advocate 
balance of power tactics to either `deter', `contain' or `constrain' China" (Shambaugh, 
1996: 184-185). For example, using neorealist analysis, Layne advocates that the 
Untied States adopt an offshore balancing strategy for dealing with the challenges 
posed by the East Asian region in the post-Cold War period, including the threat of a 
rising China (Layne, 1996: 73-75). 
As a way of discussing the strategic options faced by China today, the debate between 
engagement and containment is highly problematic. However apparently polarised 
positions in the debate are, in practice, their views are difficult to distinguish. For 
example, the realist Segal proposes that the positions in the debate arc `often 
unsophisticated", and suggests that "(c)ontainment can work, but its neighbours and 
powers further afield need to appreciate that they must .... use elements from a 
strategy of engagement as well as the balance of power" (Segal, 1996: 134). Similarly, 
on Shinn's formulation, it is necessary to pursue a strategy of `conditional 
engagement' as a more sophisticated alternative to unconditional engagement and pre- 
emptive containment (Shinn, 1996: 3-4). What this blurring between the positions 
reflects is that in the absence of information about China's underlying strategic 
intentions, its response to Western polices is extremely difficult to anticipate. 
Advocates of either position must therefore qualify their policy prescriptions by 
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making them in some way dependent or `conditional' on certain types of Chinese 
behaviour. Sophisticated commentators therefore broadly agree that "(t)he important 
thing is to aim at the reduction of China's potential `intent' (not its present or potential 
`capability') to initiate aggressive military hostilities" (Sato, 1998: 18). As Shambaugh 
identifies, "(o)ften missing in the (engagement-containment) debate ... is a 
consideration of China's potential responses to these polarised polices and 
consideration of the domestic variables inside China that will condition its external 
orientation. ... The Western 
debate over the relative merits of engagement versus 
containment seemingly treats China as a static entity that will simply have to adjust to 
whatever policy the other nations pursue" (Shambaugh, 1996: 182). 
Johnston provides an alternative framework for analysing China's strategic choices in 
the post-Cold War international system which is more amenable to consideration of 
domestic political factors within China. In his widely cited analysis of recent Chinese 
arms control policies, Johnston draws a distinction between learning and adaptation as 
qualitatively different possible responses China can make to its changing international 
environment. According to Johnston, "learning occurs if change in policy is due to 
shifts in the central paradigm held by the policy makers ... as new information about 
the external environment is internalised by the decision-makers. In contrast, in the 
adaptation model, a change in policy is due to tactical adjustment to changing external 
conditions. We should therefore expect to see no change in paradigm but rather a re- 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of previous tactics in ... as exogenous conditions 
change" (Johnston, 1996: 31). Some proponents of engagement have made the 
argument that China has engaged in social learning in response to the rising impact of 
interdependence on its foreign policy, and that this model could provide a basis for 
China's future behaviour in the international system. For example, Harris argues that 
in the economic realm, "(i)t does seem clear ... that China did undergo a major 
learning process ... . Chinese policy thinkers abandoned many deeply rooted 
assumptions ... 
(and) came to accept and internalise the reality of one world market 
with capitalism as the prevalent force, and with the need for economic co-operation 
globally and in the Asia-Pacific region" (Harris, 1997: 150). Harris is explicit that such 
behaviour could be seen as evidence that China has engaged in "global socialisation" 
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towards liberal norms of behaviour (Harris, 1997: 151). However, such a view is 
oversimplistic because it presumes a direct relationship between China's use of 
international economic institutions and change in its underlying strategic preferences. 
Harris' argument fails to identify the way in which Chinese elites have embraced 
interdependence above all else to preserve their domestic authority. Indeed, China's 
identity realist preferences have led it not only to avoid institutionalising behaviour 
wherever feasible, but to actively adopt policy discourse and practices compatible 
with realism to compensate for the paradoxical way in which interdependence 
simultaneously poses a real threat to its domestic regime's legitimacy. Thus, even in 
the economic arena where it has made the most extensive use of international 
institutions, China's behaviour must be understood in terms of adaptation rather than 
learning. What is notable about China's approach to interdependence is its failure to 
either engage in learning and thereby fundamentally alter the cognitive framework 
within which it operates within the international system, or even adopt adaptive 
behaviour above and beyond what is minimally required to prop up the legitimacy of 
the ruling communist elite. However, it is possible to develop a more sophisticated 
version of the argument that China today faces intense systemic pressures to 
fundamentally change the central paradigm held by foreign policy makers. On this 
formulation, it is precisely China's distinctive inability to fully appreciate the 
consequences of its interdependence for its domestic and international political 
behaviour which is at the source of its deep and ongoing crisis of national identity. 
One possible response the Chinese elite could make to this predicament is a shift 
towards `neoconservatism'. Whilst a neoconservative revival in China may encourage 
it to adopt a more hard-line version of realpolitik behaviour, its possibility should not 
be understood in structural realist terms. Rather, neoconservatism may be seen as a 
response to the intensification of China's crisis of national identity since the late 
1980's. Fewsmith notes that in the post-Tiananmen era, neoconservatism must be seen 
as a reaction to the way in which "the question is not so much whether to reform as 
how to hold on the face of reform" (Fewsmith, 1995: 635). Neoconservatism shares 
the orientation of traditional conservatism towards maintaining cohesion in Chinese 
society (Fewsmith, 1995: 637-638). However, it is distinctive in the degree to which it 
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breaks from central socialist values. Thus in terms of economic management 
neoconservatism is characterised by "an acceptance of a much broader and more 
important role for market forces than traditional conservative thinking ever 
contemplated" (Fewsmith, 1995: 640). Similarly, neoconservatism suggests that "a 
patriotic appeal would be more effective than traditional socialist ideology" in 
providing social integration (Fewsmith, 1995: 642). However, neoconservatism has 
important limitations as a viable long term political course for China because it "has 
not yet presented any convincing arguments to address effectively the problems in 
Chinese society that it has identified. ... (In particular, 
) neconservatives have not 
explained how their sense of nationalism can match China's evident need to continue 
importing capital and exporting goods" (Fewsmith, 1995: 649). Indeed, it is likely that 
a neoconservative shift would only exacerbate China's current problems and so speed 
up the process of regime transition. For this reason, Fewsmith concludes that "(t)he 
neoconservative ... (option 
for China) is only one of many possible outcomes, and 
perhaps not the most likely" (Fewsmith, 1995: 650). 
A second possible course for the Chinese regime would be to continue with its present 
stance and adopt a pragmatic approach to dealing with its ongoing legitimacy crisis. 
Such an approach would be characterised by incremental responses to the challenges 
faced by the Chinese state, rather than the regime accepting fundamental political 
change. This strategy should therefore be seen as a form of `muddling through' or 
adaptation in the face of change, rather than in terms of learning by the Chinese elite. 
However, as with the neoconservative course for China, there are fundamental 
question marks about the sustainability of any such course for China. Indeed, Harding 
uses the term "decay" to describe this possible future direction for China (Harding, 
1993: 36; see also Harding, 1994). The case of the hand over of Hong Kong to China 
provides a useful cue to a discussion of why this might be the case. Yahuda notes that 
"(w)hen China resumes sovereignty of Hong Kong on 1 July 1997 it will begin an 
undertaking of enormous significance for the future of China itself. The way in which 
it lives up to its promises and legal obligations will not only determine the fate of the 
former British colony ... , but 
it will also shape the evolution of China's political 
identity and its integration into the international community" (Yahuda, 1996b: 1). 
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Yahuda identifies that there are many functional incentives to the Chinese regime that 
would follow from it demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law in Hong Kong. 
For example, it would ease China's entry into the WTO, and would provide a strong 
precedent for the success of a `one country two systems' settlement for the peaceful 
integration of Taiwan into the PRC (Yahuda, 1996b: 3-4). However, he also stresses 
that "the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty will pose many problems to 
China itself. If the actual process of the transfer of sovereignty could be successfully 
managed, Hong Kong could then pose further challenges to the Chinese Communist 
government ... (because) 
it would serve as an attractive model for all those in China 
who seek the benefits of a greater legality and an increased democratic accountability" 
(Yahuda, 1996b: 4). Thus, to Yahuda, the handover of Hong Kong represents a 
"turning point" for China, because it points up the limitations of China accepting 
adaptation for the functional benefits this brings without addressing the more 
fundamental political issues this raises for the Chinese state (Yahuda, 1996b: 135). 
The challenge that is posed by Hong Kong to China must be understood in the context 
of much deeper decentralising dynamics that question core features of China's formal 
political identity. Segal suggests that regionalisation in China has meant that it "might 
best be seen as evolving a distinctive type of informal federalism where power is 
managed in different ways at different levels, and even varies in form at the same 
level" (Segal, 1994: 63; see also Zheng, 1994: 321). Moreover, trends towards informal 
federalisation in China take on even further significance when set in a wider global 
context. Segal pushes his discussion of informal federalism in China as far as to 
suggest explicitly that "(w)hether (or not) one adopts the Euro-speak of `subsidiarity' 
and `variable geometry' ... the reality in China is tending towards increasingly 
devolved power" (Segal, 1994: 63). The implication of this suggestion is that the 
Chinese state can be seen as undergoing a series of structural changes that are 
tantamount to the emergence of an informal form of what, in a German and/or 
European context, is termed multi-level governance. Thus the Chinese state finds that 
it is devolving power both `upwards' over its handling of ostensibly `international' 
issues such as its sovereignty over Hong Kong, Macao, and perhaps in future Taiwan, 
and is (albeit 
informally) ceding power `downwards' with regard to ostensibly 
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`domestic' questions such as its control over the outer provinces. The parallels 
between decentralising trends in both Germany and China are even more striking 
given the enormous political differences between these two states and the regions 
within which they are situated. Unlike Germany, the Chinese state is authoritarian in 
character, and in contrast to Europe, the network of formal regional international 
institutions in East Asia is highly underdeveloped. That a meaningful comparison can 
be made between political decentralisation in Germany and China therefore raises the 
question of what pressures have encouraged them to engage in similar patterns of 
behaviour despite their radically different political characteristics and regional 
settings. 
A plausible explanation of the parallels in trends towards political decentralisation in 
both Germany and China is that these states are responding to pressures arising from 
the international system. In the case of both Germany and China, trends towards 
`multi-level governance' are directly related to the deep-seated shifts in the identity 
structure of the states concerned. In turn these shifts in identity structure are intimately 
linked to overall patterns of change taking place within the international system. It is 
the German state's distinctive nationalinternational identity that has led it to devolve 
power upwards and downwards as part of a process of Europeanisation (Germany 
chapter: 98). Similarly, informal federalisation in China may be understood as 
symptomatic of the Chinese state's ongoing crisis of national identity within the 
international system. Indeed, at least one analyst expresses the view that China's 
foreign policy reflects the shifting nature of the relationship between domestic and 
international politics. In a statement that could equally be applied to Germany, Kim 
suggests that in China's case, "the most salient impact of globalisation dynamics on 
the state is the intensification of domestic and external linkages. As a result, the 
conventional realist divide between domestic and external linkage factors is 
substantially blurred, if not totally erased. With the increasing associated interactions 
between security and economic policies, the factors' that influence ... foreign policy 
behaviour no longer fall neatly into the dichotomous categories of 
domestic/international and external/systemic variables. Both sets of variables ... 
interact during the decision making process" (Kim, 1998: 22; Roy, 1998[b]: 243 makes 
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similar comments). It is, however, possible to take Kim's analyses one stage further 
by suggesting that the intensification of internal and external linkages he identifies is 
itself a distinctive feature of the emerging international system. On this view, trends 
towards `multi-level governance' in both Germany and China reflect the way in which 
the international system has come to embody a complex, two way interaction between 
internal and external dimensions of politics. Such an analysis suggests that the reason 
why the viability of either a shift towards* neoconservatism or a continuation of 
pragmatic adaptation are questionable is because China faces intense pressures on its 
internal identity structure arising from the international system. 
Given the challenges it faces, an alternative to either neoconservatism or a 
continuation of pragmatic adaptation, would be for it to adopt a fundamental shift in 
its political identity. Such a response would require a basic change in the cognitive 
framework informing its policy choices, and as such would represent social learning 
rather than adaptation. Once again, the issue of Hong Kong's handover exemplifies 
China's predicament. Whilst Hong Kong currently poses a potentially enormous 
threat to the sovereignty of the current Chinese regime, the problems posed to the 
Chinese regime by its acquisition arise because the elite is reluctant to formally 
recognise processes of decentralisation that are occurring. Accepting a federal solution 
could be of great benefit to China, although as Segal identifies it is important to stress 
that at present "it is unlikely that China will adopt a formally federal structure" (Segal, 
1994: 63). As has been noted, there are important functional incentives for China to 
accept a `one country, two systems' approach to the integration of Hong Kong. Yet 
more fundamentally, such a solution would perhaps provide a more sustainable basis 
on which to enhance the long term political legitimacy of the Chinese state than its 
present authoritarianism. Whilst the regime would clearly have to run the risk that it 
would face greatly increased separatist pressures from the provinces, it is equally 
important to recognise that pressures for decentralisation are unlikely to wane unless 
and until a viable long term solution to its structural cause is found. Thus, as Yahuda 
notes, "(t)he recovery of Hong Kong ... 
is occurring at a time when it could play an 
exceptional role in easing China's painful transition" (Yahuda, 1996b: 142). Moreover, 
the case of Hong Kong provides a principle which can be generalised to other aspects 
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of Beijing's management of the regionalisation process. Segal, for example, suggests 
that by acknowledging some decentralising trends, Chinese authorities "might make a 
formal break-up (of the PRC) less likely" (Segal, 1994: 64). In this sense, rather than 
being a source of fundamental political problems for the Chinese state, adopting a 
shift in its basic political identity China could become a major source of `power' for 
it, allowing it to strengthen its domestic legitimacy in ways in which it could not 
otherwise do. 
It is also possible that adopting a fundamental shift in its underlying political identity 
could be a major source of power for China in terms of its routine dealings with the 
Western powers. China's realist self-identification currently encourages it to behave in 
a largely non-transparent manner with regard to other states in the international 
system. At the same time, the debate over engagement versus containment of China 
taking place in the West reflects fundamental uncertainties about China's strategic 
preferences or intentions within the emerging international system. Indeed, precisely 
this issue has been raised by the US contributor to the track II diplomatic dialogue 
being conducted between the US, Japan and China (Abramowitz, 1998: 40). In 
response, the Chinese representative notes that debates between proponents of 
engagement and containment of China in the West have meant that "further 
clarification of Japanese and American intentions is imperative. ... (Western powers) 
should show adequate transparency ... in specifying their own concerns and plans" 
(Jisi, 1998: 29). However, it is the Japanese representative who identifies the issue 
lying at the core of this debate. He notes the key to developing strong trilateral 
relations between China, Japan and the US is that "partners in individual bilateral 
relationships should make their specific policy intentions and policy trends 
transparent to the third party (in order) ... to promote trust ... (and) recognise trust 
strengthening as a goat' (Funabashi, 1998: 53, emphasis added). In this way, 
Funabashi identifies that developing its relationships on the basis of trust has become 
a major potential source of power for China in the emerging international system. In 
particular, sustaining the trust of others provides China with the key to developing a 
positive sum structure of strategic interaction between itself and the Western powers. 
As Yunling suggests, if the premise of Chinese behaviour is averting confrontation 
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with the great powers, a possible strategy for China is "(s)imultaneously developing 
relations with the US and Japan, confronting neither" (Yunling, 1997: 464). Yet to 
clarify its underlying strategic intentions also requires China to undertake a 
fundamental shift in its foreign policy identity. In China's case, adaptation is not 
enough because of the way in which interdependence threatens the legitimacy of the 
current Chinese regime, leading it further towards non-transparent `realist' behaviour. 
Only a response involving a basic shift in the central paradigm held by Chinese policy 
makers - or learning - would provide it with a cognitive 
framework consistent with 
communicating a benign set of strategic intentions to the outside world. 
Moreover, whilst the West clearly has grounds to criticise China's particularly opaque 
foreign policy objectives, it is equally important that it recognises that it may be its 
own lack of transparency which has led to major problems 
in its dealings within 
China. Probably the single most significant political conflict with China during the 
1990s, the 1996 Taiwan Straits missile crisis, provides a suitable case in point. Prior 
to this incident, the basic objectives of the first Clinton administration's policy 
towards China had been extremely poorly defined and on numerous occasions had 
sent highly ambiguous signals about the US's strategic 
intentions towards China 
(Lampton, 1997: 1102). Tellingly, the Clinton administration itself seems to have 
recognised its own role in precipitating the crisis by the way in which it has 
subsequently made major changes to its engagement strategy. Documents reflecting 
present US policy towards China recognise that "(a) persistent problem of (then) 
current US strategy is its fundamental ambiguity; Beijing seems to understand neither 
the overall strategy nor the relative importance of American goals. " (Shinn, 1996: 14). 
Indeed, the US is explicit that, using the new principles of conditional engagement it 
has publicly set out, "Washington will be able to communicate better its policy 
objectives to China" (Shinn, 1996: 14). Thus 
it is important not to accept at face value 
a neorealist interpretation of the Taiwan 
Straits missile crisis. Instead, there is strong 
evidence that lack of transparency 
in US policy towards China was its root cause. 
Furthermore, the identification of trust as a central feature of China's relations with 
other states also implies that principles of engagement are applied in a consistent and 
co-ordinated way not only 
by the United States, but also by Japan and Europe. Sato 
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notes the ways in which the unequal nature of the US-Japanese alliance has sent 
confusing signals to Beijing and as such weakened their influence over China's 
behaviour (Sato, 1997: 1). Maull notes that the unequal nature of the US-Europe 
relationship has led to similar problems of policy co-ordination (Maull, 1997: 469- 
476). Moller identifies the ways in which economic competition between various 
European states, has both sent inconsistent messages to China and also allowed it to 
gain from internal political divisions amongst them (Moller, 1996). Moreover, as 
previous chapters have stressed, it is important not to interpret asymmetries in 
relations between the US and Europe/Japan in terms of emerging patterns of structural 
conflict within the international system. There is therefore considerable scope for 
increased transparency in the West's engagement strategy with respect to China, 
which would be likely to smooth the way towards stronger relations with it in future. 
In turn this reflects the way in which China can promote its own equality with 
Western powers by reciprocally recognising the importance of transparency and trust 
in its relations with them. It is in this sense that its relations with others is becoming 
"more equal" or increasingly "equilateral" (Jisi, 1998: 22 and 23 respectively). 
However, whilst the West can take significant steps to facilitate China's smooth 
integration into the emerging international system, it is ultimately China itself which 
must make the most crucial decisions about its future international role. It is clear that 
since 1989, China's political future has been radically open and increasingly a product 
of historical contingency (Whyte, 1992: 70). The current elite's stop-gap approach to 
dealing with change is unsustainable as a viable long term basis for China's domestic 
and international political behaviour. 
As Segal notes, regardless of the regime's 
stance, "(t)he signs that China is changing shape are increasingly clear. A closer look 
at its national identity reveals 
fissures and pressures that have long been masked by an 
official determination to uphold the myth of national unity" (Segal, 1994: 54). In the 
face of this predicament, China could move in any one of a number of radically 
different political directions. Both a shift towards neoconservatism or a compete break 
up of China are options which should not 
be ruled out. This wide variety of possible 
future directions for China arises because ultimately "(t)he fate of China ... will 
depend critically on how ... (the Chinese) manage their reforms" (Segal, 1994: 62). In 
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negotiating the transition to the post-Cold War world, it is the elite's distinctive 
political identity which is currently the major obstacle preventing China from 
adopting a `learning' response to the challenges it today faces. Whilst the elite 
continues to block off fundamental political change, the most probable path forward 
for the medium term will be a continuation of the present policy of pragmatic 
adaptation. As Segal recognises, "(t)he most likely outcome (for China) is a prolonged 
crisis of identity, where changes short of a complete collapse have an important 
impact on the lives of the Chinese and its neighbours" (Segal, 1994: 62). 
Segal's analysis of the ongoing problems China has faced over the 1990s returns the 
chapter to the theme of `mid-life crisis' introduced in the opening pages. As was 
noted, over the forty or so years since the foundation of the PRC, communist ideology 
provided a viable framework within which China's regime could sustain its domestic 
and international political identity. However, since the late 1980's, China has been 
presented with the problem of negotiating the transition to the-post-Cold War world at 
a time when its Communist ideology no longer provides it with the sense of domestic 
and international purpose it was once able to. This situation presents China with both 
opportunities and dangers. In order to grasp the new opportunities its crisis opens up, 
China must be willing to run consciously entertained risks, and in particular, it must 
be prepared to confront reflexively and resolve the way in which its existing political 
identity is no longer able to deal effectively with the new challenges it faces. 
Nevertheless, this requires China's ruling elite to take the unlikely course of accepting 
fundamental political change. However unlikely in the short to medium term, China's 
failure to take this course can only further exacerbate China's sense of `ontological 
insecurity' within the emerging international system by intensifying its crisis of 
national identity. As with an individual displaying ontological insecurity, China lacks 
a consistent feeling of biographical continuity in the sense that Communism has not 
been replaced by an ideology which is effectively able to restore a legitimate sense of 
national cohesion. As with an ontologically insecure individual, in an external 
environment full of changes, the Chinese regime is preoccupied by possible risks to 
its existence, and is paralysed in terms of practical action. Finally, as with an 
ontologically insecure 
individual, China feels morally `empty' and lacks 'self regard' 
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in the sense that the regime is fundamentally unsure about the very basis for its 
existence. Moreover, under these conditions the regime finds that it subjects its 
behaviour to constant scrutiny. Indeed, the essence of China's `mid-life crisis' is that, 
somewhat paradoxically, it is the Chinese regime's intensification since 1989 of its 
traditionally `realist' foreign policy orientation which increasingly lies at the root of 
its deep sense of insecurity in the world. Until the regime comes to recognise that its 
ongoing sense of insecurity derives from the way in which the sense of identity which 
sustained its past development has become inadequate to this context in which it today 
finds itself, China will continue to face a crisis of identity transition as it negotiates 




This thesis has utilised the `real world laboratory' provided by the end of the Cold 
War to assess neo- or structural realist, institutionalist and liberal models of the 
international system. Each of the theories examined makes very different predictions 
about the key variable affecting state behaviour, the levels and type of 
institutionalisation which will take place between states, and the sources of power for 
states in the post Cold War international system. By applying these models to 
examining the strategies pursued by Germany, Japan and China since 1989, this thesis 
aims to account for how states have adjusted to the end of the Cold War, and make 
general statements about the overall nature of international change in the post Cold 
War period. The conclusions which follow summarise the empirical findings of the 
thesis with respect to the strategic behaviour of units, the. structure of interaction 
which exists between them, and the process through which the structure of interaction 
feeds back into altering units' preferences. They demonstrate how the distinctive 
patterns of behaviour observed may be explained with reference to a liberal model of 
the international system. The section on the strategic behaviour of units highlights the 
significance of states' domestic preferences as the key variable determining their 
behaviour and outcomes at the international level. The section on the structure of 
interaction which exists between the units supports liberal claims about the level and 
type of institutionalisation taking place, and the sources of power for states in the post 
Cold War international system. The section on reflexivity supports liberal claims 
about' the distinctive process of 
identity construction and socialisation that has taken 
place. Finally, the relationship 
between the process of change in the international 
system identified and the methodological status of the 
foreign policy literature upon 
which this thesis 
is based is examined. This follows from the overtly critical 
rnethodological stance adopted, and serves to 
highlight the relationship which exists 
between the foreign policy literature and the reflexivity in the international system 
documented by the thesis. 
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Units 
Over the first ten years of the post Cold War period, Germany, Japan and China have 
each pursued strategies which reflect a distinctive set of foreign policy preferences. 
The preferences fall outside of the ranges of behaviour anticipated by either the 
neorealist or the institutionalist models, and are summarised in Table I below: 
Table 1 
State Strategies 1989-1999 
State Strategic Preferences Analyst(s) 
Germany Reflexively Institutionalist Anderson and Goodman 
Japan Mercantile Realist Heginbotham and Samuels 
China Identity Realist Johnston 
The preferences articulated by the unified Germany have been characterised by 
Anderson and Goodman as reflexively institutionalist. As it adjusted to the post Cold 
War transition, "institutions ... restructured and remoulded German interests, so that, 
in the eyes of the German political elites, institutional memberships were not merely 
instruments for policy but normative frameworks for policy making" (Anderson and 
Goodman, 1993: 24). Although Anderson and Goodman's characterisation was 
developed through an analysis of Germany's strategies in the initial post unification 
period, it may legitimately be extended to 
its behaviour throughout the 1990s. 
Contrary to neorealist theory, the united Germany did not begin to relax its major 
institutional commitments. Contrary to institutionalist theory, Germany's use of 
institutions reflected not only instrumental calculations about interests but the way in 
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which Germany's institutional commitments had reshaped its foreign policy 
preferences. Overall, Germany has developed its strategies in a norm governed 
fashion over the 1990s, changing the formal procedures through which it participated 
in international institutions in order to preserve their underlying normative fabric. 
Germany's strategic preferences may be regarded as liberal, rather than neorealist or 
institutionalist, in the sense that it has internalised the norms of multilateral 
institutional frameworks. 
Over the 1990s, Japan has articulated an equally distinctive set of' strategic 
preferences. Following Heginbotham and Samuels, it is possible to characterise 
Japan's preferences as mercantile realist in orientation (Heginbotham and Samuels, 
1999). Mercantile realism combines economic nationalism with a low political 
profile. Contrary to neorealist theory, Japan consistently prioritised techno-economic 
over politico-military interests, defining its strength in terms of wealth and technology 
and its position in terms of its industrial structure. This has been most notable in its 
pronounced tendency to continue to free ride on the US for its security over the 1990s, 
in particular during the Gulf War and in the 1995 National Defence Planning Outline. 
It has also been apparent in its close economic relations with China over the 1990s, 
which according to neorealist theory should be a major potential military rival for 
Japan. Contrary to institutionalist theory, Japan's economic relations with other states 
have been strongly mercantilist in orientation. This has been reflected in the character 
of its aid and investment strategies in Asian countries, and in its troubled economic 
relations with Western economies. In line with mercantile realist behaviour, Japan is 
co-operating economically with Asian states which have complementary industrial 
structures (notably China) whilst balancing against other advanced industrialised 
states. Thus, as with Germany, the distinctive strategic preferences articulated by 
Japan over the 1990s are compatible with neither neorealist nor institutionalist 
predictions about its foreign policy behaviour. 
Following Johnston, China's strategic preferences since 1989 may be characterised as 
identity realist. Identity realism suggests that Chinese leaders believe that the primary 
dangers from their security environment come from challenges to the cohesiveness of 
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internal order, and under these circumstances use realpolitik discourse and behaviour 
to prop up regime legitimacy (Johnston, 1999). China's identity realism has its origins, 
in the regimes' realisation in 1989 that pursuit of a strategy of developing 
interdependent relations with the West as a key to social and economic modernisation 
had major domestic ramifications, and was greatly magnified by the disappearance of 
a direct external threat to China since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As 
with the other two cases analysed, the preferences articulated by China over the 1990s 
are anomalous to both neorealist and institutionalist international relations theory. 
Contrary to realism, the intensification of Chinese realpolitik discourse and behaviour 
since 1989 has been largely symbolic or performative, and has been tempered by tacit 
acknowledgement by the ruling elite that engagement with the West is a necessary 
component in sustaining the high growth rates required for continued regime 
legitimacy. Contrary to institutionalism, the Chinese elite's deep sense of unease with 
the effects of increased interdependence on its domestic political structure results in 
foreign policy practices with a strongly realist orientation. The result is an inconsistent 
mix of motivations underlying Chinese foreign policy which highlight the regimes' 
underlying concern with identity rather than its relative or absolute status. 
In terms of the particular content of their strategies, Germany, Japan and China have 
responded very differently to the changes which have taken place in the international 
system since 1989. However, it remains possible to generalise about the foreign policy 
behaviour observed in the cases of Germany, Japan and China over the 1990s. Each of 
these states has acquired a heightened capacity for autonomous action. Their 
distinctive strategic preferences fall outside of the ranges predicted by neorealist and 
institutionalist models because of the influence of domestic factors on their foreign 
policy behaviour. This finding conforms to the predictions offered by a liberal model 
of the international system, which, as has been stressed, does not require states to 
articulate liberal preferences. Indeed, particularly, at the margins of change, the 
articulation of non-liberal preferences is to be expected. Only one of the cases 
examined, that of Germany, has articulated preferences that may broadly be 
characterised as `liberal' in orientation. However, this is not problematic for 
predictions of the liberal model. The key prediction of the liberal model is that, with 
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the emergence of a critical mass of formally liberal states in the international system, 
states' domestic preferences will become a chronic factor influencing their 
international behaviour. This is not to make the claim that states' interactions with 
other units in the international system have not significantly affected international 
outcomes, as shall be discussed in the following two sections below. However, it does 
imply that patterns of state behaviour present anomalies to both neorealist and 
institutionalist predictions. 
Neorealists and institutionalists might object to this claim on the grounds that they can 
accept that, in particular instances, states' domestic preferences can influence their 
international behaviour. However, three responses may be made to any such 
arguments on the basis of the case studies examined. First, these findings apply in 
relation to the behaviour of three major states that neorealists have identified as 
candidates to become polar powers within the international system. Such states ought 
to find themselves exposed to the full force of pressures arising from the international 
system. Second, Germany, Japan and China operate within radically different 
circumstances in the sense that there are wide variations in patterns of 
interdependence faced by each of the three states. Yet across all three domestic 
preferences have heavily influenced foreign policy behaviour. Thirdly, the cases have 
been examined over a ten year period. In each case, states' domestic political 
preferences have been a consistent factor in influencing foreign policy behaviour over 
an extended period of time. It cannot be suggested that, in the cases examined, 
domestic preferences have influenced foreign policy behaviour in an ad hoc fashion. 
Rather, they have decisively shaped their `grand strategies' throughout the 1990s. It is 
difficult for neorealists and institutionalists to suggest that these consistent patterns of 
behaviour across three major states which operate in very different circumstances over 
an extended period represent temporary anomalies to the patterns of behaviour their 
theories predict. By contrast, the capacity for autonomous action they have acquired 
can be explained with reference to the liberal model of the international system. 
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Structure 
A second distinctive feature of the international system since 1989 has been the 
structure of interaction which exists between the units. This structure stands out most 
clearly in the context of East Asia, where the absence of well developed patterns of 
interdependence combined with Japan and China's non-liberal preferences brings its 
benign effects into bold relief. In the chapters dealing with Japanese and Chinese state 
strategies, a wide range of literature was drawn upon to document the distinctive 
structure of interaction they face. However, for the purposes of exposition, this 
discussion will focus upon Yunling's article Changing Sino-US-Japanese Relations, 
which provides a particularly clear outline of these trends (Yunling, 1997). Yunling's 
analysis will be summarised before generalising his findings to the structural 
characteristics displayed by the emerging post Cold War international system as a 
whole. 
Yunling documents the emergence of what he refers to as a "triangular structure" of 
strategic interaction between the US, Japan and China over the post Cold War period 
(Yunling, 1997: 458). This triangular structure consists of three sets of bilateral 
relations between China and the US, the US and Japan and between China and Japan 
which are tightly interconnected. Changes in one set of bilateral relations strongly 
affect both of the others, and consequently have an extended impact on outcomes in 
the international system as a whole (Yunling, 1997: 458). Yunling notes that relations 
between the US, Japan and China embody common interests and potential 
contradictions. In terms of commonalties, the three states share a wide base of 
economic and security interests in maintaining regional stability (Yunling, 1997: 458). 
There are also contradictions because trilateral relations are "out of balance" - the 
United States seeks regional hegemony, Japan is a would-be superpower which needs 
US support but does not like US control, and China is a rising power that will not 
accept US dominance in the region (Yunling, 1997: 459-460). However, he suggests 
that the triangular structure of interaction which exists between the three sets of 
bilateral relations is such that it can contain these contradictions. This is because no 
one state can balance against the structure generated by the other two sets of bilateral 
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relations. Attempting to isolate one state would drive it closer to the third, thus 
proving counterproductive. By contrast a strategy of co-operation with the same state 
reinforces the other two sets of bilateral relations by making it harder for any one of 
them to attempt to balance against the overall structure. The result is a self-reinforcing 
triangular pattern of interaction between the three sets of bilateral relations. 
Yunling demonstrates his claims by working through the consequences of changes in 
each set of bilateral relationships for patterns of behaviour within the other two. He 
begins by examining the consequences of a deterioration in Sino-US relations initiated 
by the US. Under these conditions, "China may try to improve Sino-Japanese 
relations to ease the pressure from bad Sino-US relations. Japan would then be faced 
with a difficult choice: it may, in deference to the US, maintain a tough attitude 
towards China, but this risks a deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations. .... (In 
consequence) Japan may instead decide to lean towards China, exerting pressure on 
the US" (Yunling, 1997: 461). Pursuit of such a strategy. would therefore prove 
counter-productive for the US. Similarly, Japan is constrained by the way in which 
"(b)ad US-Japanese relations ... bear upon Sino-US relations. Both the US and China 
may exert pressure on Japan by developing their bilateral relations" (Yunling, 
1997: 461). Finally, Sino-Japanese relations affect Sino-US and US-Japan relations. In 
particular, "(w)hen Sino-Japanese ties are close, the US becomes alert and might force 
Japan to loosen its ties with China. Sino-Japanese relations are thus constrained by 
Sino-US relations: the US will not allow Sino-Japanese relations to influence Sino-US 
relations" (Yunling, 1997: 461). Furthermore, Yunling analyses the consequences of 
these three sets of interacting bilateral relations for their likely strategic choices. The 
United States is likely to pursue the option of "(s)imultaneously developing relations 
with both China and Japan. The US would seek to maintain the US-Japan Alliance 
and develop strategic relations with China, pulling her `into the network' and using 
relations with China to check Japan" (Yunling, 1997: 462). For Japan, the logical 
strategy in "(m)aintaining the US-Japan alliance while developing stable relations 
with China. The critical issue here is how Japan handles the US-Japan alliance. If 
Japan uses the alliance with the US to confront China, the foundation of Sino- 
Japanese relations will be undermined. If instead Japan treats its alliance with the US 
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as a support as it engages with China ... Sino-Japanese friendship will increase" 
(Yunling, 1997: 463). Finally, China is encouraged to pursue a strategy of 
"(s)imulaneously developing relations with the US and Japan and confronting 
neither". This avoids the risks of isolation that arise from allying with either the US or 
Japan to oppose the third party (Yunling, 1997: 464). Overall, Yunling concludes that 
the triangular structure of interaction he identifies "indicates that despite differences 
of interest and differing policy making orientations, the possibility of confrontation or 
antagonism in Sino-US-Japanese relations is relatively low" (Yunling, 1997: 464). 
The emergence of the structure of interaction documented by Yunling's analysis of 
changing Sino-US-Japanese relations strongly conforms to the patterns of behaviour 
predicted by a liberal model of the international system. Liberalism predicts that, with 
the emergence of a critical mass of formally liberal states within the global 
international system since 1989, units have acquired a heightened capacity for 
autonomous action. In a situation where there are three major states, this automatically 
generates an overall configuration of preferences conducive to the formation of a 
triangular structure of interaction along the lines suggested by Yunling. This is 
because the preferences adopted by any one state will be a necessary feature in the 
calculations made in the other two sets of bilateral relationships. As a result, any given 
state in the structure cannot risk alienating the other two by attempting to balance 
against either one of them. Alternatively expressed, each state is influenced by the 
structure of interaction generated by the overall configuration of preferences within 
the system. The result is that, even in a region such as East Asia where patterns of 
interdependence between states are poorly developed and there are large numbers of 
states which articulate non-liberal preferences, the prospects for peaceful change are 
high. 
Yunling's analysis has more specific implications concerning the level and type of 
institutionalisation which takes place between the US, Japan and China, the form their 
relations take, and the sources of power for them. Again, these fit clearly within the 
ranges of behaviour predicted by the liberal model. The structure of interaction 
encourages states to transparently convey a benign set of preferences towards each of 
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the other two states in the triangle. Thus levels of institutionalisation will be higher 
than anticipated by neorealist and institutionalist theory because states are encouraged 
to share information about their underlying strategic intentions towards one another. It 
follows that the type of institutionalisation which will occur in the international 
system will be organised around the diffuse practice of reciprocity through the 
exchange of information about strategic intentions. In terms of the form they take, 
Sino-US-Japanese relations will increasingly be negotiated on the basis of 
independence and equality. Each state is independent in the sense that it has a high 
degree of autonomy of action in the strategic preferences which it articulates. 
However, no one state has complete dominance over the behaviour of the other two in 
their interactions, and as such will be unable to skew the triangle in its favour. The 
overall effect is to promote a balanced set of relations within which each state is an 
equal partner in the trilateral structure. Finally, trust becomes the major source of 
power for states. It enables any one state in the triangle to develop deeply 
institutionalised relations with both the others simultaneously. Neorealism suggests 
that this is not possible for states. Institutionalism holds that, when it is possible, 
institutionalisation will be limited and will only develop around the practice of 
specific reciprocity. Thus sustaining the trust of others enables states to behave in 
ways which otherwise they would not be able to. 
The structure of interaction documented by Yunling in an East Asian context is 
symptomatic of wider global trends which have impacted directly on Germany's 
behaviour. These arise because the configuration of preferences in the international 
system as a whole is overwhelmingly dominated by a core of formally liberal 
democratic states. Under these conditions, information about states' underlying 
strategic intentions towards one another becomes the key variable affecting 
international behaviour and outcomes. Thus in terms of levels of institutionalisation 
Germany's deeply internalised commitment to multilateralism may be understood as 
falling into alignment with the structure of interaction of the system within which it 
operates. In terms of type of institutionalisation, Germany's appreciation of the 
importance of transparency about its underlying strategic intentions suggests that the 
structure of interaction it faces encourages it to organise its relations with others on 
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the basis of the diffuse practice of reciprocity. Germany has also shown strong signs 
of developing a more active and independent involvement in multilateral institutions, 
and participating on a more equal basis within them. This echoes the form being taken 
by Sino-US-Japanese relations. Finally, Germany has found that the key to developing 
this overall pattern of institutional commitments is sustaining the trust of its partners. 
Sustaining trust about its underlying strategic intentions has allowed it to rethink its 
position on the use of military force abroad and initiate a strategy of differentiated 
integration. These developments have been critical in allowing Germany to sustain its 
reflexive commitment to both NATO and the EU, and in this sense has allowed it to 
develop a pattern of institutionalised ties which it would otherwise have been unable 
to. That is to say, Germany has identified that trust is the major form of power for it in 
the emerging international system. 
The overall pattern of change which emerges at the level of the global international 
system is therefore highly distinctive. Levels of institutionalisation occurring in the 
post Cold War system are high, in contrast to the moderate level of institutionalisation 
anticipated by institutionalist theory and the low levels anticipated by neorealist 
theory. This holds both in Western Europe, and more significantly, in East Asia which 
exists at the core-periphery margin. In terms of the type of institutionalisation, norms 
of diffuse reciprocity increasingly characterise the relationships between the major 
powers within the system. This reflects the way in which states locked into the overall 
structure will be encouraged to reveal information about their underlying strategic 
preferences as a basis for their relations with others in the international system. 
Relationships between states are increasingly negotiated and sustained on the basis of 
independence and equality. At present the involvement of the United States in both 
the Europe and East Asia skews relationships between the major powers. However, 
trends in relations between the US and Germany, Japan and China indicate that the 
US is likely to be encouraged to reduce its participation in both these regions to 
strengthen its relationships with these states. Finally, trust has become the major 
source of power for states in the post Cold War international system. Sustaining the 
trust of others allows states to develop more deeply institutionalised ties with others 
than they would otherwise be capable of doing. These features of the post Cold War 
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international system ultimately arise because it is overwhelmingly dominated by a 
core of formally democratic states. Under these conditions, a structure of interaction is 
generated which, regardless of any particular units' preferences, pushes states towards 
peaceful cooperation. This general pattern of behaviour is best explained with 
reference to the predictions of the liberal model, due to its stress on the configuration 
of state preferences as the key variable affecting state behaviour. 
Reflexivity 
The post Cold War international system is not only distinctive in terms of the 
behaviour of the units and the structure of interaction which exists between them. A 
further general pattern of behaviour may be observed across the three cases examined. 
In particular, Germany, Japan and China each face a major crisis of national identity 
in the face of the changes that have taken place in the international system since 1989. 
This reflects the way in which the distinctive structure generated by the liberal core in 
turn feeds back so as to alter the behaviour of units within the international system. 
Units become socialised to the norms of the dominant core by internalising liberal 
patterns of behaviour, a process which stands in complex relation to the autonomy of 
action they acquire. 
Germany's crisis of national identity reflects the way in which, as the 1990s 
progressed, many of the institutional commitments which had underpinned its 
strategies in the past became increasingly unsustainable. In the initial period of 
adjustment between 1989 and 1991, Germany's reflexively institutionalist preferences 
encouraged it to continue to pursue strategies compatible with the distinctive `post 
national and European' orientation that it had developed over the post-War period. 
However, sustaining the institutional commitments this involved has proved 
impossible for the unified Germany. This has been felt most acutely in relation to 
Germany's participation in the use of military force outside the NATO area, and the 
severe economic pressures placed on Germany by simultaneous broadening and 
deepening of the EU. These issues, particularly the question of the use of military 
force abroad, have raised fundamental questions about the basic way in which 
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Germany defines its `interests' within the international system. In the process of 
redefining its role within NATO and the EU over the 1990s, Germany has taken ,a 
more active approach to managing its international affairs. In turn this has caused 
Germany to make major changes in the way in which it participates in these 
international institutions, a process which has raised uncomfortable questions for it 
about the extent of its independence as an actor and its `normalisation' within the 
international system. However, it is important to recognise that through the process of 
change Germany has actually strengthened its commitment to multilateralism. By 
altering the terms of its participation in international institutions, Germany has 
attempted to increase the degree of reciprocity they embody. As a result, its preference 
for multilateralism has evolved in a norm governed fashion, reflecting an active and 
reflexive process of adaptation rather than a passive policy reflex. Whilst Germany 
has altered the procedures through which it participates in international institutions, it 
has done so precisely in order to preserve their basic underlying normative fabric. 
Japan's predicament mirrors the one facing the unified Germany in the sense that the 
distinctive strategies it developed after World War II have proven increasingly 
inappropriate to its position within the international system during the 1990s. The 
mercantile realist preferences that Japan has articulated over the period since 1989 
reflect the central tenets of the Yoshida doctrine, originally developed in the 1950's. 
As the 1990s have progressed, the domestic underpinnings of the Yoshida strategy 
have been rapidly corroded in response to the changes which have taken place in the 
international system. Two major developments have made this trend increasingly 
apparent. The first came in 1993, with the demise of the Liberal Democratic Partyas 
the party of government for the first time since it was founded in the 1950's. The 
second came in 1998, when recession meant that structural problems with Japan's 
system of economic management became apparent. Behind these trends were 
pressures for Japan to adopt a more active political role in the world, and to liberalise 
its economy. Taken together, these changes indicate the extent to which Japan's 
mercantile realist strategic preferences are increasingly out of line with the overall 
trajectory of change in the international system. They have raised significant questions 
about the way in which Japan defines its national interests, and its sense of purpose 
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and identity in the international system. At the root of this crisis of identity is a search 
for a legitimate Japanese nationalism and a new, non-exclusively economic role in the 
world. 
China's crisis of identity has been reflected directly in the distinctive foreign policy 
preferences it has articulated over the period since 1989. Over the 1990s, China has 
intensified realist foreign policy discourse and behaviour in response to the threat 
posed to its political regime by the consequences of growing international 
interdependence. The initial impetus to the process came after the Tiananmen Square 
massacre in 1989, when the Chinese elite first came to realise the extent of the 
challenge to its political authority posed by domestic changes begun in the mid- 
1970's. In this sense China's identity realist foreign policy preferences are a result of 
the domestic political challenges it faces in terms of the changes brought by economic 
and social modernisation and domestic challenges to the legitimacy of Communist 
party authority. However, the international context China has faced since the end of 
the Cold War is equally important in explaining the largely symbolic or performative 
nature of China's realpolitik behaviour. China's identity realism is the product of the 
most distinctive features of the post Cold War international system in terms of the 
absence of a clear direct threat to China, and China's inability to pursue traditional 
realist balancing strategies in the face of the structure of interaction generated by the 
liberal core. China's crisis of national identity in the post-1989 period is therefore 
intimately bound up with its failure to abandon its realist foreign policy orientation, 
and internalise liberal norms through a process of socialisation. 
In each case examined, the crisis of identity confronted by the state penetrates deeply 
into the very fabric of its domestic political constitution. In particular, the identity 
crisis faced is intimately related to powerful decentralising tendencies operating both 
above and below the level of the state. In the case of Germany, this trend has been 
reflected in the `Europeanisation' of the state in terms of both pervasive procedural 
adaptations and a constitutionally prescribed institutional programming for further 
involvement in the integration process by all public political institutions. This has 
resulted in the participation of Germany in an emerging mutli-tiered pattern of 
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governance in Europe, linking the Lander and supra-national institutions. It has been 
reinforced by Germany's pursuit of a variable geometry Europe as a means of 
resolving the potential contradictions . of pursuing a strategy of broadening and 
deepening the EU in tandem. This has led to an increasingly close institutional fit 
between Germany's federal constitution and the emerging patchwork of European 
institutions operating around the principle of subsidiarity (see especially Goetz, 1996). 
In the case of Japan, decentralising trends are evident in the need for it to internalise 
the norms of regional and global international institutions, particularly those of an 
economic nature. This demands increasing openness to the international economy, 
creating related pressures for political decentralisation. Politicians such as* Ichiro 
Ozawa identified as `normalisation nationalists' within Japan are not associated with 
demands for increased centralisation of the Japanese state, but instead advocate a 
vision of the Japanese nation compatible with the devolution of state power both 
upwards and downwards (see especially Nakano, 1998). 
However, it is in China that decentralising tendencies have developed most clearly in 
the sense that they present a serious and direct challenge to the state's formal political 
authority. Trends towards informal federalisation in China have become chronic over 
the 1990s, arising from its nationalities problem in the provinces, the growing 
participation of its coastal regions into the world economy, and the integration of 
Hong Kong, Macao and perhaps in future Taiwan into the PRC along the `One China 
Two Systems' model. In consequence, the Chinese state finds itself devolving power 
both upwards and downwards in a trend which mirrors closely what, in a 
German/European context, is referred to as multi-level governance (see especially 
Segal, 1994). It is therefore possible to identify powerful decentralising trends in the 
case of each country examined, even, and indeed especially, in the `hard case' 
provided by a regime which is formally authoritarian and undemocratic, and operates 
in a region where networks of formal international institutions are not well developed. 
This reflects the close connections which exist between deep seated changes taking 
place in the internal identity structures of the cases examined and pressures arising 
directly from the overall nature of change in the international system. Decentralising 
trends in Germany, Japan and China are symptomatic of the wider crisis of identity 
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engendered by the need for it to internalise increasingly liberal norms as a basis for 
their international interactions. They signal an increasingly reflexive interaction 
between the internal and external dimensions of politics required by trends in the 
international system. Moreover, it is important to recognise that these changes are 
occurring as much informally and in response to considerations of political power as 
they are through constitutional processes. In the case of Germany, decentralisation has 
been formalised and actively encouraged by statesmen as a means to increase political 
legitimacy and participation in international institutions. However, the case of China 
reveals the extent to which devolution is a structural response to the shifts taking place 
in the internal identity structures of states as they come under increasing pressure to 
internalise liberal norms. 
As well as penetrating deeply into the domestic political constitution of each of the 
cases examined, there are also strong parallels between the. underlying historical 
process through which Germany, Japan and China have experienced their crisis of 
national identity. In particular, the responses of all three states to the end of the Cold 
War embody a high degree of historicity, understood as a process of adjustment 
informed by past patterns of behaviour. Each state defined its initial reaction to the 
sudden and largely unexpected changes that occurred in the international system 
between 1989 and 1991 in terms of cues provided by the strategies they had pursued 
over the post-War period. In adjusting to change, Germany sought to protect the 
institutional commitments it developed under the shelter of the Cold War. Similarly, 
the principles of the Yoshida Doctrine have heavily influenced Japan's response to the 
post-1989 transition. In the case of China, foreign policy elites have attempted to 
behave in ways which preserve and shore up the `traditional' sense of national identity 
it developed prior to 1989. However, historicity is an active process which implies not 
simply passive or path dependent change, but also the adjustment of past practices to 
fit changed circumstances. As the 1990s have progressed it has become apparent that 
policy reflexes established in the past need to be revised in the light of changes which 
have taken place in the international system. Germany has found that to sustain its 
deep commitment to multilateralism, it had to take on a more independent and active 
role in international institutions than it had in the past. By adjusting past policies to its 
, 
tos 
present needs, Germany's strategies have evolved coherently, and it has been able to 
take positive steps towards resolving the crisis of identity transition it has faced since 
1989. Indeed, Germany has discovered that this process of reflexive adjustment can be 
empowering for it, if managed appropriately. By contrast, over the 1990s Japan and 
China have proved more reluctant to confront and resolve the problems generated by 
the altered international circumstances they face. The result is that the strategies they 
have pursued have become increasingly incoherent in response to change, and they 
have faced an ongoing crisis of national identity in the post Cold War period. 
The historicity evident in the responses Germany, Japan and China have made to the 
end of the Cold War reflects the way in which they have dealt with the high degree of 
autonomy of action they have acquired in the post Cold War period. Cues provided by 
past patterns of behaviour became the most obvious point of reference for states in 
formulating their post Cold War strategies. The distinctive preferences they built up 
over the post War period therefore heavily influenced their initial responses to the end 
of the Cold War. However, the autonomy of action acquired by units in turn fed into 
the structure of interaction within the international system, generating powerful 
pressures for each of them to become socialised to the dominant norms of the liberal 
core and participate more fully in its multilateral frameworks. Under these 
circumstances, units were encouraged to alter established patterns of behaviour, and 
make a more independent and active contribution to international institutions than in 
the past. Their capacity for autonomous action was thereby further enhanced in the 
sense that each unit is required to become more self-reflexive in the way it defines its 
interests and constructs its strategic identity within the international system. As they 
came under pressure to internalise liberal norms, units were encouraged to continually 
monitor and revise their behaviour as part of an ongoing process of transformation in 
the international system. Relatedly, each unit requires a more reflexive construction of 
its sense of national identity as a basis for its post-Cold War state strategies. In the 
past, Germany and Japan and China either actively suppressed their sense of national 
identity, or defined it largely in opposition to competing states. Today, these states 
require a sense of national identity compatible with making a full and independent 
contribution to an international community in which relationships between states are 
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increasingly negotiated and sustained on the basis of trust and equality between 
partners. 
Patterns of identity construction taking place within the international system in turn 
come to reinforce the liberal configuration of preferences within the international 
system, thereby strengthening the overall trajectory of socialisation within it. The 
international system itself comes to embody higher and higher levels of reflexivity as 
the increasingly reflexive behaviour on the behalf of units within the system further 
reinforces the structure of interaction provided by the liberal core, which in turn feeds 
back so as to increase unit autonomy. This process is depicted in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1 
Reflexivity In the International System 
Increased unit 
autonomy 





With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a critical mass of liberal states has been 
reached in the international system. As a consequence, the democratic peace begins to 
develop powerful socialisation effects because the structure of interaction within the 
international system as a whole is overwhelmingly dominated by the liberal core. The 
socialisation effects generated by the core encourage states at the margins of change to 
adopt shifts in their underlying identity, a process which in turn feeds into the 
properties of the system. Overall, the system continually reconstitutes itself through 
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an ongoing process of transformation which defines a self reinforcing positive 
feedback loop. 
Given the overtly critical methodological stance adopted by the literature, it is 
important to recognise the relationship which exists between the expansion of 
reflexivity in the international system documented by this thesis and the professional 
discourse on foreign policy within the discipline of international relations. The 
methodological premise of this thesis is that the survey of the foreign policy literature 
upon which this thesis is draws to substantiate its empirical claims develops a double 
hermeneutic - it consists not just of works `about' the foreign policy of each of the 
states concerned, but also actively helps to constitute their strategies. The purpose of 
adopting this premise is to sensitise the research to the constitutive functions played 
by the professional discourse on international relations. Having adopted this 
methodological premise, a final conclusion which may be drawn by this thesis is that 
the foreign policy literature upon which the empirical findings of this thesis is based is 
itself both symptomatic and constitutive of the reflexivity in the international system 
it identifies. In an international system characterised by high levels of reflexivity, the 
routine incorporation of expert foreign policy analysis into the strategic practices of 
states becomes intimately intertwined with the ongoing transformation of the 
international system taking place. Similarly, the literature itself can and routinely does 
play a role in bringing about, or hindering, the process of transformative change in 
patterns of behaviour and outcomes in the international system. 
- The most prominent example of where the former has occurred is in the debates 
surrounding the 1995 review of US security policy in East Asia, or the Nye report 
(Office Of International Security Affairs, 1995). The Nye report, which concluded 
that the US should maintain its forward defence presence in the East Asia region as a 
basis for multilateralism, is so-called because it was supervised by the prominent 
institutionalist Joseph Nye. Its conclusions follow logically from institutionalist 
international relations theory, which suggests that in the absence of a situation of 
complex interdependence in the East Asia region, the US presence is a necessary 
precondition for international institutions to take on instrumental value for key states 
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in the region. The report has been enormously influential in shaping the responses of 
both Japan and China to the post Cold war international system. One of the key 
objectives of the report was to develop Japan as a non-military or `civilian power' in 
the East Asia region, a policy which in practice strongly coincides with Japan's 
mercantile realist orientation. It has influenced China by encouraging the US to 
develop an engagement strategy as part of the development of multilateralism in the 
East Asia region. Furthermore, the Nye report has also exerted a more subtle and 
indirect impact on patterns of interaction which have taken place between Japan and 
China. The low political profile that the Nye Report encourages Japan to adopt has 
helped it to foster good economic relations with China, despite China's rising military 
capabilities and political influence in the region. 
The Nye report and its implications have been widely discussed in the foreign policy 
literature over the 1990s, both before and after its formal publication in 1995. The 
report has its intellectual precursors in a series of influential articles published by 
Hans Maull, Yoshi Fubabashi and Nye himself in the journals Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Policy in the early 1990s (Maull, 1991; Funabashi, 1991; Funsbashi, 1992; 
Nye, 1992). These analysts developed the idea that the United States should pursue a 
policy of maintaining Germany and Japan as civilian powers, a strategy which, it was 
argued, was suited to an emerging international system characterised by multi-level 
interdependence. The articles responded to those articulating the view, broadly 
compatible with neorealist international relations theory, that the end of the Cold War 
would encourage Germany and Japan to adopt increasingly hostile relations with the 
United States in the post Cold War period. In so doing, they were themselves the 
consequence of the wider debate about the role Germany and Japan would play in the 
post Cold War international system which was occurring in the foreign policy 
literature in the early 1990s. The articles proved enormously influential, and are 
routinely referred to in the foreign policy literature of the period. The publication of 
the Nye report in 1995 was itself accompanied by the publication of an influential 
article in Foreign Affairs setting out and justifying the strategy (Nye, 1995). 
Moreover, at the point at which it became incorporated into US foreign policy, the 
report become the object of routine analysis and criticism throughout the foreign 
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policy literature on states behaviour in the East Asia region. Thus `expert' literature 
become reflexively incorporated into the policy of major powers within the region, a 
development which in turn fed back into the professional discourse about foreign 
policy. 
As well as the theoretical and policy oriented professional discourse affecting the 
strategic practices of major states, the literature surveyed also provides examples of 
where the strategies pursued by states involve making use of the professional foreign 
policy discourse. This trend has been most clearly evident in the case of German 
foreign policy over the 1990s. German policy makers have routinely published articles 
in the professional foreign policy literature in justifying its major strategic initiatives 
over the 1990s, including the reinterpretation of their constitution to allow the use of 
military force abroad and the announcement of a strategy of differentiated integration. 
They have done so not out of academic interest, but as a means of transparently and 
publicly conveying their benign strategic intentions towards. other actors. They are 
cognisant of the way in which sustaining the trust of other actors is a major source of 
power for Germany in the international system in the sense that it allows Germany to 
retain its deep commitment to multilateralism whilst simultaneously developing 
greater flexibility in its pattern of institutionalised behaviour. Use of the literature in 
this manner is also apparent in an East Asian context. Publications such as Shinn's 
Council of Foreign Relations pamphlet on conditional engagement with China and the 
Abramowitz et al track two publication on trilateral relations between China, the US 
and Japan taking place as part of the ARF security dialogue both reflect and identify 
the importance of transparency between the major actors in the Asia Pacific region 
(Shinn, 1995; Abramowitz et al, 1998). Moreover, as was stressed in the discussion of 
these publications in chapters on Japan and China, the information about states' 
intentions towards one another they disclose is not of incidental to the conduct of 
states in the region, but addresses issues of crucial importance to their routine conduct 
towards one another. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union became apparent did 
the international system reach a point of criticality after which states achieved a 
heightened capacity for autonomous action within it. Under these conditions, 
information about states intentions towards one another took on special significance 
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for the constitution of international behaviour and outcomes. As a result, the foreign 
policy literature took on a historically distinctive role as a potential source of power 
for states because it provides a means of disclosing benign intentions transparently to 
other actors. Finally,. it is important to recognise that the use of the professional 
literature of transparently convey information about states intentions towards one 
another itself provides knowledge that feeds back into theories of the international 
system, posing anomalies for neorealist and institutionalist approaches and supporting 
liberal claims about the importance of state preferences in the constitution of 
international outcomes. 
These examples serve to highlight both the general involvement of the foreign policy 
literature in a double hermeneutic, and the historically specific way in which the 
foreign policy literature has been drawn into the process of transformation that has 
been taking place in the international system since 1989. At the level of the general 
involvement of the literature in a double hermeneutic, the examples demonstrate the 
way in which it is impossible to draw a clear distinction between professional 
theorising about international relations, expert analysis and commentary on foreign 
policy, and states' strategic practices. The majority of the literature on the state 
strategies of Germany, China and Japan is oriented towards providing expert analysis 
and commentary which will be relevant to decisions being made by policy makers. 
However, this literature routinely draws upon theoretical concepts of a contested 
nature, either implicitly or explicitly. For example, the term `international system' 
appears throughout the foreign policy literature surveyed, whether or not the 
theoretical assumptions this terms carries are clearly specified. Indeed, it is virtually 
impossible to discuss relations between the strategies of the three states examined 
without some reference to the general patterns of interaction through which they 
conduct their affairs. Furthermore, the literature also enters into foreign policy 
practices. Although the degree to which any one piece influences behaviour varies, in 
general the literature is routinely incorporated into wider public and elite debates 
about foreign policy. In consequence there is no clear, discernible distinction between 
'primary' and `secondary' literature on the state strategies analysed because the 
secondary literature shades off into advice incorporated into policy. In the same way 
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that it is not possible to draw a clear distinction between professional theorising about 
international relations and advice to policy makers in the case of any one particular 
article, the line between what constitutes `policy advice' and policy practice' is also 
blurred in any particular instance. Thus it is important to acknowledge that the 
positive knowledge produced in foreign policy literature, and upon which the 
empirical findings of this thesis is based, routinely serves to organise the patterns of 
behaviour being reported upon. It both reflects and contributes to a much broader 
professionalised and routinised process of theoretical and empirical reflection on state 
strategies the post Cold War international system with which it is intimately bound up 
with as both cause and consequence. 
At the level of the specific way in which the foreign policy literature has been drawn 
into the process of transformation that has been taking place in the international 
system since 1989, the examples serve to illustrate the involvement of the literature in 
the reflexivity documented by the thesis. This thesis has identified the way in which 
the changes which have taken place in the international system since 1989 have 
encouraged states to reflect on their identity as actors and reflexively adjust their 
strategic preferences in line with the dramatically altered overall trajectory of 
international change. However, it is important to recognise that the foreign policy 
literature itself is intimately bound up with this process of reflection and adjustment. 
For example, the findings of this thesis identify important limitations in the advice 
offered by the Nye report. The US forward defence presence in East Asia has 
frustrated the emergence of a more equal and balanced set of trilateral relations 
between the US, Japan and China, and prevented the development of transparency in 
relations between the US and Japan and the US and China. This is because the highly 
asymmetrical relations it promotes between the US and Japan directly encourages 
Japan to continue with its mercantile realist orientation, and promotes inconsistency in 
principles of engagement with China. The expert advice offered by the Nye report 
represents knowledge which has been incorporated into the historically specific 
process of transformation which has taken place in the international system since 
1989. It has been drawn into the reflexivity documented by this thesis in the sense that 
it has inhibited rather than facilitated the process of transformation taking place in the 
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international system. This stands in direct contrast to the manner in which literature 
published by German statesmen and policy makers has been incorporated into 
reflexivity in the international system. By using the literature to transparently convey 
their benign intentions towards other states has empowered Germany, and played a 
major role in promoting systemic transformation since the end of the Cold War. 
Conversely, the knowledge generated by this thesis is itself part of the reflexivity in 
the international system it identifies. This thesis has contributed to the critical 
evaluation of the existing body of positive knowledge within the discipline of 
international relations. Critical activity of this kind is itself inherently theoretical in 
the sense that it involves probing deeply into fundamental assumptions about the 
possibility for action in the international system. Thus the counter productive nature 
of the strategy suggested by Nye points up limitations in his underlying assumptions 
about the nature and constitution of the international system. Similarly, by 
appreciating the significance of using the foreign policy literature to clarify 
Germany's strategic intentions towards its major partners, German statesmen and 
policy makers have posed anomalies to both neorealist and institutionalist 
international relations theory. However, criticism is not a wholly negative process 
aimed solely at highlighting the limitations of existing knowledge. It necessarily 
involves reconstruction and reconceptualisation of basic theoretical categories in order 
to identify sources of transformation. In this way, it reflexively feeds back into 
positive research about the overall nature of change in the post Cold War international 
system. In so doing it promises to both enlighten policy makers about possible sources 
of transformative change, and to become a major source of power for them in 
formulating their strategies. In turn, this highlights the significance of adopting a 
critical methodological stance as a prerequisite to the successful identification of 
positive trends in the post Cold War international system of interest to both 
professional social scientists and policy analysts and makers. The dramatic and largely 
unexpected nature of the changes which have taken place in the international system 
since 1989 have opened up fundamental questions about the overall nature of 
international change at the turn of the century. By examining how major states have 
responded to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, this thesis 
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has challenged prevailing conceptions of the overall nature of change in the post Cold 
War international system. Thinking differently about international relations after the 
Cold War may enable statesmen and policy makers to make full use of the new 
opportunities presented to them in the emerging international system. 
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